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CAMPBELLS  POPULAR  HANDBOOKS. 


HANDBOOK  OF  ENGLISH  SYNONYMS; 

WITH  AN  APPENDIX 
SHOWING    THE    CORRECT    USES    OF    PREPOSITIONS. 

By   LOOMIS  J.   CAMPBELL. 
160  pages.     Neat  cloth  binding.     Price  50  cents.     Mailed  on  receipt  of  the  money. 
This  compact  little  volume  contains  about  40,000  synonymous  words  printed  in 
clear,  distinct  type. 

It  is  a  work  which  will  substantially  aid  speakers,  writers,  teachers,  and  students,  — 
in  fact,  all  who  would  gain  a  more  copious  vocabulary,  and  increase  their  power  of 
expression. 

It  includes  the  really  important  matter  of  the  more  bulky  volumes  which  arc  com- 
monly sold  for  two  dollars  or  more. 
A  great  choice  of  words  is  here  placed  at  the  service  of  the  writer  and  the  speaker. 
The  Appendix,  containing  "  Prepositions  Compared  and  Discriminated,"  and  "  A 
List  showing  what  Prepositions  to  use  after  Certain  Words,"  is  a  trustworthy  guide  in 
a  great  number  of  cases  of  doubtful  usage.     A  writer's  knowledge  of  English  idiom 
and  his  style  are  best  shown  by  his  use  of  these  little  hinges  of  the  language. 
From  the  Boston  Jonrttal,  April  S,  /SSr. 
"  It  is  prepared  on  the  }>tnltii»i  in  parvo  principle,  and  it  would  not  be  easy  to  find 
a  book  of  its  size  which  contains  more  information  of  a  useful  sort.     Clearly  printed 
and  well  arranged,  it  is  adapted  to  help  any  one  who  writes  much,  to  enrich  his  vocab- 
ulary, vary  his  expressions,  and  .secure  accuracy  in  conveying  his  thought.     The  appen- 
dix, explaining  and  illustrating  the  correct  use  of  different  prepositions,  is  a  particularly 
valuable  feature." 

From  the  Journal  p/ Education,  Boston,  April,  1881. 
"  For  writers  and   teachers  this  is  one  of  the  most  useful  and  convenient  Hand- 
books of  Synonyms  we  have  ever  seen." 

PRONOUNCING    HANDBOOK 

OF  WORDS  OFTEN  MISPRONOUNCED,  AND  OF  WORDS   AS   TO 
WHICH  A  CHOICE  OF  PRONUNCIATION  IS  ALLOWED. 

By  LOOMIS  J.  CAMPBELL  and  RICHARD  SOULE. 
Price  50  cents.     Cheap  edition,  35  cents.     Mailed  on  receipt  of  the  money. 
Designed  to  report  the  Current  Usage  of  the  Best  Speakers,  after  a  careful 
comparison  of  those  bulky  standards 

WEBSTER    AND    WORCESTER, 
and  due  consultation  with  the  works  of  the  best  English  lexicographers  and  orthoe- 
pists.     Also,  to   record  such  Words  as  May  be  Pronounced  in  either  of  Two 
Ways  without  offence  to  good  taste. 

It  is  Concise,  Explicit,  and  Wastes  no  Words.  We  venture  the  prediction 
that  Ninety-nine  Persons  out  of  every  Hundred  who  should  look  the  book 
through  would  be  greatly  surprised  to  find  how  many  words  they  are  mispronouncing 
every  day. 

It  is  adapted  for  use  as  a  text-book  for  schools,  and  has  already  found  its  way  into 
a  large  number. 

This  book  is  a  standard  authority  upon  the  subject  of  pronunciation,  and  an  inval- 
uable aid  to  teachers. 

From  hundreds  of  testimonials  as  to  accuracy,  usefulness,  and  h.andiness,  we  have 
room  but  for  the  following  as  specimens  :  —  _         _ 

From  Wm.  A.  Wheeler,  Editor  of  Webster's  Series  of  Dictionaries: 
"  This  Handbook  really  meets  a  public  want  which  has  never  been  adequately  met 
before." 

Prof.  W.  D.  Whitney,  Yale  College: 
"  I  should  think  it  would  attract  general  attention,  and  fill  the  needs  of  many." 
"  The  editors  have  performed  their  work  with  judgment  and  good  taste,  and  it  will 
be  found  a  very  desirable  assistant  in  an  essential  accomplishment." 

—  T/te  Christian  Intelligencer. 


».* 


Sold  by  all  booksellers,  atid  sent  by  mail,  postpaid,  on  receipt  of  price. 

LEE  AND  SHEPARD,  Publishers,  47  Franklin  Street,  Boston. 


ENGLISH 
SYNONYMS    DISCRIMINATED 


BY 

RICHARD   WHATELY    D.D. 

ARCHBISHOP   OF    DUBLIN 


Beta  ©Uition 


^i 


^    ^ 


BOSTON 
LEE   AND   SHEPARD,   PUBLISHERS 

NEXT   OLD   SOUTH    MEETING-HOUSE 

No.  10  Milk  Street 


^\'^^ 


EDITOR'S    PREFACE. 


This  little  work  has  been  carefully  revised  by  me, 
throughout;  and  though  I  am  far  from  presuming 
to  call  it  perfect,  it  is,  I  am  confident,  very  much 
the  best  that  has  appeared  on  the  subject. 

Of  the  importance  of  that  subject  itself,  very 
different  opinions  will  probably  be  found  to  exist. 
Some  advantage,  indeed,  all  will  acknowledge,  in 
the  cultivation  of  correctness  and  precision  in  our 
expressions.  But  the  importance  of  this,  and  of 
all  that  relates  to  language,  will  be  much  less 
highly  estimated  by  those  who  have  adopted  the 
metaphysical  theory  of  ideas,  and  who  consider 
the  use  of  language  to  be  merely  the  convening' 
our  meaning  to  others,  than  by  those  who  adhere 
to  the  opposite  —  the  nominalist  —  view,  (which  I 
have  set  forth  in  the  Introduction  to  the  Logic, 
§  8,)  and  who  accordingly  regard  words  —  or  some 
kind  of  signs  equivalent  to  words  —  as  an  indis- 
pensable instrument  of  thought,  in  all  cases,  where 
a  process  of  reasoning  takes  place. 

Richard  Dublin. 

[31 


PREFACE,   BY  THE   AUTHOR. 


In  offering  a  collection  of  synonyms  to  the  public, 
a  few  words  of  explanation  may  be  necessary. 

It  is  scarcely  needful  to  remind  the  reader  that 
the  word  '  synonym '  is,  in  fact,  a  misnomer,  as 
applied  to  words  of  the  description  in  question. 
Literally,  it  implies  an  exact  coincidence  of  mean- 
ing in  two  or  more  words :  in  which  case  there 
would  be  no  room  for  discussion  ;  but  it  is  generally 
applied  to  words  which  would  be  more  correctly 
termed  psetido-synonyms  —  i.  e.,  words  having  a 
shade  of  difference,  yet  with  a  sufficient  resem- 
blance of  meaning  to  make  them  liable  to  be  con- 
founded together.  And  it  is  in  the  number  and 
variety  of  these  that  (as  the  Abbe  Girard  well 
remarks)  the  richness  of  a  language  consists.  To 
have  two  or  more  words  with  exactly  the  same 
sense,  is  no  proof  of  copiousness,  but  simply  an 
inconvenience.  A  house  would  not  be  called  well 
furnished  from  its  having  a  much  larger  number  of 
chairs  and  tables  of  one  kind  than  were  needed, 
1*  [5] 


PREFACE. 


but  from  its  having  a  separate  article  for  each  dis- 
tinct use.  The  more  power  we  have  of  discrimi- 
nating the  nicer  shades  of  meaning,  the  greater 
facility  we  possess  of  giving  force  and  precision 
to  our  expressions.  Our  own  language  possesses 
great  advantages  in  this  respect;  for  being  partly 
derived  from  the  Teutonic,  and  partly  from  the 
Latin,  we  have  a  large  number  of  duplicates  from 
the  two  sources  ;  which  are,  for  the  most  part,  though 
not  universally,  slightly  varied  in  theh'  meaning. 

These  slight  variations  of  meaning  add  to  the 
copiousness  of  the  English  language,  by  affording 
words  of  more  and  less  familiarity,  and  of  greater 
and  less  force.  This  may  be  easily  understood,  if 
we  consider  that  the  branch  of  the  Teutonic,  spoken 
in  England  during  the  Anglo-Saxon  period,  never 
became  extinct,  but  that  three  fourths  of  the  Eng- 
lish language  at  present  consist  of  words  altered 
or  derived  from  that  ancient  dialect;  that  these 
words  usually  express  the  most  familiar  ideas,  such 
as  man,  house,  land,  &c. ;  and  that  the  French  terms 
gradually  introduced,  being  those  of  a  more  highly 
civilized  people,  were  adapted  to  express  the  more 
refined  ideas.  This  is  true  even  of  physical  objects  ; 
thus,  for  instance,  most  of  the  names  of  the  animals 
used  for  food  are  still  Teutonic,  such  as  ox,  sheep, 
swine,   &c.      The    Anglo-Saxons,    like    the   modem 


PREFACE. 


Germans,  had  no  objection  to  say  ox-fleshy  shcep' 
Jlesh,  swine^s-flesh,  —  but  the  Norman  conquerors, 
inti'oducing  a  more  refined  cookery,  introduced  with 
it  French  words  for  the  flesh  of  the  animal ;  hence 
we  have  beef,  mutton,  pork* 

"We  have  entirely  lost  such  compounds  as  ox-fiesh, 
sheep-flesh,  but  we  still  retain  swine' s-flesh,  with  a 
peculiar  modification  of  meaning,  when  we  speak 
of  it  as  one  of  the  meats  prohibited  f  by  the  Mosaic 
Law.  in  which  case  it  is  plain  that  it  presents  to  the 
mind  a  gross  idea,  which  pork  docs  not. 

In  the  case  of  such  duplicates  as  have  no  assign- 
able difference,  it  may  happen,  from  the  mere  fact 
of  the  greater  or  less  familiarity  which  one  word 
presents  to  the  mind,  that  although  it  be  in  most 
cases  indifferent  which  we  use,  yet  in  some  instances 
custom,  founded  on  the  facts  above  mentioned, 
makes  a  difference  in  their  employment.  (See  the 
articles  '  Liberty,   Freedom,'  '  Righteous,  Just,'  &c.) 

It  has  not  been  the  design  of  this  work  to  notice 
all  the  synonmys  in  our  language;  which  would, 
indeed,  be  an  almost  endless  task ;  but  merely 
(after  excluding  technical  terms,  and  words  which 
do  exactly  coincide)  to  select  a  few  of  those  groups 

•  See  the  amusing  remarks  on  this  subject  in  the  second   chaptei 
of  Scott's  Ivanhoe. 

t  Isai.  Ixv.  4  ;  Ixvi.  17.     2  Mac.  vi.  18. 


8  PREFACE. 

of  wortls  which  are   in   most  frequent  use,  and  are 
most  liable  to  be  confounded. 

Many  persons  imagine  that  two  words  must  either 
coincide  precisely  in  their  meaning,  so  as  to  be,  in 
the  primary  and  strict  sense  of  the  word,  'synony- 
mous,' or  else  stand  for  two  (more  or  less)  distinct 
things.  Indeed,  it  would  often  be  regarded  as  almost 
a  truism  to  assert  this ;  but  those  who  maintain  such 
an  opinion  overlook  the  fact,  that  two  words,  without 
exactly  coinciding  in  sense,  may  nevertheless  relate 
to  one  and  the  same  thing,  regarded  in  two  dif- 
ferent points  of  view.  An  illustration  of  this  is 
afforded  in  the  relation  which  exists  between  the 
words  '  inference '  and  '  proof.'  Whoever  justly 
infers,  proves ;  and  whoever  proves,  infers :  but  the 
word  '  inference '  leads  the  mind  from  the  premises 
which  have  been  assumed,  to  the  conclusion  which 
follows  from  them:  while  the  word  'proof  follows 
a  reverse  process,  and  leads  the  mind  from  the  con- 
clusion to  the  premises.  We  say,  '  What  do  you 
infer  from  this?'  and  'How  do  you  prove  ihdXl^* 
Another  illustration  may  be  quoted  in  the  synonyms 
'expense'  and  'cost'  —  considered  elsewhere  more 
at  length.     The  same  article  may  be  expensive  and 

*  See  Whately's  Logic,  book  IV.  chap.  iii.  §  1,  in  which  the  above 
is  illustrated  by  the  difference  between  the  road  from  London  to 
Fork,  and  the  road  from  York  to  London. 


PREFACE. 


9 


costly;  but  we  speak  of  expense  in  reference  to  the 
means  of  the  purchaser;  of  cost,  in  reference  to  the 
actual  value  of  the  article. 

We  have  seldom  in  the  following  pages  intro- 
duced,—  what  are  usually  considered  so  closely 
connected  with  the  subject  of  synonyms  as  to 
demand  a  prominent  place  in  a  work  of  this  kind, 
—  namely,  etymologies ;  which  are  generally  ap- 
pended to  every  group  of  synonyms  as  an  almost 
essential  part  of  it. 

But  it  may  be  doubted  whether  this  procedure 
does  not  tend  to  confuse  the  subject  it  was  intended 
to  clear.  The  history  of  the  derivation  of  words 
is,  indeed,  one  which  offers  a  most  interesting  and 
important  field  of  inquiry,  and  one  which  may 
accidentally  throw  light  on  their  meanings  ;  but 
the  two  questions  are  in  themselves  completely 
distinct ;  and,  in  inquiring  into  the  actual  and 
present  meaning  of  a  word,  the  consideration  of 
what  it  originally  meant  may  frequently  tend  to 
lead  us  astray.* 

*  The  following  notice  is  extracted  from  the  Common-place  Book 
of  the  late  Bighop  Copleston  :  — 

*  Words  apparently  synonymous  —  and  really  so  in  the  great  major- 
ity of  instances  —  have  nevertheless  each  an  appropriate  meaning, 
which  on  certain  occasions  is  made  to  appear.  The  propriety  of 
meaning  is  known,  a  priori,  by  the  scholar  who  is  acquainted  with 
the  etymology  of  the  word,  but  the  person  who  has  collected  its 
meaning  only  from   its  use  is  ever  liable  to  mistakes,  and  often  \» 


10  PREFACE. 

It  is  curious,  and  illustrative  of  national  charactei 
and  customs,  to  observe  how  completely  words, 
radically  the  same,  modify  their  meaning  in  the 
various  languages  which  branch  out  from  one  com 
mon  source.  Who  would  expect  to  see  words,  so 
nearly  the  same,  differ  so  widely  in  meaning  as  our 
English  word  altered  (changed,)  the  French  '  aitere,' 
(overheated  or  thirsty,*)  and  the  Italian  '  alterato ' 
(angry) :  and  then,  again,  our  English  word  aller- 
ative,  (a  choice  between  two  courses,)  and  the 
Spanish  '  alternativa,'  (the  social  circle  in  which  a 
person  moves,)  all  these  different  words  springing 
from  the  Latin  'alter'  (another)?  Who  would  sup- 
pose that  the  same  word,  the  French  '  defendre,' 
should  signify  'to  defend'  and  'to  forbid?'  or  that 


the  most  ridiculous  mistakes  ;  because,  perhaps,  in  the  course  of 
his  experience,  it  has  never  been  used  in  such  a  manner  as  to 
demonstrate  its  peculiar  signification.  E.  g..  Benevolence  and  Phi- 
lanthropy are  frequently  synonymous  —  they  might,  nine  times  out  of 
ten,  be  substituted  for  one  another;  and  an  illiterate  person,  recollect- 
ing that  each  term  is  applied  to  characters  and  actions  of  kindness, 
mercy,  and  humanity,  will  indiscriminately  use  them,  even  when  that 
humanity  is  shown  towards  the  brute  creation,  than  which  mistake 
nothing  could  be  more  ludicrous,' 

Many  other  words,  however,  are  now  used  habitually  with  impro- 
priety, as  far  as  regards  etymology,  —  as  wine,  tea,  coffee,  which 
originally  signified  liquors  drawn  from  particular  plants,  and  are  now 
applied  to  any  imitations  of  these  liquors,  as  '  sage-tea,'  ♦  ginger- 
wine.' 

*  It  originally  meant,  altered /or  the  worse  —  then,  angry  or  excited 
—thence,  heated  —  and,  lastly,  thirsty. 


PREFACE.  ll 

one  word,  honesty,  (honnetete,)  should  imply  civility 
in  France,  and  probity  in  England ;  and  another 
(%drtus,)  valor  in  Latin,  and  excellence  in  the  arta 
in    Italian  ?    or   that   the   three    words    '  substantia,' 

*  understanding,'  *  'hypostasis,'  should  all  three  have 
corresponding  origins,  though  so  widely  different  in 
their  signification? 

Again,  it  is  curious  to  observe  what  different  ideas 
originally  suggested  the  words  which  now  mean 
precisely  the  same  thing  in  different  languages. 
The  word  '  Heaven,'  for  instance,  conveyed  with 
it  the  idea  of  something  heaved  or  lifted  up,  as 
also    the  old    word    ' /i/"/,'    and    the    German    ^  lufl. 

*  Ccelum,'  again,  referred  to  something  hollowed 
out  or  vaulted,  being  derived  from  the  Greek  word 
koilon,  hollow,  our  own  word  '  coiled '  being  probably 
of  the  same  origin.  '  A  torrent,'  again,  signified  in 
Latin  a  stream,  which  was  bm'nt  up  in  summer, 
while  the  Greek  word  referred  to  its  flowing  (only) 
in  winter. 

All  these  variations  of  meaning  help  to  elucidate 
national  manners  and  habits  of  thought,  and  as 
such  are  valuable  and  curious ;  but  though  they 
may  occasionally  help  us,  they  must  not  be  allowed 


*  Understanding  (*  ouderstonding ' )  in  Dutch,  is  help.  '  Give  me 
understanding  that  I  may  keep  thy  laiv  '  —  would  to  a  person  com- 
paring Dutch  (as  a  cognate  dialect)  suggest,  '  Give  me  help.' 


12 


PREFACE. 


to  innncni-e  our  decisions  with  respect  to  the  sio-ni- 
fications  of  words.  Our  question  is,  not  what  ought 
to  be,  or  formerly  was,  the  meaning  of  a  word,  but 
what  it  now  is ;  nor  can  we  be  completely  guided 
by  quotations  from  Shakespeare  or  Milton,  or  even 
from  Addison  or  Johnson.  Language  has  under- 
gone such  changes,  even  within  the  last  sixty  or 
seventy  years,  that  many  words  at  that  time  con- 
sidered pure,  are  now  obsolete;  while  others  (of 
which  the  word  '  mob '  is  a  specimen,)*  formerly 
slang,  are  now  used  by  our  best  writers,  and 
received,  like  pardoned  outlaws,  into  the  body  of 
respectable  citizens.  The  standard  we  shall  refer 
to  in  the  present  work,  is  the  sense  in  which  a 
word  is  used  by  the  purest  writers  and  most  cor- 
rect speakers  of  our  own  days. 

A  few  observations  may  be  added  on  the  subject 
of  conjugate  or  paronymous  words;  by  which  is 
meant,  correctly  speaking,  different  parts  of  speech 
from  the  same  root,  which  exactly  correspond  in 
point  of  meaning:  for  example,  the  adjective  'ex- 
pensive '  is  conjugate  or  paronymous  with  the 
substantive  'expense;'  the  verb  'to  restrain'  with 
the  substantive  'restraint,'  &c. 


*  The  word  '  flimsy  '  aflFords  another  instance  of  a  word  which  was 
formerly  a  slang  expression;  it  was  a  corruption  of  film-sy.  It  would 
not  be  found  in  Johnson's  Dictionary. 


PREFACE.  13 

But,  like  the  word  *  synonym,'  this  designation 
has  been  somewhat  corrupted  in  its  use ;  words 
being  called  '  conjugate,'  which  are  in  fact  pseudo- 
conjugate  —  i.  e.,  which  coincide  in  point  of  gram- 
mar and  derivation,  but  not  precisely  in  meaning. 
Such  are  '  sorrow '  and  '  sorry,'  '  fright '  and  '  fright- 
ful,' and   many  others. 

Where  the  conjugates  exactly  and  completely 
correspond,  we  have  sometimes  used  them  indif- 
ferently in  this  work,  as  in  the  instance  of  '  expense ' 
and  '  cost,'  answering  respectively  to  '  expensive  '  and 
'  costly ; '  but  where  there  is  a  shade  of  difference, 
it  has  been  noticed,  as  being  an  important  branch 
of  the  subject. 

In  order  to  avoid  confusion,  we  have  thought  it 
best  to  divide  the  groups  of  synonyms  according 
to  the  parts  of  speech  —  viz.,  into  particles  nouns, 
adjectives,  and  verbs. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 


ADVERBS.  PRONOUNS,  PARTICLES. 

Which,  that  ..... 

In  Bpite  of,  notwithstanding    .... 

While,  though        ..... 

Nearly,  almost  ..... 

Completely,   entirely,  and  > 

Scarcely,  hardly,  J 

With,  thi  ough,  by        .  .  . 

But,  hjwever,  yet,  still,  notwithstanding,  nevertheless 

Also,  too,  likewise,  besides       .... 

Voluntarily,  willingly         .... 

Therefore,  wherefore,  then,  accordingly,  hence,  thence, 
sequently  ...  . 

Because,  since,  inasmuch  as,  for,  as  .  . 

Amid,  amidst,  among,  amongst  .  .  . 

Betwixt,  between  .... 

Though,  although         ..... 

Indeed,  nay      ...... 

Only,  solely,  alone,  merely,  simply 

Except,  excepting,  but,  save    .... 


so,  con- 


Fagi 
21 
22 
28 
23 

23 

24 
26 
26 

27 

28 
29 
81 
81 
82 
32 
83 
84 


VERBS. 

To  allow,  permit,  suffer,  tolerate                .            .            .  .85 

To  confess,  acknowledge,  own,  avow    ....  85 

To  charm,  enchant,  enrapture,  captivate,  facinate,  attract  .       87 

To  contemn,  or  show  contempt,  despise,  scorn,  disdain  .            88 

To  conquer,  subdue,  vanquish,  subjugate              .  ,89 

[16] 


16 


CONTENTS. 


To   ask,   request,   beg,   beseech,  supplicate,  entreat,   implore, 

solicit  .... 

To  bear,  suffer,  endure 
To  puzzle,  perplex,  embarrass       .  . 

To  forbid,  prohibit        ... 
To  guide,  direct,  sway       .  .  . 

To  mislead,  delude        .  .  . 

To  think,  believe,  surmise,  suppose,  presume,  coiyecture 
To  abandon,  desert,  forsake 
To  abdicate,  resign,  relinquish       .  . 

To  distinguish,  discriminate         .        . 
To  teach,  instruct,  inform,  educate 
To  alleviate,  mitigate,  relieve 
To  announce,  proclaim,  declare 
To  renounce,  recant,  adjure         .        . 
To  understand,  to  comprehend 

To  praise,  to  admire,  to  commend,  to  extol,  to  eulogize 
To  promote,  to  forward      .... 
To  be,  to  exist 
To  remark,  to  observe 
To  endue,  to  endow 

To  shun,  avoid,  elude        .  .  . 

To  amaze,  to  astonish  .  . 

To  employ,  to  make  use  of  .  . 

Shall,  will         .... 
To  rend,  to  tear     .... 


Paqi 

40 
41 
41 
42 
42 
48 
48 
45 
45 
46 
46 
48 
48 
49 
50 
50 
51 
61 
52 
52 
52 
68 
64 
64 
66 


ADJECTIVES. 

Civil,  polite,  courteous,  polished,  well-bred 
Graceful,  elegant  .... 

Beautiful,  handsome,  pretty,  lovely,  fine 
Sincere,  honest,  upright  .  .  . 

Wonderful,  strange,  surprising,  admirable,  curious 
Silly,  foolish,  absurd,  weak,  stupid,  simple,  dull 
Joyful,  glad,  pleased,  delighted,  gratified 
Idle,  lazy,  indolent,  slothful  .  . 

Grateful,  thankful  .... 

Fruitless,  useless,  ineffectual,  vain       .  . 


58 
59 
61 
62 
63 
64 
66 
66 
67 
67 


CONTENTS. 


17 


Frank,  open,  candid,  ingenuous    .  .  . 

Rash,  fool-hardy  ..... 

Transient,  transitory,  fleeting        .... 

Bright,  sliiiiing,  sparkling,  brilliant,  glistening,  glittering 

Timid,  cowardly,  timorous,  dastardly         .  . 

Mild,  gentle,  meek,  soft  .  . 

DifFei-ent,  unlike,  dissimilar,  distinct  .  . 

Romantic,  sentimental 

Authentic,  genuine  .... 

Secret,  hidden,  concealed,  covert 

Everlasting,  eternal  .... 

Durable,  lasting,  permanent    . 

Continual,  continuous,  perpetual 

Talkative,  loquacious,  garrulous 

Strong,  powerful,  vigorous,  forcible,  potent 

Inconsistent,  incongruous 

Cruel,  barbarous,  inhuman,  savage 

Sublime,  migiiifioent,  splendid,  grand,  superb 

Pleasing,  agreeable,  pleasant 

Calm,  tranquil,  quiet,  placid  , 

Delightful,  delicious  .... 

Obstinate,  stubborn      .... 

Fickle,  capricious,  variable,  changeable    . 

Deep,  profound  .... 

Weighty,  heavy  .... 

Faultless,  blinialess,  spotless,  innocent      . 

Wicked,  sinful,  criminal,  depraved,  guilty 

Benevolent,  beneficent,  charitable,  munificent,  liberal,  bountiful, 

philanthropic  .... 

Benignant,  kind,  good-natured  .  . 

Neglectful,  negligent  .... 

Absent,  abstracted        .... 
Trifling,  trivial       ..... 
Fatherly,   paternal;   motherly,  maternal;   brotherly,  fraternal; 

kingly,  regal  .... 

Friendly,  amicable        .... 
Righteous,  just       ..... 
CalculateJ,  fit,  suitable,  apt     .  .  . 

Accurate,  exact,  precise     .  .  . 

2* 


18  CONTENTS. 

Pag  a 
Famous,  celebrated,  illustrious,  renowned  .  .      94 

Sly,  cuuiiiiig,  ci-afty,  deceitful  ....  94 

NOUNS. 

Diligence,  industry  .  .  .  .  .  .96 

Contentment,  satisfaction  .....  96 

Anger,  indignation,  displeasure,  resentment  .  97 

Recompense,  reward,  meed       .....  98 

Approval,  approbation       .  .  .  .  .  .99 

Timidity,  bashfulncss,  shyness,  diffidence        ...  99 

Sorrow,  grief,  affliction,  distress,  regret,  sadness,  melancholy      .     ICO 
Fear,  fright,  terror,  alarm,  dread,  apprehension  .  .  102 

Patience,  fortitude,  resignation      .....     105 

Utility,  usefulness         ......  106 

Expense,  cost  .......     106 

Wisdom,  prudence         ......  107 

Self-conceit,  pride,  vanity,  arrogance,  haughtiness  .  .     108 

Eflfects,  consequences,  results  ....  110 

Conflict,  combat,  contest,  contention  .  .  .  .111 

Detestation,    aversion,   antipathy,    dislike,   abhorrence,  hatred, 

repugnance  .  .  .  •  .  .  112 

Enemy,  antagonist,  adversary,  opponent  .  .  .     113 

Reproof,  rebuke,  reprimand,  censure,  remonstrance,  expostula- 
tion, reproach        .  .  .  .  .  .114 

Answer,  reply,  rejoinder  .  .  .  .     116 

Command,  injunction,  order     ....  116 

Deference,  respect,  veneration       .  .  .  .  .117 

Illusion,  delusion  ......  118 

Falsehood,  falsity  .  .  .  .  .  .118 

Deceit,  Deception,  fraud  .....  118 

Admittance,  admission       ......     119 

Compulsion,  coercion,  restraint,  constraint      .  .  .  119 

Determination,  resolution,  decision  .  .  .  .121 

Narration,  narrative,  relation,  accoxmt,  history,  tale  .  .  122 

Display,  show,  parade,  ostentation  ....     123 

Imagination,  conception,  fancy  ....  124 

Conviction,  persuasion        .  .  .  .  .  .     125 

Goodness,  virtue  ......  127 


CONTENTS. 


ly 


Hiuderance,  obstacle,  impediment  . 

Allegiance,  loyalty        .  ...  .  , 

Security,  safety,  surety      .... 

Reformation,  reform    ..... 

Faith,  belief,  certainty        .... 

Forgiveness,  pardon      ..... 

Feelings,  sentiments  .... 

Speech,  or.ation,  harangue,  discovirse  . 

Pity,  compassion,  sympathy  .  .  . 

Modesty,  diffidence,  humility  . 

Austerity,  severity,  rigor,  sternness,  strictness 

Genius,  wisdom,  abilities,  talents,  parts,  ingenuity,  capacity, 
cleverness  ...... 

Fortitude,  courage,  valor,  bravery,  intrepidity,  gaEantry,  hero- 
ism     ...... 

Law,  statute,  rule,  regulation 

Consolation,  comfort,  solace  .  . 

Gift,  present,  donation  .... 

Reason,  cause,  source,  origin        .  .  . 

Self-love,  selfishness      ..... 

Discipline,  trial      ..... 

Attachment,  affection,  tenderness,  fondness,  love,  liking 

Reason,  sense,  understanding        .  . 

Gayety,  liveliness,  animation,  vivacity  . 

Misfortune,  calamity,  disaster        .  . 

Envy,  emulation,  jealously       .... 

Privacy,  retirement,  solitude,  seclusion,  loneliness 

Earth,  world,  globe      ..... 

Profit,  gain,  emolument     .... 

Import,  meaning,  sense  .... 

Amusement,  entertainment,  diversion,  recreation 

Usage,  custom  ..... 

Dexterity,  address,  skill     .... 

Help,  aid,  assistance  .... 

Act,  action,  deed  .... 

Anger,  wrath  ..... 

Tyranny,  despotism  .... 

Liberty,  freedom  .  .  . 

Vestiges,  traces      ..... 


20 


CONTENTS 


Chastisement,  panislimcnt,  penalty 
Project,  design,  scliemc,  plan 
Purpo!<e,  intent,  intention  . 

List,  catalogue  .  . 

Brevity,  conciseness 
Tolerance,  toleration    . 
Confi  lence,  trust,  reliance 
Error,  mistake,  blunder 
Malije,  spite  .  .  , 

Occupation,  business,  avocation 
Novel,  romance      .  .  . 

Povorty,  indigence,  pauperism 
Matter,  subject 

Language,  words,  terms,  expressions 
Suggestion,  hint  .  , 

Moment,  instant 


Paob 
163 
1G4 
164 
165 
166 
166 
166 
167 
167 
168 
168 
169 
170 
170 
171 
171 


SYNONYMS. 


ADVERBS,  PRONOUNS,  AND  PARTICLES. 

WHICH,    THAT. 

'Which  '  and  '  that'  are  very  often  used  synonymously  ; 
but  there  are  some  cases  where  either  particle  might  be 
used,  but  where  the  sense  of  the  whole  would  be  materially 
altered  by  the  choice  made. 

1st.  '  Which '  is  used  in  speaking  of  a  class  generally, 
and  '  that  '  when  we  mean  to  designate  any  particular  indi- 
vidual of  that  class.  For  instance,  in  this  sentence  :  '  A 
person  who  declines  investing  his  money  in  a  railway  specu- 
lation which  is  highly  advantageous,'  we  should  imply  that 
a  railway  speculation  in  general  is  an  advantageous  thing  ; 
but  if  we  say,  '  in  a  railway  speculation  that  is  highly  ad- 
vantageous,' we  mean  that  the  particular  speculation  we  are 
speaking  of  is  so.  Again  :  '  The  South- American  Indians 
make  great  use  of  horses,  which  are  very  serviceable  ani- 
mals.' '  Which,'  here  implies  that  we  are  speaking  of  the 
class  horse  ;  if  we  said  '  that,'  it  would  seem  to  allude  to 
some  individual  horses. 

2dly  (and,  indeed,  this  second  rule  follows  from  the 
first"*.  '  That '  is  applied  to  the  antecedent  immediately  pre- 
ceding the   relative,  and  '  which  '  to  an  antecedent  sentence 

[21] 


22  A    COLLECTIOX    OF 

or  part  of  a  sentence.  For  instance  :  '  I  should  be  unwil- 
ling at  this  juncture  to  introduce  a  new  question  which 
might  raise  objections.'  This  would  imply  that  the  introduc- 
tion of  any  question  might  raise  objections,  whatever  its 
purport  might  be;  if  we  said  '  that  might  raise  objections,'  it 
would  imply  that  this  individual  question  itself  might  raise 
thom. 

IN    SPITE    OF,    NOTWIIHSTANDING. 

*  Notwithstanding  '  is  a  milder  expression  than  '  in  spite 
of.'  '  lu  spite  of  implies  some  decided  obstacles  ♦;o  be 
overcome.  '  Notwithstanding '  simply  indicates  the  pres- 
ence of  some  circumstance  which  may  be  supposed  to  be 
an  impediment.  If  we  say,  '  Notwithstanding  his  youth, 
he  has  made  great  progress  in  his  studies,'  this  would  gener- 
ally imply  that  the  tender  age  which  might  have  been  an 
impediment  to  him,  did  not  prove  to  be  one  ;  but  when  we 
say,  '  In  spite  of  a  bad  education,  his  attainments  are  of  a 
very  high  order,'  we  point  out  that  the  bad  education  was  a 
real  obstacle  and  impediment,  which  he  was  able  to  break 
through  and  overcome,  but  which  could  not  be  regarded  as 
otherwise  than  an  impediment.  They  are,  however,  often 
used  synonymously  ;  but  '  notwithstanding  '  generally  ap- 
plies more  to  negative  hinderances,  passive  difficulties  ;  and 
'  in  spite  of '  to  active  opposition.  We  should  say,  '  He  was 
dragged  along  in  spite  of  his  resistance,'  rather  than  '  not- 
withstanding.' Again,  it  would  be  a  more  polite  form  of 
expression  to  say,  '  Notwithstanding  what  you  have  said,  I 
still  think,'  than  '  In  spite  of  what  you  have  said.' 

To  act  in  spite  of  experience,  is  to  go  against  the  lesson 
it  teaches.  But  if  we  were  to  say,  '  Notwithstanding  his 
experience,  he  acted  thus,'  we  should  imply  that  the  person 
alluded  to  had  not  gained  any  such  lessons  by  his  experi- 
ence. 


ENGLISH    SYNONYMS.  23 


WHILE,    THOUGH. 

'  Though '  implies  more  of  contrast  in  the  parallels  made 
than  '  while.'  For  instance,  we  should  say,  '  While  1 
admire  his  courage,  I  esteem  his  mildness  and  moderation ; ' 
but  '  Though  I  admire  his  courage,  I  detest  his  ferocity.' 
'  While'  might  be  used,  indeed,  in  both  cases,  but 
'  though  '  necessarily  implies  contrast. 

NEARLY,     ALMOST. 

These  words  are  often  used  synonymously,  but  there  is  a 
slight  differenece  between  them  ;  '  nearly  is  applied  rather 
to  questions  of  quantity,  time,  and  space  :  as,  '  It  is  nearly 
eight  o'clock'  —  '  This  child  is  nearhj  ten  years  old'  —  '  1 
walked  nearly  two  miles,'  '  Almost '  might  be  used  in  the 
same  way,  but  it  is  less  frequently  so  employed,  and  more 
commonly  appropriated  to  questions  of  degree ;  as,  for  in- 
stance, '  It  is  almost  as  white  as  snow  '  —  '  He  is  so  plain  as 
to  be  almost  ugly.'  In  this  sense  we  should  not  say  '  near- 
ly.' '  Almost '  is  never  used  with  a  negative.  We  should 
say,  '  She  is  not  nearly  so  handsome  as  her  sister  ;  '  in  this 
case,  '  almost '  could  not  be  applied. 

COMPLETELY,    ENTIRELY.       SCARCELY,    HARDLY. 

These  two  pairs  of  adverbs  bear  very  much  the  same 
relation  to  each  other  as  '  nearly  '  and  '  almost.'  *  Complete- 
ly,' like  '  almost,'  is  used  in  questions  of  degree  ;  '  entirely  ' 
in  those  of  quantity.  They  are  often  used  synonymously, 
but  still  we  should  say,  '  I  am  completely  tired,'  not  '  I  am 
entirely  tired,'  and  '  The  space  was  completely  (not  entirely) 
filled  up.'  '  Scarcely,'  again,  relates  to  quantity  ;  '  hardly  ' 
to  degree.  We  say,  '  He  is  scarcely  ten  years  old,'  '  it  is 
scarcely  a  mile  off ; '  but,  '  I  shall  hardly  be  able  to  finish 
this  work,'  &c. 


24  A    COLLECTION    OF 


WITH,    THROUOn,    BY. 

'  By '  and  '  with '  are  in  many  cases  used  synonymously, 
but  there  arc  also  many  cases  in  which  they  convey  a  dis- 
tinct meaning  to  the  mind. 

Whenever  a  certain  effect  is  implied  as  proceeding  from 
two  causes,  the  remote  and  original  cause  is  expressed  by 
the  use  of  '  by,'  and  the  immediate  one  by  '  with.'  Fur 
instance  :  '  The  tree  was  cut  down  hy  a  woodman  with  an 
axe.'  If  we  said  '  hy  an  axe,'  it  would  imply  some  free 
agency  on  the  part  of  the  axe.  '  With  a  woodsman,'  on 
the  other  hand,  would  imply  that  the  woodsman  was  an  un- 
conscious instrument  in  the  tree's  destruction.  On  the  other 
hand,  whenever  a  conscious  agent  is  implied,  we  use  the 
word  '  by.' 

This  was  not  the  case  in  old  English :  Shakespeare  uses 
the  expression,  '  marred  with  traitors.'  In  modern  speech 
it  would  be  '  hy  traitors  '  —  but  marred  with  the  swords  of 
traitors  or  with  the  wounds  inflicted  by  them.  In  general, 
•  with  '  is  improper,  not  only  when  a  conscious  agent  is  sup- 
posed, but  when  the  agent  is  personified  to  a  certain  degree 
in  our  own  minds,  from  its  action  being  apparently  volunta- 
ry. For  instance,  we  hardly  ever  say  '  struck  with  light- 
ning '  or  '  loith  a  thunderbolt,'  but  '  iy  ;  '  although  if  another 
agency  were  poetically  or  mythically  introduced,  the  expres- 
sion would  again  be  changed  to  '  with,'  as  '  Jupiter  struck 
him  to  the  ground  with  a  thunderbolt.' 

'  By  '  and  '  with  '  are  often  used  when  no  agent  is  spoken 
of,  but  a  certain  object  is  said  to  be  accomplished  hy  certain 
means.  But  in  this  case,  '  by  '  implies  that  the  means  used 
are  essential ;  '  with '  only  that  they  are  useful  in  aiding  our 
endeavors.  The  two  following  phrases,  '  By  patience  and 
perseverance  the  work  will  be  completed,'  or  '  with  patience,' 
&c.,  would  be   equally  correct :   but  the  word  '  by  '  implies 


ENGLISH    SYNONYMS.  25 

that  patience  and  perseverance  are  the  chief  instruments  in 
accomplishing  the  work  ;  while  '  with  '  points  out  merely 
that  they  will  prove  useful  auxiliaries  in  its  prosecution. 

'  By '  and  '  with,'  however,  have  each  separate  meanings 
of  their  own,  completely  distinct  from  those  we  have  just 
mentioned,  but  tending  to  throw  additional  difficulty  on  the 
subject  of  their  relation  to  each  other.  '  With '  implies 
companionship  as  well  as  instrumentality  ;  and  '  by '  — 
without  reckoning  the  cases  in  which  it  is  synonymous  with 
'  beside  '  —  is  also  applied  to  designate  the  mode  of  per- 
forming some  act ;  as,  '  this  is  locked  hj  a  key,  tied  by  a 
string,  shut  by  a  clasp  ;  '  'we  travelled  hy  railroad ;  '  '  the 
letter  was  sent  ly  express.*  In  Greek  and  Latin,  '  with  ' 
was  expressed  by  the  dative  or  ablative  case  ;  '  by  *  the 
word  '  hypo  '  in  Greek,  (with  a  genitive,)  and  a  or  ah  in 
Latin  (with  an  ablative.) 

'  Through '  is  somewhat  diiferent  from  the  other  words 
mentioned.  It  often  implies  that  the  means  used  are  the 
appointed  channel  for  the  conveyance  of  the  objector  advan- 
tage specified  ;  as  '  I  heard  the  news  through  such  a  person  ; ' 
'  I  received  a  remittance  through  the  bank.' 

BUT,    HOWEVER,    YET,    STILL,    NOTWITHSTANDING, 
NEVERTHELESS. 

'  But,'  like  its  corresponding  conjunctions  in  French, 
Italian,  and  Greek,  has  two  distinct  meanings,  one  in  a 
certain  sense  conjunctive,  and  the  other  disjunctive.  The 
one  would  be  expressed  at  full  length  by  '  but  yet,'  the  other 
by  '  but  on  the  contrary.'  For  instance  :  '  This  is  not  sum- 
mer, hut  it  is  almost  as  warm,'  would  express  the  first ;  and 
'  This  is  not  summer  hut  winter,'  the  second.  Home  Tooke 
was  so  struck  with  the  difference  of  these  two  meanings 
of  '  but,'  that  he  referred  the  word  to  two  separate  roots,  one 
being  '  boot,'  (besides,)  the  other  '  he-out,''  (left  out.)  Inge- 
3 


26  A    COLLECTION    OF 

nioiis  as  this  theory  is,  it  is  hardly  tenable ;  for  not  only 
in  French  and  Italian,  but  even  in  Greek,  there  is  but  one 
conjunction  to  express  these  two  different  meanings. *••  In 
German,  Spanish,  and  Latin,  \vc  find  a  conjunction  for  each 
of  these  two  meanings  ;  the  German  abcr,  the  Spaiiisli  j)Ct^o, 
the  Latin  autcin,  answering  to  '  but  yet ;  '  and  sondern,  sino, 
and  scd,  to  '  but  on  the  contrary.' 

The  other  words  in  the  group  before  us  all  correspond  to 
the  first  of  these  two  meanings  ('  but  yet ').  The  weakest 
of  them  all  in  disjunctive  power  is  '  however,'  which  seems 
rather  to  waive  the  question  than  to  qualify  or  alter  it. 
'  This,  however,  is  not  essential,'  differs  in  force  from  '  but 
this  is  not  essential ; '  the  latter  rather  implying  that  it  might 
be  thought  essential. 

'  Yet '  is  stronger  than  '  but,'  and  '  still '  even  stronger 
again,  as  it  indicates  an  exception  to  what  has  been  said 
before.  It  seems  an  abbreviation  of  '  not  removed.'  '  All 
you  say  is  true,  still  I  think  '  —  this  implies  that  full  weight 
is  given  to  the  opponent's  arguments,  but  that  they  do  not 
remove  the  difficulty  in  the  mind  of  the  objector.  '  Not- 
withstanding '  and  '  nevertheless  '  are,  again,  stronger  than 
'  still.'     '  Nevertheless  '  is  strongest  of  all. 

ALSO,    TOO,    LIKEAVISE,    BESIDES. 

'  Too  '  is  a  slighter,  and  a  more  familiar  expression  than 

•'Boot,'  however,  is  probably  the  origin  of  'but,'  as  'alios,' 
(another,)  is  of  '  alia,'  (but,)  in  Greek.  So  in  Latin  '  caeterum  '  sig- 
nifies '  but.'  Home  Tooke  may  have  intended  to  allude  to  a  third 
sense  of  the  word  •  but,'  where  it  bears  the  same  meaning  as  '  ex- 
cept,' whish  does  literally  imply  'left  out.'  And  even  this  third 
meaning  is  probably  derived  from  '  boot,'  (first  implying  addition, 
and  afterwards  exception,)  just  as  in  old  English  we  sometimes  see 
the  word  '  beside  '  loosely  used  for  '  excopt,'  as  '  all  beside  him.'  The 
Greek  pleen,  except,  was  probably  derived  from  pleion,  more. 


ENGLISH    SYNONYMS.  27 

'also,'  which  has  something  in  it  more  specified  and  formal. 
This  is  the  only  difference  between  the  two  words.  '  Like- 
wise '  has  a  rather  different  meaning.  Originally  it  meant, 
'  in  like  manner,'  and  it  has  preserved  something  of  that 
signification.  It  implies  some  connection  or  agreement 
between  the  words  it  unites.  We  may  say,  '  He  is  a  poet, 
and  likewise  a  musician  : '  but  we  should  not  say,  '  He  is  a 
prince,  and  likewise  a  musician,'  because  there  is  no  natural 
connection  between  these  qualities :  but  '  also '  implies 
merely  addition. 

'  Besides '  is  used  rather  when  some  additional  circum- 
stance is  named  after  others  ;  as  a  kind  of  after- thought, 
and  generally  to  usher  in  some  new  clause  of  a  sentence ; 
as,  '  Besides  what  has  been  said,  this  must  be  considered,' 
&c. 

VOLUNTAKILY,    WILLINGLY. 

'  Voluntarily  '  is  more  restricted  in  its  sense  than  '  wil- 
lingly ; '  it  simply  means  that  the  thing  done  is  not  per- 
formed under  immediate  compulsion,  nor  without  intention. 
All  our  outward  actions  are  voluntary,  —  for  that  cannot 
be  called  an  action  which  is  not  voluntary  ;  but  they  are  not 
necessarily  performed  willingly  ;  for  this  implies  that  out 
wishes  and  inclinations  go  along  with  the  action  performed. 
There  are  many  things  which  are  done  voluntarily,  but  are 
much  against  the  wishes  of  the  agent.  For  instance,  in 
Roman-catholic  countries  a  girl  who  takes  the  veil  must  do 
so  voluntarily ;  but  it  frequently  happens  that  she  is  far 
from  doing  it  willingly ;  the  entreaties  and  threats  of  her 
friends,  unhappiness  at  home,  despair  of  a  better  fate,  will 
often  induce  her  to  decide  on  taking  a  step  which  neverthe- 
less is  quite  against  her  inclination.  Originally,  however, 
these  words, '  willingly  '  and  '  voluntarily,'  must  have  had  the 
same  meaning. 


28  A    COLLECTIOy    OP 


THEREFOEE,     ■WHEREFORE,    THEX,     ACCORDIXGLY,    UENCB, 
THEN'CE,    SO,    CONSEQUENTLY. 

All  these  are  what  aie  called  illulive  particles — i.e., 
particles  which  denote  that  which  in  some  way  follows  from 
what  has  been  previously  said  ;  but  they  denote  this  in  dif- 
ferent way?. 

'  Therefore  '  and  '  wherefore  '  are  nearly  alike,  but  '  there- 
fore '  may  indicate  a  conclusion  from  several  reasons 
adduced  ;  '  wherefore  '  refers  only  to  something  immedi- 
ately i)receding.  We  might  say  —  '  This  and  that  and  the 
other  difficulty  will  attend  such  a  procedure  ;  I  cannot, 
therefore,  approve  of  this  measure.'  And  again  :  '  I  found 
his  testimonials  insufficient,  zoherefure  I  refused  to  appoint 
him.'  '  Wherefore  '  is,  however,  rather  obsolete.  In  old 
English,  it  was  used  to  signify  not  only  '  for  which  cause,' 
but  also  '  for  what  cause;'  as  'the  more  part  knew 'not 
wherefore  they  were  gathered  together.'     (Acts,  xix.  32.) 

'  Then  '  bears  the  same  relation  to  '  therefore  '  that  '  as  * 
does  to  '  because  ;  '  it  is  less  formally  conclusive,  and  is 
used  more  by  the  way  and  incidentally  than  '  therefore.' 
Whenever  the  main  object  is  to  establish  a  certain  propo- 
sition, the  word  '  therefore  '  is  used  ;  when  this  point  is 
subsidiary,  '  then  '  is  to  be  preferred.  In  establishing  a  pro- 
position of  Euclid,  it  would  be  inappropriate  to  say,  '  the 
angles  of  a  triangle  are  then  equal,'  &c.  :  '  therefore '  would 
be  the  proper  word.  In  using  '  then,'  we  often  imply  that 
the  proposition  on  which  our  argument  is  based  is  taken  for 
granted  ;  it  seems  to  say,  '  Recollect  this  has  been  proved.' 

In  old  English,  '  therefore  '  is  used  where  '  then '  is  now ; 
as  '  Therefore  being  justified  by  faith,  we  have  peace,'  &c., 
we  should  now  say,  '  Being  then  justified  by  faith,'  as  the 
question  had  been  already  discussed  and  fully  established. 
'  Hence  '  and  '  thence  '  resemble  '  then  '  more   than  '  there- 


ENGLISH    SYNONYMS.  29 

fore  ; '  they  answer  nearly  to  '  this '  and  '  that,'  the  one  indi- 
cating an  antecedent  reason  close  at  hand  ;  the  other,  one 
more  remote. 

♦  Accordini^ly  '  is  something  like  '  therefore,'  but  more 
limited  in  its  meaning.  '  Therefore  '  includes  both  inference 
and  ])roof ""  —  both  physical  and  logical  sequence  ;  '  accord- 
ingly,' only  the  former.  We  might  say,  '  It  has  rained, 
therefore —  or  accordingly  —  the  ground  is  wet ; '  and  '  It  is 
wet,  therefore  it  has  rained  :  '  in  this  last  sense  we  could 
not  use  '  accordingly.'  '  Therefore,'  '  accordingly,'  and 
'  then,'  often  indicate  a  practical  course  of  action  following 
from  certain  causes  or  reasons;  'hence'  and  '  thence '  are 
applied  exclusively  to  reasoning.  For  instance,  '  I  deter- 
mined not  to  act  hastily,  and  therefore  consulted  the  best 
advisers.  Such  an  one's  opinion  seemed  to  me  the  most 
just,  and  accordingly  I  adopted  the  course  of  action  he 
recommended ;  I  fixed  then  upon  this  plan,'  &c.  In  such 
a  sentence,  '  hence  '  and  '  thence  '  could  not  be  used  ;  but 
we  say,  '  hence  we  may  infer,'  or  '  thence  we   may  conclude.' 

*  So '  is  something  like  '  then,'  but  slighter  and  more  col- 
loquial. 

'Consequently'  is  the  most  formally  and  deliberately 
conclusive  of  tlie  whole  group ;  it  is  generally  confined  to 
di  practical  sequence  or  conclusion,  and  is  seldom  used  in 
mere  speculative  argument. 

BKCAUSK,    SINCE,    INASMUCH    AS,  EOR,  AS. 

These  are  all  causal  particles  ;  i.  e.,  they  indicate  a  pro- 
position fro?n  which  something  follows  ;  they  correspond, 
conversely,  to  the  illative,  which  point  out  that  which  does 
follow. 

'  Because  '  (by  cause)  would  seem  from  its  etymology  to 

•  See  Whately's  Logic  — Inference  and  Proof. 
3" 


30  A    COLLECTION    OF 

have  orignally  referred  onlj*  to  physical  sequence,  but  is 
now  used  as  an  answer  to  '  why  ?  '  in  the  three  senses  in 
which  it  may  be  asked,  1st,  indicating  physical  sequence, 
(from  what  cause  ? )  as,  '  Why  arc  'the  days  longest  in  sum- 
mer ? '  2dly,  logical  sequence,  (how  is  it  proved  ? )  as, 
♦  Why  is  this  line  equal  to  that  ?  '  and  3dly,  '  For  what  pur- 
pose ? '  as,  '  Why  did  you  go  to  Loudon  yesterday  ?  ' 

'  Since  '  is  more  incidental  and  less  formal  than  '  because ; ' 
it  also  generally  begins  the  sentence,  or  is  understood  as  the 
beginning. 

'  Inasmuch  as '  has  something  of  a  qualifying  power, 
which  the  others  do  not  possess ;  it  is  nearly  the  same  as 
'  in  as  far.'  This  sentence,  for  example,  —  '  I  approve  of 
his  sentiments,  inasmuch  as  they  are  patriotic,'  would  imply 
that  they  are  approved  only  so  far  and  no  further.  If  we 
substituted  '  because,'  we  should  be  accounting  for  instead 
of  qualifying,  our  approbation. 

'  As  '  is  even  more  incidental  than  '  since,'  and  seems  to 
take  for  granted  what  is  stated  ;  for  instance,  in  saying, 
'  As  1  know  him  to  be  dishonest,  I  must  take  these  precau- 
tions '  —  the  fact  of  the  dishonesty  is  merely  noticed  in 
passing,  as  something  already  established ;  just  as  in  the 
relation  of  '  then  '  to  '  therefore.'  '  As  '  seems  to  suppose 
its  corresponding  word  '  so  '  to  follow.  In  our  earlier  wri- 
ters '  so  '  is  generally  expressed  ;  but  imless  some  very  strict 
comparison  is  intended,  it  is  commonly  omitted  by  mod- 
erns.* 

'  For  '  is  a  slighter  '  because.'  In  the  older  writers,  as 
Shakespeare,  we  may  find  it  used  as  '  because''  would  be 
now  :   '  I  hate  him,   for  he  is  a  Christian.'  —  (^Merchant  of 

*  Thus  in  a  letter  of  Sir  F.  Walsingham  to  Harleigh  :  '  As  your 
Btudie  in  these  things  is  very  commendable,  so  I  thank  you  for  tho 
same  ; '  in  modern  language  this  would  be,  '  as  your  studie,  &c.,  I 
thank  you.' 


ENGLISH    SYNONYMS.  31 

Venice).  Cowper  has  accordingly  introduced  it  into  John 
Gilpin,  which  is  an  imitation  of  the  antique  style,  '  for  that 
wine  is  dear,'  &c. 

AMID,    AMIDST,    AMONG,    AMONGST. 

These  words  preserve  much  of  their  etymological  signi- 
fication. '  Among  '  originally  signified  '  one  out  of  many  : ' 
'amid'  and  'amidst,'  'in  the  middle  of.'  Hence,  then, 
'  among'  and  '  amongst'  always  imply  number,  'amid  '  and 
'  amidst '  generally  quantity.  We  should  say,  —  '  Among  ' 
(not  '  amidst ')  '  all  these  books  I  cannot  find  the  one  I  want ; ' 
but  not,  '  I  was  out  among  snow  and  rain  :  '  in  this  last  case 
'  amidst '  would  be  the  correct  expression. 

'  Amid  '  and  '  amidst '  also  indicate  that  the  thing  specified 
is  of  a  difi'erent  class  from  those  around  it ;  while  '  among  ' 
and  '  amongst '  are  oftener  (though  not  always)  applied  to 
objects  surrounded  with  those  of  the  same  class.  We  speak 
of  '  a  rose  amidst  nettles,'  but  not  of  '  a  tree  amidst  the 
forest ; '  we  are  said  to  be  '  among  friends,'  but  '  amidst 
enemies.'  * 

BETWIXT,    BETWEEN. 

♦  Betwixt '  is  ordinarily  confined  to  places  ;  '  between  '  has 

*In  poetry  these  rules  are  not  strictly  adhered  to.  See  Milton's 
description  of  the  seraph  Abdiel :  — 

'  faithful  found. 
Among  the  faithless  faithful  only  he : 
Among  innumei'oMe  false,  unmov'd. 
Unshaken,  unseJ'iced,  unterrified, 
His  loyalty  he  kept,  his  love,  his  zeal : 
Nor  number,  nor  example,  with  him  wrought 
To  swerve  from  truth,  or  change  his  constant  mind 
Though  single.     From  amidst  them  forth  he  pass'd.' 

Paradise  Lost,  Book  V. 
Here  the  two  words  are  used  indifferently. 


82  A    COLLECTION    OF 

a  much  more  extended  signification.  We  speak  of —  '  what 
may  happen  between  morning  and  evening,'  of  '  hesitating 
between  opposite  courses :  '  we  could  not  use  '  betwixt '  in 
these  senses  ;  but  '  betwixt  the  chair  and  the  table,'  '  betwixt 
the  road  and  the  mountain,'  would  be  quite  correct.  In 
poetry,  however,  'betwixt'  is  used  much  as  'between'  is 
in  prose  :  as  in  Scott's  ballad  of  '  Alice  Brand,'  —  '  Betwixt 
night  and  day,'  &c. 

THOUGH,    ALTHOUGH. 

These  particles  nearly  approach  each  other  in  meaning ; 
but  '  although '  is  the  stronger  and  more  emphatic  of  the 
two,  and  is  therefore  generally  chosen  to  begin  a  sentence  : 
as, — '■Although  vay  difficulties  are  great,  I  hope  to  succeed.' 
It  seems  to  imply  that  full  weight  is  allowed  to  the  former 
clause  of  the  sentence,  and  to  answer  to  the  additional  '  all ' 
so  often  introduced  into  old  English,  as,  '  aJl  too  soon,'  *  a 
combination  still  preserved  in  German,  — '  all  zu-wohl,'  or 
'  gar  zu  schon.' 

IXDEED,    XAY. 

'  Indeed  '  still  preserA'es  its  original  etymological  meaning, 
which  is  nearly  the  same  as  —  'in  reality,'  '  in  fact,'  '  in 
truth.'  When  used  synonymously  with  'nay,'  it  generally 
adds  to  the  force  of  the  second  clause  of  the  sentence,  —  as, 

*  I  know  it,  indeed  I  am  sure  of  it.'  '  Nay '  has  this  force 
in  a  much  more  intense  degree,  and  makes  the  second 
clause  even  stronger  in  pro])()rtion  to  the  first  than  '  indeed,' 
—  as,  'I  think,  nay,  I  am  sure.'  In  ',lu  English,  '  yea  '  had 
nearly  the  same  senso  as  '  nay  '  has  now,  —  as  in  Cor.  ix., 
^  yea,  I  judge  not  mine  ownsclf :  '  in  modern   English  the 

*  The   particle  '  alto,'  likewise  useil   in  old  English,  and   meaning 

*  entirely,'  is  sometimes  confounded  with  this  expression.  But  in  '  all 
too  soon,'    ♦  entirely  '  could  not  have  been  meant. 


ENGLISH    SYNONYMS.  33 

word  '  nay '  would  have  been  here  employed  Each  of 
them  signifies,  'this  is  not  all,  for  — ;'  or,  not  only  this, 
hut — .'  These  ellipses  were  often  expressed  in  Greek  by 
'  alia'  (but)  or  '  gar  '  (for).  An  instance  where  this  ellipse 
was  mistaken  by  our  translators  occurs  in  1  Cor.  xv.,  —  ''for 
one  star  difFereth  from  another  in  glory.'  The  Greek  word 
used  is  the  one  usually  translated  '  for ; '  but  '  nay,'  or 
'  indeed,'  would  have  been  the  correct  rendering  of  the  idea 
in  English. 

ONLY,    SOLELY,    ALONE,    MERELY,    SIMPLY. 

'  Only '  (preserving  its  etymology,  one-ly)  relates  to  cases 
of  number,  time,  or  quantity,  which  none  of  the  others  do : 
as,  '  I  have  only  one  left ;  '  '  he  only  left  me  just  now.' 

But  when  '  only '  relates  to  questions  unconnected  with 
time,  number,  or  quantity,  '  solely '  approaches  the  nearest 
to  it  in  sense.  It  differs,  however,  in  being  more  emphatic 
and  deliberate,  and  in  marking  more  distinctly  the  excep- 
tion indicated.  For  instance,  the  phrase,  '  I  resolved  to 
attend  only  to  this  case,'  draws  the  attention  to  the  abandon- 
ment of  all  others  ;  while  '  I  attended  solely  to  this,'  points 
out  the  circumstance  of  one  being  singled  from  the  rest. 
Or  we  might  say,  '  This  I  have  mentioned  is  only  one  out  of 
many  reasons  ;  '  but,  '  I  have  been  influenced  solely  by  this 
consideration.'  In  the  former  sentence  the  word  '  only ' 
could  not  be  substituted.  '  Alone,'  when  used  as  a  particle, 
has  nearly  the  same  meaning  as  '  only.' 

'  Merely  '  and  '  simply  '  somewhat  resemble  each  other  ; 
but  '  merely '  conveys  (at  present)  the  sense  of  '  no  more 
than ;  '  while  '  simply '  seems  (according  to  its  original 
meaning)  to  convey  a  disavowal  of  complex  acts  or  motives 
in  the  speaker.  The  former  implies  no  addition  —  the 
latter,  no  admixture.  For  instance,  '  this  is  merely  a  per- 
sonal argument,'  implies  that  nothing  more  is  urged  :   '  this 


84  A    COLLECTION    OF 

is  simply  a  statement  of  facts,'   excludes   the   idea  of  any 
comment  accompanying  it. 

'  Only  '  might  be  used  for  any  of  the  other  three  parti- 
cles.* 


EXCEPT,    EXCEPTING,    BUT,    SAVE. 

'  Except '  and  '  excepting '  are  nearly  the  same,  the  latter 
being  more  cumbrous  and  less  in  use. 

The  chief  difference  between  them  and  '  but '  is,  that 
♦  except '  seems  to  imply  a  more  decided  and  emphatic 
exclusion  of  the  case  specified  than  '  but.'  '  I  have  written 
all  my  letters  but  one,'  conveys  a  less  marked  exception 
than  '  all  except  one.'  '  Save  '  is  almost  exclusively  limited 
to  poetry. 


•  I  only  meant 
To  show  the  reed  on  which  you  leant. 
Deeming  this  path  you  might  pursue 
Without  a  pass  from  Roderick  Dhu.' 

Scoxt'8  Lady  of  the  Lake,  Canto  v. 


SNGLISH    SYNONYMS.  35 


VERBS. 

TO  ALLOW,  PERMIT,  SUFFER,  TOLERATE. 

'  To  allow,'  and '  to  permit,'  are  often  used  synonymously ; 
but '  to  allow  '  is  used  rather  more  in  the  active,  — '  permit,' 
in  the  passive  sense.  In  saying,  '  I  allow  him  to  walk  in  my 
garden,'  we  seem  to  give  a  positive  sanction  to  the  action ; 
'  I  permit  him,'  simply  implies  that  '  I  do  not  hinder  him.' 

'  Xo  suffer  '  is  more  passive  than  either.  It  implies  rather 
tolerance  than  sanction.  An  indolent  and  careless  teacher 
will  suffer  his  pupils  to  negect  their  lessons ;  if  we  said,  he 
allowed  or  permitted  them,  it  would  imply  that  he  formally 
gave  them  leave  to  be  idle.  '  To  tolerate '  is  always  used  in 
the  sense  of  permitting  something  unpleasant  or  otherwise 
objectionable  to  the  tolerator ;  thus,  we  speak  of  tolerating 
differences  in  religion,  &c. 

TO    CONFESS,    ACKNOWLEDGE,    OWN,    AYOW. 

'  To  confess  '  is  to  make  a  declaration  of  some  action  we 
have  done,  which  is  not  known  to  the  persons  to  whom  we 
speak  ;  as  a  Roman-catholic  penitent  confesses  his  sins  to 
his  priest.  If  the  action  is  already  known,  but  not  the 
author  of  it,  the  declaring  ourselves  to  be  the  doers  of  it 
would  be  called  acknowledging,  or  owning.  Or  again,  if 
both  the  action  and  the  doer  of  it  are  known,  we  acknow- 
ledge it,  by  declaring  our  consciousness  of  it,  as  for  instance, 
we  acknowledge  or  own  a  fault  which  we  are  already  known 
to  have  committed.  Hence  we  speak  of  a  person's  '  refus- 
ing to  acknowledge  himself  in  the  wrong,'  which  implies 


30  A    COLLECTION    OF 

that  liis  fault  is  already  known  ;  but  we  should  speak  of 
'  extorting  a  confession,'  not  '  an  acknowledgment,'  from  a 
criminal ;  —  because  his  confession  would  be  a  statement  of 
facts  not  supposed,  at  least,  to  be  known  to  others. 

We  sometimes  speak  of  '  acknowledging '  or  '  confess- 
ing'—  indifferently — some  fault:  but  in  using  the  word 
confess,  we  are  pointing  out  the  fact  that  we  are  not  known 
to  be  the  doers  of  the  action  ;  while  in  using  the  word 
acknoiohdge,  we  are  rather  adverting  to  the  fact  that  the 
action  itself  is  known.  If  both  the  action  and  the  doer  of 
it  were  known,  w'e  could  not  speak  of  '  confessing  it.'  We 
do  indeed  speak  of  '  confessing  our  sins  to  God,'  to  whom 
all  must  be  known  ;  but  this  is  rather  said  figuratively,  — 
as  Ave  are  commanded  in  the  Scriptures  '  to  make  our  re- 
quests known '  to  Him,  though  of  course  they  must  be 
known  ah'cady  before  we  make  them.  But  in  both  these 
cases  the  words  used  refer  to  our  own  state  of  mind. 

Confessing  is  oftener  applied  in  reference  to  a  fault  than 
either  owning  or  acknowledging :  indeed,  strictly  speaking, 
it  almost  always  implies  some  error.  '  To  avow  '  is  never 
used  in  the  sense  of  confessing  a  fault,  though  the  noun 
avowal  sometimes  is.  But  '  to  avow  '  implies  a  bold,  frank 
acknowledgment  of  the  truth.  We  never  avozo  what  we 
are  ashamed  of ;  but  we  avow  our  motives,  the  reasons  of 
our  conduct,  our  opinions,  &c.  We  confess  our  weakness, 
errors,  or  faults  —  we  acknowledge  or  own  what  we  are 
charged  with. 

The  conjugate  word  '  confessor,'  *•'  is  used  in  two  senses, 
both  very  unlike  those  implied  by  the  verb ;  first,  indicating 


*  It  is  curious  that  this  word  and  one  other  —  i.  e.,  ♦  prisoner '  — 
present  almost  the  only  exceptions  to  the  general  rule  in  our  lan- 
guage, that  the  terminations  '  or  '  and  '  er  '  indicate  an  agent,  and 
not  a  passive  recipient. 

v;   . 


ENGLISH    SYNONYMS.  87 

one  who  receives  a  confession,  and  secondly,  one  who  has 
boldly  avoioed  his  religious  faith,  (whether  previously  known 
or  not,)  and  has  suffered  for  that  avowal.  This  last  employ- 
ment of  the  word  probably  grew  out  of  the  older  and  less 
defined  use  of  the  verb  '  to  confess,'  which,  as  we  may  see 
in  our  translation  of  the  Bible,  was  often  formerly  used 
where  we  should  now  substitute  the  word  '  avow,'  or  '  ac- 
knowledge.' 

TO    CHARM,    ENCHANT,    ENKAPTUHE,    CAPTIVATE,    FASCI- 
NATE,   ATTEACT. 

'  To  charm,'  '  to  enchant,'  and  '  to  enrapture,'  have  a 
considerable  resemblance  in  meaning.  They  differ  chiefly 
in  point  of  force  ;  '  enchant '  being  stronger  than  '  charm,' 
and  '  enrapture '  stronger  still.  This  last  word  is  distin- 
guished also  from  the  other  two,  by  implying  a  powerful 
excitement  of  feeling,  as  well  as  of  taste  or  fancy ;  and  by 
being  very  rarely,  if  ever,  applied  to  the  feelings  awakened 
by  persons. 

'  To  attract '  is  to  draw  after  one,  —  to  win  upon  a  person's 
liking,  — to  inspire  an  inclination.  It  is  used  generally  for 
persons ;  whereas  the  other  three  terms  apply  equally  well 
to  things.  We  are  charmed  or  enchanted  with  beautiful 
poetry,  music,  or  scenery,  by  personal  beauty  or  agreeable 
manners,  —  we  are  attracted  by  person  and  manners  only. 
The  conjugate  word  'attraction'  is  less  limited  in  specifi- 
cation ;  we  speak  of  places,  pursuits,  &c.,  as  having  a 
'  strong  attraction.' 

'  To  captivate  '  and  '  to  fascinate '  have  nearly  the  same 
meaning  as  '  to  attract ; '  but  they  are  stronger  terms,  and 
the  latter  implies  something  of  design ;  we  use  it  in  speak- 
ing of  the  manners  of  an  accomplished  woman  of  the  woi'ld, 
who  knows  and  uses  her  power.  The  conjugate  adjective 
'  fascinating '  does    not    convey  so  unfavorable  a  meaning, 

4         A-NCt^ 


38  A    COLLECTION    OF 

though  it  generally  implies  more  of  art  than  '  captivating 
or  '  attractive.' 

TO    CONTEMN    OK    SHOW    CONTEMPT,     DESPISE,    SCORN, 
DISDAIN. 

'  To  contemn '  is  less  cemmonly  used  than  its  conjugate 
noun,  contempt.  This  word  is  nearly  the  same  in  its  mean- 
ing as  '  to  despise,'  or  rather  it  may  be  said  that  despise  is 
the  verb,  and  contempt  the  noun  belonging  to  it.  A  proud 
man  despises  or  feels  contempt  for  those  beneath  him.  Both 
imply  looking  down  upon  others,  considering  them  as  un- 
worthy of  notice.  '  To  contemn '  is  rather  different  in  its 
meaning,  both  from  '  to  despise '  and  also  from  its  own 
conjugate,  '  contempt.'  We  never  speak  of  contemning  an 
individual;  the  expression  is  exclusively  applied  to  quali- 
ties. We  may  despise,  or  feel  contempt  for  persons  who 
act  in  such  or  such  a  way ;  we  only  contemn  their  actions, 
or  the  dispositions  which  lead  to  those  actions. 

'  To  scorn '  and  '  to  disdain  '  are  used  in  a  stronger  sense 
than  the  words  before  mentioned.  These  verbs,  like  '  con- 
temn,' are  never  properly  used  towards  persons,  though 
their  conjugate  nouns  are.  We  are  said  to  treat  an  inferior 
with  scorn  or  disdain,  but  not  to  scorn  or  disdain  him.  Dis- 
dain implies  a  feeling  of  haughty  indignation.  The  Italian 
sdegno  is  evidently  from  the  same  root,  and  somewhat 
resembles  in  its  meaning  our  own  word,  though  it  is  more 
frequently  used  to  designate  anger.  Disdain  is  shown  by 
a  haughty  supercilious  manner,  —  contempt  often  shows  itself 
in  good-humored  condescension.  Scorn  implies  a  mocking, 
scoffing  spirit,  —  it  forms  a  kind  of  link  in  its  meaning  be- 
tween contempt  and  ridicule. 

We  have  said  that  the  verbs  '  to  scorn  '  and  '  to  disdain ' 
are  used  rather  towards  things  than  persons.  We  speak  of 
•disdaining'  or  'scorning'  a  proposal  or  course  of  action; 


ENGLISH    SYNONYMS.  89 

but  there  is  a  shade  of  difference  in  the  meaning.  We 
disdain  something  which  we  consider  beneath  our  station, 
capacity,  or  powers ;  we  scorn  what  is  in  itself  disgraceiui 
or  contemptible.  Alexander  disdained  to  share  the  Persian 
Empire  with  Darius,  though  it  was  a  compromise  very 
fitting  for  Parmenio :  he  would  have  scorned  to  do  anything 
unworthy  of  a  Macedonian. 

TO  CONQUER,  TO  SUBDUE,  VANQUISH,  SUBJUGATE. 

'  To  conquer '  is  less  individual  and  more  general  in  its 
meaning  than  '  to  vanquish : '  we  vanquish  an  enemy  who 
attacks  us  ;  we  conquer  a  country. 

'  Vanquish '  is  always  used  for  combat,  generally  with 
some  personal  enemy ;  '  conquer '  for  a  series  of  combats. 
We  speak  of  vanquishing  an  enemy  in  a  single  encoimter, 
but  of  conquering  a  country.  Achilles  vanquished  Hector 
before  Troy ;  Napoleon,  in  his  campaigns,  conquered  great 
part  of  Europe. 

'  To  conquer '  is  oftener  used  metaphorically  than  '  to 
vanquish ; '  we  talk  of  conquering  evil  inclinations,  con- 
quering oneself,  &c.  But  in  this  last  sense,  '  to  subdue  '  is 
oftener  used.  '  Subdue '  implies  a  more  continued  pressure, 
and  a  more  gradual,  but  surer  and  final  victory. 

When  a  nation  has  ceased  to  resist,  we  say  it  is  subdued. 
'Subjugate'  (which  originally  means,  to  bring  under  the 
yoke)  implies  external  and  continued  restrictions.  We 
subdued  the  French,  but  we  did  not  subjugate  them.  Poland 
is  subjugated  —  that  is  to  say,  kept  under  by  a  continuous 
pressure  from  without ;  but  its  spirit  remains  imsubdued. 

'Subjugate'  is  always  used  in  speaking  of  nations  — 
never  of  individuals,  and  never  in  an  abstract  sense.  '  Sub- 
due '  may  be  applied  to  individuals  even  in  a  literal  sense, 
but  always  indicates  mental  as  well  as  physical  conquest. 
A  child,  or  a  captive,  is  said  to  be  completely  subdued  by 


40  A    COLLECTION    OF 

severe  ti'eatmcnt,  when  the  spirit  is  broken  and  the  mind 
enfeebled,  or  cowed,  as  it  is  sometimes  expressed. 


TO  ASK,  KEQUEST,  BEG,  BESEECH,    SUPPLICATE,  ENTREAT, 
IMPLORE,    SOLICIT. 

'  To  ask '  (not  in  the  sense  of  inquiring)  is  the  simplest 
form  of  making  a  request.  '  Request '  is  merely  a  moro 
polite  form  of  asking.  '  To  bog '  is  stronger  ;  a  starving 
man  is  said  to  beg,  not  to  ask,  for  alms. 

'  To  beseech '  is  the  same  as  to  beg,  but  stronger  still, 
and  moro  high-flown  than  poetical.  '  To  entreat,'  again,  is 
nearly  the  same  ;  but  beseeching  is  more  urgent — entreating 
more  argumentative  :  we  entreat  an  equal ;  we  beseech  a 
superior ;  we  entreat  a  person  on  whom  we  are  urging  ad- 
vice, when  he  is,  in  fact,  receiving  a  favor  from  us  :  in  this 
sense  it  is  merely  to  urge  strongly. 

'  To  supplicate '  and  '  to  implore '  both  imply  extreme 
distress  and  urgency  of  entreaty ;  but  we  implore  equals  — 
we  supplicate  superiors.  Supplication  generally  implies  a 
state  of  humiliation  and  abject  inferiority  ;  a  slave  will  sup- 
plicate pardon  of  his  master  —  a  captive  supplicate  a  con- 
queror to  spare  his  life.  These  two  last  verbs  are  stronger 
than  any  of  the  other  mentioned.  '  To  solicit,'  on  the  other 
hand,  is  simply  to  make  a  request  to  some  one  whom  we 
address  as  our  superior. 

The  government  of  these  eight  verbs  is  somewhat  different. 
*  To  ask,'  '  to  beg,'  '  to  request,'  govern  commonly,  though 
not  always,  the  object  sought ;  the  other  five,  generally  the 
person  to  whom  the  request  is  made.  We  ask  a  favor,  a 
mendicant  begs  his  bread ;  but  we  implore  or  supplicate 
some  one  to  grant  us  our  request.  This  rule,  however,  does 
not  universally  hold  good  :  we  may  ask  a  person  for  some- 
thing, entreat  a  favor,  implore  pardon. 


ENGLISH    SYNONtMS.  41 


TO    BEAK,    SUFFEK,    ENDURE. 

'  To  suffer,'  when  used  as  an  intransitive  verb,  implieg 
simply  to  bo  in  pain  or  distress  of  body  or  mind.  '  To 
bear'  or  '  endure,'  is  to  support  tbat  distress  witb  fortitude. 
It  is  true  that  the  adverbs,  '  patiently,'  '  firmly,'  '  resolutely,* 
are  generally  added  to  the  verbs  '  to  bear  '  and  '  to  endure  ;  * 
but  still  they  have  not  so  decidedly  a  negative  action  as  '  to 
suflfer  : '  wc  may  say,  '  He  suffers  a  great  deal,  but  has  no 
idea  of  bearing  pain  '  — '  it  is  impossible  to  hear  (or  endure) 
sucb  distress,'  &c. ;  meaning,  to  bear  with  fortitude.  '  En- 
dure' is  often  used  synonymously  with  'bear,'  but  it  gen- 
erally implies  bearing  for  a  long  continuance.  '  To  suffer,' 
when  transitively  used,  is  nearly  the  same  as  'to  tolerate.' 

I  have  called  the  verb  '  to  suffer '  an  i7/transitive  verb 
when  applied  to  the  endurance  of  pain  or  distress;  for 
though  it  is  true  that  we  often  speak  of  '  suffering  pain,' 
&c.,  yet  it  seems  to  be  rather  an  elliptical  expression  for 
'  suffering  under  or  from  pain,'  as  no  action  takes  place ; 
and  we  could  not  reverse  the  expression,  and  speak  of  pain 
'  being  suffered,'  though  we  often  speak  of  its  being  borne 
or  endured.  This  seems  to  show  the  intransitive  character 
of  the  verb  '  to  suffer,'  in  the  sense  under  consideration. 

TO    PUZZLE,    PEKPLEX,    EMBARRASS. 

We  are  puzzled  when  our  intellectual  faculties  are  con- 
fused, and  we  cannot  comprehend  what  is  proposed  to  us  : 
we  are  perplexed  when  the  feelings  and  will  are  brought 
into  play  as  well  as  the  intellect,  and  we  are  at  a  loss  what 
to  decide  or  how  to  act.  We  are  embarrassed  by  some  bin- 
derance  or  difficulty  which  impedes  our  powers  of  thought, 
speech,  or  action.  This  need  not  necessarily  be  an  intel- 
lectual hindcrance  ;  it  is  generally  either  of  a  kind  which 

affects  the  feelings,  as  timidity  or  bashfulness,  or  a  material 
4. 


42  A.    COLLECTION    OF 

obstacle  which  hampers  us,  such  as  an  impediment  in  the 
speech.  A  schoolboy  is  "puzzled  with  a  difficult  sum :  a 
riddle  puzzles  those  who  try  to  guess  it :  we  are  perplexed 
by  the  subtleties  of  a  casuist,  or  in  the  midst  of  conflicting 
opinions :  a  rustic  is  embarrassed  in  the  presence  of  his 
superiors,  or  a  traveller  when  trying  to  speak  a  foreign  lan- 
guage he  knows  but  imperfectly.  It  is  the  characteristic  of 
embarrassment  to  take  away  our  presence  of  mind. 

The  French  use  the  word  '  embarrass,'  not  only  in  our 
sense,  but  also  as  we  should  use  the  expression  '  hampered ' 
or  encumbered.  We  use  the  word  in  this  sense  when  we 
speak  of  '  embarrassed  circumstances.' 

TO    FORBID,    niOHIBIT. 

The  expression  '  to  prohibit '  has  more  of  an  official 
character  than  is  implied  by  '  to  forbid,'  which  is  oftener 
used  in  relation  to  private  life.  A  government  prohibits 
contraband  goods  :  a  schoolmaster  forbids  his  pupils  to 
break  the  rules  of  the  school. 

TO    GUIDE,    DIRECT,    SWAT. 

'  To  guide '  and  '  to  direct '  are  words  similar  to  the 
results  which  they  indicate,  but  not  similar  in  the  means  by 
which  these  results  are  attained.  We  may  be  directed 
from  a  distance  :  a  guide  must  accompany  and  keep  close 
to  us. 

A  person  in  a  road  unknown  to  him  requires  directions. 
A  blind  man  needs  a  guide.  A  general  may  direct  the 
movements  of  his  army  from  head-quarters  :  a  ship  is  not. 
directed,  but  guided,  by  the  pilot  or  steersman.  Directions 
are  often  nearly  equivalent  to  commands,  with  this  differ- 
ence, that  they  always  imply  instructions  how  to  act  in 
some  particular  case,  and  not  merely  a  positive  order.  We 
may  command  a  person  to  be  silent,  or  to  speak  :   we  could 


ENGLISH    SYNONYMS.  43 

not,  in  such  a  case,  be  said  '  to  direct ; '   we  direct  a   child 
or  scholar  to  perform  the  prescribed  task. 

'  To  sway  '  implies  a  propelling  force,  which  neither  of 
the  other  words  do,  and  also  implies  that  the  person  who 
sways  is  himself  the  propelling  force.  It  is  most  generally 
used  in  an  abstract  or  moral  sense,  and  in  such  cases, 
always  indicates  an  exertion  of  the  lower  faculties,  A  man 
is  guided  or  directed  by  his  reason  or  intellect,  but  swayed 
by  his  passions  or  interests. 

TO    MISLEAD,    DELUDE. 

To  mislead '  is,  simply,  to  lead  astray  in  any  manner ; 
'  to  delude,'  is  to  mislead  by  acting  on  the  imagination.  A 
man  may  be  misled  by  any  one  who  gives  him  bad  advice  ; 
Mahomet  deluded  his  followers  with  his  visionary  tales  and 
pretended  inspiration. 

'  To  delude  '  always  implies  some  intention  to  deceive ; 
when  we  speak  of  being  '  deluded  by  passion  or  vanity '  we 
personify  the  qualities  mentioned,  and  speak  as  if  they  were 
agents  with  evil  intentions.  '  To  mislead  '  does  not  neces- 
sarily imply  design :  we  may  be  misled  by  the  obscurity  of 
writing  on  a  sign-post,  or  by  a  mistaken  interpretation  from 
a  foreign  language  ;  the  word  deluded  could  not  be  used  in 
such  a  case. 

TO    THINK,    BELIEVE,    STJKMISE,    SUPPOSE,    PRESUME, 
CONJECTURE. 

'  To  think '  is  used  in  three  senses. 
1st.  To  express  the  ordinary  operations  of  the  intellect. 
2d.  An  opinion  formed  in  the  mind  ;  and, 
3d.  A  belief  in  something  as  nearly,  but  not  quite  cer- 
tain. 

The  three  following  sentences  are  specimens  :  — 
'  Thinkins  is  a  useful  exerase  for  the  mind.' 


44  A    COLLECTION    OF 

'  I  think  this  a  sensible  book.' 

'  1  think  such  and  such  an  event  has  happened,  but  I  am 
not  sure.' 

'To  believe'  has  also  two  meanings;  one,  a  decided /atVA 
in  some  opinion  ;  the  other,  nearly  synonymous  with  the 
third  meaning  of  '  to  think ;  '  as,  'I  believe,  but  am  not 
sure,'  which  is  nearly  the  same  as  '  I  think,'  but  expresses 
a  rather  stronger  conviction. 

'  To  suppose '  has  also  two  senses  ;  one  in  which  we 
assume  a  thing  for  the  sake  of  argument ;  the  other,  in 
which  we  conclude  it  to  be  most  likely.  '  We  will  sup- 
pose such  a  thing  to  be  the  case.'  '  I  suppose  this  must 
be  true.' 

'  To  presume  '  is  to  go  upon  a  supposition,  to  consider  the 
'  burden  of  proof '  as  on  the  other  side.  (See  Whately's 
Rhetoric.)  Presumption  is  not  quite  conjugate  to  the  verb 
'  presume,'  being  weaker.  '  There  is  a  presumption  in 
favor  of  his  guilt,  because  he  is  a  bankrupt,'  is  different 
from,  '  We  may  presume  he  is  guilty.'  '  To  conjecture '  and 
'  to  surmise,'  with  their  respective  substantives,  which  are 
strictly  conjugate  to  the  verbs,  are  nearly,  but  not  quite 
alike.  We  conjecture  in  a  case  in  which  we  have  little  or 
no  direct  evidence  to  go  upon.  '  To  surmise '  is  nearly  the 
same,  but  differs  — 

First,  in  being  always  practical.  We  may  form  conjec- 
tures about  the  volcanoes  in  the  moon,  or  the  immateriality 
of  the  soul :  we  can  only  surmise  the  truth  of  some  prac- 
tical transaction,  as  the  reality  of  a  crime  being  committed. 

Secondly,  a  surmise  is  a  strong  conjecture,  and  must  be 
founded  on  more  evidence.  We  might  say,  '  I  can  form  no 
surmise  in  a  case  like  this ;  it  must  be  a  matter  of  mere  con- 
jecture.' 

Thirdly,  a  surmise  is  always  expressed  and  brought  for- 
ward :   a  conjecture  may  be  kept  to  ourselves ;  and,  lastly, 


ENGLISH    SYNONYMS.  45 

a  surmise  is  generally  unfavorable.     We  may  conjecture  the 
innocence  of  a  suspected  criminal :   we  surmise  his  guilt. 

'4^  TO    ABANDON,    DESEKT,    TOKSAKE. 

We  may  abandon  not  only  persons  but  things  :  we  can 
only  deserl  a  person  or  a  cause.  A  man  abandons  house, 
lands,  and  wealth ;  he  deserts  his  friends,  his  country,  or 
his  standard. 

'  To  abandon '  is  generally,  though  not  always,  blamcable. 
It  usually  implies  that  the  thing  or  person  abandoned  suffers 
some  loss  ;  hence,  it  must  imply  blame,  except  in  an  abstract 
case,  such  as  '  abandoning  a  useless  pursuit  or  hopeless  un- 
dertaking.' '  To  desert '  is  always  disgraceful,  even  when 
used  in  an  abstract  sense.  '  To  desert '  a  cause,  is  to  aban- 
don it  in  a  case  where  it  cannot  be  abandoned  without  dis- 
grace. A  soldier  who  abandons  his  standard  shamefully 
deserts  his  duty. 

'Forsake'  is  rarely,  if  ever,  used  in  reference  to  any- 
thing abstract :  we  may  forsake  a  house,  friends,  or  coun- 
try; but  not  fortune,  rank,  or  station.  It  is  also  distinguished 
from  the  other  two  words  by  implying  no  blame.  An  early 
Christian  might  forsake  his  family  and  friends  for  his  reli- 
gion :  he  would  not  be  said  to  abandon  them,  except  when 
reproached  by  his  heathen  enemies.  It  likewise  implies  no 
loss  to  the  person  or  thing  forsaken. 

The  conjugate  particles  are  all  more  or  less  different: 
'  forsaken '  is  nearly  the  same  as  deserted,  and  both  imply 
loss  or  bereavement ;  they  in  fact  nearly  correspond  to  the 
verb  '  abandon.'  To  abandon  a  place  is  to  leave  it  de- 
serted. 

TO    ABDICATE,    KESIGN,    EELINQUISH. 

We  can  only  abdicate  a  high  dignity  or  station ;  we  may 
resign  any  situation,  high  or  low  —  or  indeed  any  advan- 


46  A    COLLECTION    OF 

tage.  A  king  abdicates  his  crown :  a  private  person  may 
resign  wealth  or  station ;  a  servant  may  resign  his  place : 
in  short,  any  benefit  may  be  resigned.  '  To  relinquish  '  is 
oftener  used  for  claiins  of  some  kind  —  something  whose 
possession  is  disputed  or  struggled  for  ;  as,  for  example,  a 
contested  inheritance.  But  it  always  implies  yielding  after 
a  struggle.  We  might  say,  '  He  would  not  resign  his  claims 
to  the  property  without  an  effort ;  but  after  a  long  struggle, 
he  was  compelled  to  relinquish  his  object.' 

TO    DISTINGUISH,    DISCKIMINATE. 

'  To  distinguish '  is  merely  to  mark  broad  and  obvious 
differences  ;  '  to  discriminate '  is  to  notice  minuter  and  more 
subtle  differences.  The  generality  of  people  can  distinguish 
color  ;  but  many  who  possess  the  faculty  to  a  certain  point 
do  not  really  discriminate  between  the  nicer  shades.  An 
ignorant  man  can  distinguish  a  rose  from  a  lily  :  only  a 
botanist  can  discriminate  between  the  varieties  most  closely 
allied  and  nearly  resembling.  The  faculty  of  distinguishing 
belongs  to  every  one  whose  intellect  is  above  that  of  a  child 
or  a  brute  :  it  is  only  those  who  are  skilled  or  well  informed 
in  any  particular  department  who  can  discriminate  clearly. 

TO  TEACH,  INSTRUCT,  INFORM,  EDUCATE. 

Of  these  words  the  first  two  are  often  used  synonymously, 
but  they  have  also  a  distinct  meaning.  '  Teaching,'  strictly 
speaking,  when  distinguished  from  instruction,  is  applied  to 
the  practice  of  an  art  or  branch  of  knowledge  :  instruction  to 
the  theory.  A  child  is  (correctly  speaking)  instructed  in  the 
grammar  of  a  language,  and  taught  to  speak  the  language. 
Thus,  teaching  may  be  merely  mechanical ;  while  '  instruc- 
tion '  implies  a  degree  of  understanding  in  the  pupil,  as  well 
as  the  master.  A  child  who  has  been  taught  to  learn  les- 
sons by  rote,  without  understanding  them,  will  find  difficulty 


ENGLISH    SYNONYMS.  47 

in  compreliending  instruction  in  the  principles  of  what  he 
has  learned.  Hence,  we  speak  of  teaching  a  brute,  but 
never  of  instructing  it. 

hjformation,'^'  again,  is  distinguished  from  instruction,  in 
relation  to  the  truths  conveyed  by  it.  Matters  of  fact,  made 
known  to  one  who  could  not  have  known  them  before,  are 
called  information :  instruction  elicits  new  truths  out  of 
subject-matter  already  existing  in  the  mind.  (See  Whately's 
Logic,  Book  iv.  §  1.) 

A  traveller  gives  us  information  respecting  foreign  coun- 
tries ;  a  metaphysician  instructs  us  in  the  principles  of  moral 
science  —  principles  drawn  from  facts  already  known  to  us. 
The  two  processes  may  take  place  at  the  same  time  ;  a 
child  in  learning  a  lesson  receives  both  information  and 
instruction  ;  he  is  taught  things  he  never  knew  before,  and 
also  taught  to  apply  and  make  use  of  what  he  does  know 
already.  In  fact,  pure  mathematics  is  the  only  branch  of 
instruction  which  includes  no  information,  as  the  propositions 
are  all  based  on  principles,  previously  assumed. 

In  short,  a  person  who  is  informed,  knows  something  he 
did  not  know  before  ;  one  who  is  instructed,  understands 
something  he  did  not  before  ;  one  who  is  taught,  can  do 
something  he  could  not  do  before. 

Education  is  more  comprehensive  than  any  of  the  other 
words  before  us.  It  includes  the  ivhole  course  of  moral  and 
intellectual  teaching.  One  who  gives  occasional  lessons  is 
not  said  to  educate.  To  educate,  (agreeably  to  its  derivation, 
from  '  e-duco,'  not  '  in-duco,')  includes  the  draioing  out  of 
the  faculties,  so  as  to  teach  the  pupil  how  to  teach  himself; 
which  is  one  of  the  most  valuable  of  arts. 

Moral  training,  considered  hy  itself,  is  called  '  teaching ; 


*  We  have  here  used  the  nouns  instead  of  the  verbs  for  convenience' 
Bake,  as  they  precisely  correspond. 


48  A   COLLECTION    OF 

this  constitutes  no  exception  to  the  rule  laid  down,  as  its 
object  is  to  enable  us  —  not  to  know  —  but  to  rfo  what  is 
right.  We  see  an  example  of  this  in  Kenn's  well-known 
evening  hymn,  — 

Teach  mo  to  live,  that  I  may  dread,  &c. 

TO    ALLEVIATE,    MITIGATE,    RELIEVE. 

The  first  two  words  express  a  more  limited  action  than 
the  third  ;  or  rather,  to  speak  more  correctly,  the  verb  '  to 
relieve '  includes  both  a  limited  and  a  complete  action  ; 
while  '  to  mitigate '  and  '  to  alleviate  '  have  only  a  limited 
one.  Pain  or  grief  is  said  to  be  relieved  when  it  is  either 
lessened  or  entirely  removed  ;  when  it  is  alleviated  or  miti- 
gated, it  is  only  partially  removed.  We  might  say, '  I  hope 
this  remedy  will  mitigate  your  sufferings,  even  if  it  cannot 
entirely  relieve  them.'  '  To  relieve '  may  also  be  applied 
either  to  persons  or  things.  We  speak  not  only  of  '  reliev- 
ing a  sufferer,'  but  of  '  relieving  pain  or  distress.' 

'  To  mitigate  '  and  '  to  alleviate  '  resemble  each  other 
very  nearly  ;  but  there  is  a  slight  shade  of  difference.  '  To 
alleviate  '  is  only  used  to  describe  what  is  done  to  others  ;  '  to 
mitigate '  is  rather  oftener  applied  to  ourselves.  We  may 
pursue  some  course  of  action  to  mitigate  our  own  sorrow 
and  anxiety ;  we  endeavor  to  alleviate  the  sorrow  of  an- 
other. 

'  Alleviate  '  is  only  applied  to  suffering  or  distress  ;  ♦  miti- 
gate '  may  be  used  in  speaking  of  the  severity  of  the  laws. 

^     TO    ANNOUNCE,    PKOCLAIM,    DECLARE. 

The  arrival  of  a  distinguished  person  is  announced  —  the 
tidings  of  a  victory  are  proclaimed  —  a  man  on  trial  de- 
clares his  innocence.  '  To  announce  '  is  applied  to  persons 
and  tidings,  but  not  to  opinions  ;  '  to  declare  '  and  '  proclaim,' 
to  tidings  and  opinions,  but  not  to  persons.    '  To  announce,' 


ENGLISH    SYNONYMS.  49 

extends  not  only  to  the  present,  but  to  things  a  little  future, 
or  just  at  hand;  an  approaching  marriage,  for  example,  is 
announced,  but  '  to  proclaim'  and  '  to  declare  '  only  apply 
to  the  present  and  what  is  j  ust  past.  A  determination  may 
be  either  announced,  proclaimed,  or  declared ;  but  when 
announced,  it  is  merely  noticed  as  about  to  take  place  ;  when 
proclaimed,  published  to  the  world  at  large,  and  As  it  were 
officially,  (a  thing  can  only  be  proclaimed  to  a  number)  ; 
when  declared,  merely  stated  openly. 

Formerly,  '  to  declare '  meant,  to  make  clear,  or  to  prove : 
as  we  may  see  in  the  22d  Article  of  our  Church,  '  unless  it 
may  be  declared  that  they  be  taken  from  Scripture.' 

TO    RENOUNCE,    RECANT,    ABJURE. 

'  To  renounce  '  is  simply  to  give  up  or  throw  aside  a  pos- 
session, a  pursuit,  or  an  opinion ;  we  may  even  renounce  a 
thing  we  never  had,  or  a  pursuit  we  never  followed,  if  we 
are  capable  of  having  it,  are  supposed  to  have  had  it,  or  are 
liable  to  have  or  follow  it ;  as  when  a  child  has  the  prom- 
ise made  for  him  at  his  baptism,  of  '  renouncing  the  world,' 
&c.  '  To  recant '  is  limited  to  opinions,  and  implies  change  ; 
and  not  only  this,  but  an  open  declaration  of  having  changed 
the  opinion  in  question,  and  almost  a  confession  of  error. 
'  To  abjure  '  is  applied  both  to  opinions  and  to  allegiance  or 
adherence  to  any  person  or  party  ;  and  it  does  not  necessa- 
rily imply  any  change,  as  is  shown  by  the  formula  of  abjur- 
ing all  allegiance  to  the  Pope,  &c. 

Perhaps  it  may  be  added,  that  to  abjure,  properly  speak- 
ing, is  an  act  professing  to  be  performed  readily  and  of  free 
will,  while  a  recantation  or  renunciation  may  be  forced. 
We  might  say,  '  these  two  men  have  changed  in  a  very  dif- 
ferent way  ;  the  one  has  altered  his  sentiments  and  abjures 
his  opinions  ;  the  other,  rather  than  renounce  certain  privi- 
leges, was  induced  to  recant.' 


50  A    COLLECTION    OF 

'  To  abjure  '  also  preserves  much  of  its  original  meaning, 
{ab-juro,  to  swear  against)  ;  it  always  implies  a  solemn  and 
strong  protest  against  the  thing  abjured.  Wc  may  renounce 
what  we  think  good-for-nothing,  or  even  what  wc  still  value  ; 
we  may  recant  opinions  we  in  our  hearts  approve  of ;  we 
abjure  what  we  detest,  or  are  supposed  to  detest. 

^      XO    UNDERSTAND,    TO    COMPREHEND. 

The  former  of  these  verbs  is  used  in  a  much  more  ex- 
tended sense  than  the  latter.  Whatever  we  comprehend, 
we  understand  ;  but  '  to  understand  '  is  used  on  many  occa- 
sions in  which  to  comprehend  would  be  inadmissible.  We 
never  speak  of  '  not  comprehending  a  foreign  language,'  or 
indistinct  speech  ;  in  these  cases  '  understand  '  would  be  the 
correct  word.  But  we  may  comprehend  the  sense  of  some 
deep  and  abstruse  discourse  or  problem,  though  '  understand' 
might  also  be  employed  in  this  sense.  It  would  be  quite 
correct  to  say,  '  I  did  not  comprehend  his  exposition,  or  his 
arguments,  although  I  understood  the  language,  and  the 
grammatical  import  of  each  sentence.* 

Some  deep  and-  rather  hidden  meaning  seems  to  be  im- 
plied by  the  word  '  comprehend  ;  '  it  preserves  something  of 
its  old  etymology,  '  to  take  in '  ;  and  in  this  sense  many 
English  readers  arc  accustomed  to  take  for  granted  that  the 
word  '  incomprehensible  '  in  the  Athanasian  Creed,  implies 
a  deep  mystery  which  cannot  be  comprehended  :  whereas 
the  word  used  is  an  obsolete  and  now  incorrect  translation 
of  the  Latin  *■  lmme7isus,'  and  should  be  rendered  'Infinite.' 

TO    PRAISE,    TO    ADMIRE,    TO    COMMEND,    TO    EXTOL,    TO 
EULOGIZE. 

We  praise  or  commend  a  person  for  what  he  does ;  we 
admire  him  for  what  he  is ;  we  praise  his  actions  ;  we  ad- 
mire his  natural   quali*.i?s.     No  natural  endowment  can  be 


ENGLISH    SYNONYMS.  51 

correctly  praised  or  commendod.  Secondly,  '  to  admire ' 
relates  to  feeling,  rather  than  to  the  expression  of  that  feel- 
ing ;  while  '  to  praise  '  or  '  commend  '  is  the  out-.vard  expres- 
sion of  sentiments  of  esteem  or  approbation.  We  are  said 
'  to  praise '  a  person  in  verse  ;  we  could  not  be  said  to 
admire  him  in  verse,  but  to  only  give  utterance  to  our  admi- 
ration. 

'  To  praise '  has  also  a  second  and  religious  meaning, 
which  is  the.  chief  distinction  between  it  and  the  verb  '  to 
commend.'  In  '  praising  God,'  it  would  be  impious  to  con- 
ceive that  any  idea  of  approbation  or  commendation  could 
be  intended  ;  the  expression  is  nearly  synonymous  with 
'  glorify  '  or  '  magnify.' 

'  To  extol '  is  to  express  either  praise  or  admiration  in  a 
vehement  and  high-flown  manner  :  '  to  eulogize,'  is  to  do  the 
same  thing  in  a  set  discourse.  The  substantive  '  eulogy  ' 
may  be  considered  as  a  conjugate  to  both  these  verbs.  • 

TO    PROMOTE,    TO    FOR'WAKD. 

The  words  are  often,  but  not  uniformly,  synonymous. 

1st.  '  To  forward  '  applies  to  the  means  ;  '  to  promote,'  ta 
the  end.  A  philanthropist  is  said  to  promote,  not  forward, 
the  welfare  of  mankind :  he  endeavors  to  fonvard  those 
objects  which  are  undertaken  with  this  view. 

2dly.  '  To  promote  '  is  often  used  in  relation  to  some 
effect  which  is  only  heginning  to  be  produced,  while  '  to  for- 
ward '  would  be  used  when  the  cause  was  actually  in  opera- 
tion. For  instance:  '  I  have  taken  great  pains  to  j^rowo^e 
education  iii  an  uncivilized  and  ignorant  district,  aiul  the 
contributions  of  my  friends  have  done  much  to  forward  my 
views.' 

TO    BE,    TO    EXIST. 

These  two  verbs  arc  often  used  in  a  nearly  similar  sense  : 
but  '  to  exist '  refers  more  to  the   original   nature  of  things 


52  A    COLLECTION    OF 

than  '  to  be.'  Jf  wc  eay,  '  there  couhl  not  he  freedom  of 
the  press  under  a  despotic  govcrmcnt,'  we  merely  imply 
that  it  would  not  be  allowed  ;  but  the  phrase  '  freedom  of 
the  press  could  not  exist  under  a  despotic  government,' 
would  imply  an  inherent  incompatibility  in  the  nature  of  the 
'wo  institutions. 
\, 

'    TO    REMARK,    TO    OBSERVE. 

These  verbs  are  used  sometimes  to  describe  the  act  of  the 
raind,  and  sometimes  the  expression  of  that  act :  in  this  last 
sense  they  are  nearly  if  not  quite  synonymous. 

But  where  the  mental  act  is  the  thing  referred  to,  the  verb 
'  to  observe  '  is  more  general,  '  to  remark  '  more  particular. 
We  should  say,  in  reference  to  any  natural  phenomenon,  '  I 
observe  that  such  and  such  a  law  generally  prevails ;  I  re- 
marked several  instances  of  it.'  '  I  observe  he  has  a  harsh 
and  cold  demeanor  ;  if  you  watch  you  will  remark  proofs  of 
it.'  in  this  last  clause,  '  to  observe  '  might  have  been  used 
instead  of  '  to  remark :  '  but  we  do  not  usually  speak  of 
'  remarking  '  a  general  principle. 

We  speak  of  '  a  habit  of  observing  ;  '  of  '  the  advantage 
of  knowing  how  to  observe,'  &c.  ;  in  neither  of  these  cases 
could  the  verb  '  to  remark  '  be  substituted. 

TO    ENDUE,    TO    ENDOW. 

'  To  endue  '  is  limited  to  mental  qualification  :  '  to  en- 
dow '  also  includes  physical  and  worldly  ones  :  indeed,  prima- 
rily it  refers  to  property,  and  is  only  figuratively  extended 
to  qualities  of  the  mind  or  person.  An  institution  is  richly 
endowed ;  a  person  is  endowed  with  beauty,  strength,  tal- 
ents, &c. :  he  is  endowed  only  with  mental  qualifications. 

TO    SHUN,    AYOID,    ELUDE. 

We  shun  a  person  we  dislike  or  dread  :  we  avoid  either 


ENGLISH    SYNONYMS.  53 

a  person,  a  thing,  an  action  or  course  of  action  ;  we  elude 
search  or  pursuit  only.  '  To  elude  '  always  implies  literally 
or  figuratively  an  attempt  to  defeat  efforts  to  seek  or  follow 
us  ;  and  it  also  implies  (as  its  root  e-ludo  does)  a  round- 
about and  indirect  way  of  escape.  The  prisoner  we  read 
of,  who  was  set  by  the  Indians  to  run  for  his  life,  would  not 
be  said  to  elude  pursuit  as  long  as  his  course  was  on  an 
open  plain  ;  as  soon  as  he  had  recourse  to  the  bushes  and 
sought  concealment,  the  word  might  be  applicable. 

To  shun  or  avoid,  on  the  other  hand,  are  hardly  ever  used 
when  a  search  is  implied.  To  shun  is  always  personal ;  for 
when  we  speak  of  '  shunning  vice,'  &c.,  a  personification  is 
always  implied.  It  also  indicates  a  more  pointed  and 
marked  endeavor  to  keep  out  of  a  person's  way  than  '  to 
avoid,'  '  To  avoid  '  is  used  in  a  more  abstract  sense  than 
either  '  shun  '  or  '  elude  ;  '  we  not  only  avoid  persons  and 
things,  but  trouble,  thought,  &c. 

Lastly,  '  to  avoid '  '^-  and  '  to  elude  '  both  generally,  if  not 
always,  imply  success  :  which  '  shun  '  does  not.  '  To  shun ' 
is  only  to  seek  to  avoid.  We  might  say,  '  I  have  constantly 
shunned  him,  but  I  cannot  avoid  meeting  him  sometimes, 
for  I  cannot  elude  his  continued  pursuit  of  me.' 

TO    AMAZE,    TO    ASTONISH. 

'  To  astonish  '  merely  implies,  to  affect  very  strongly  with 
overpowering  wonder.  '  To  amaze  '  generally  conveys  the 
impression  of  some  degree  of  perplexity  or  bewilderment. 
It  may  be  said,  to  use  a  colloquialism,  that  we  '  do  not  know 
what  to  make '  of  anything  that  amazes  us.  We  are  aston- 
ished at  some  marvel  of  nature  or  art :  we  are  amazed  when 
a  person's  conduct  is  quite  difi'erent  from  what  we  expected. 

The  immediate  root  of  this  last  verb  —  the  word  '  maze ' 


"Originally,  to  make  void,  or  of  no  effect. 
6* 


54  A    COLLECTION    OF 

—  conveys   the  idea   of   entanglement   and   bewilderment, 
whether  mental  or  material. 

In  the  West  of  England,  '  mazed  '  is  the  exprc  ssion  used 
among  the  common  people  for  '  mad,'  still  implying  the 
same  notion  of  entanglement  in  the  brain. 

TO    EMPLOY,    TO    MAKE    USE    OF. 

'  To  employ  '  generally,  though  not  always,  implies  some 
degree  of  co-operation,  or  at  least  of  consciousness  in  the 
agent.  '  To  make  use  of '  implies  a  passive  agency.  We 
employ  an  amanuensis  —  we  make  use  of  a  pen.  Hence, 
when  a  person  is  said  to  '  make  use  '  of  another,  it  generally 
implies  an  idea  degrading  or  insulting  towards  tlic  agent ; 
which  would  not  be  conveyed  by  the  word  '  employ.'  A 
person  is  made  use  of  unconsciously,  or  perhaps  even  against 
his  will.  A  confidential  second  is  employed  by  his  superior: 
a  tool  in  the  hands  of  an  intriguer  is  made  use  of.  Hence, 
we  speak  of  a  person's  employing  himself,  but  making  use 
of  his  faculties. 

Both  these  Avords,  correctly  speaking,  imply  the  use  of 
means  to  an  end,  and  do  not  apply  to  any  act  which  is  itself 
the  end.  Hence  the  expression  common  among  the  lower 
classes  of  Irish,  '  to  make  use  of  food,'  sounds  anomalous  in 
the  ears  of  strangers.  It  is  true  that  the  act  of  taking  food, 
and  of  inhaling  air,  is  a  means  used  for  the  purpose  of  sup- 
porting life  ;  but  in  breathing  and  eating  this  is  not  contem- 
plated at  the  moment,  these  acts  being  instinctive  :  there- 
fore, the  expression  '  to  make  use  of '  does  not  apply  to 
them. 

SHALL,    -WILL. 

These  two  verbs  have  undergone  curious  alterations.  In 
very  old  English,  '  shall '  indicated  simple  futurity,  and 
'  will '  intention. 


ENGLISH    STKONYMS.  55 

At  the  time  our  Bible  translation  was  made,  the  language 
in  this  respect  was  in  a  state  of  transition  ;  in  some  cases, 
the  two  verbs  were  used  in  the  old  sense,  while  in  others 
they  were  applied  nearly  in  our  modern  acceptation.  For 
instance,  in  2  Kings,  we  read  —  '  Ahab  shall  slay  me  ; '  and 
in  Gal.  v., '  Walk  in  the  spirit,  and  ye  shall  not  fulfil  the  lusts 
of  the  flesh.' 

In  both  these  sentences,  '  will '  would  be  used  in  modern 
English  ;  and  in  many  others  a  misapprehension  of  the  real 
meaning  of  the  sacred  writers  is  induced  by  a  forgetfulness 
of  this  difference.  But  then,  again,  in  John  xvi.  2,  we  have, 
'  Whosoever  killeth  you  will  think  that  he  doeth  God  ser- 
vice : '  '  will '  is  here  employed  exactly  as  it  would  be  in 
modern  English. 

It  is  difficult  to  define  intelligibly  to  a  foreigner  the 
modern  use  of  these  two  words,  though  throughout  the 
whole  of  England  no  misuse  of  them  can  be  observed, 
even  among  the  lowest  of  the  people.'^*'  But  in  Ireland  they 
are  constantly  reversed,  and  in  Scotland  '  will '  is  used  im- 
properly, though  '  shall  '  is  not. 

In  our  modern  use  of  these  verbs,  we  have  curiously 
divided  the  persons  of  each.  '/  will,  you  shall,  he  shall,' 
denotes  a  futurity  connected  with  the  will  of  the  speaker  : 
while,  '  I  shall,  you  vnll,  he  will,'  implies  a  futurity  uncon- 
nected with  the  speaker's  resolve.  For  instance,  we  should 
say,  '  I  will  go,  you  shall  go,  he  shall  go  '  —  but  '  I  shall 
die,  you  will  die,  he  will  die.' 

We  always  say,  '  I  shall  attain  such  an  age  next  birthday  : ' 
if  '  will  *  were  substituted,  it  would  imply  a  power  of  volun- 

*The  expression  common  in  the  West  of  England,  *  I  will  if  I  shall,' 
cannot  be  considered  an  exception  ;  for  it  is  an  ellipso  for  '  I  will  if 
you  say  that  I  shall. 


56  A    COLLECTION    OF 

tarily  determining  our  age.  '  You  shall  liave  some  money 
to-morrow '  implies  '  I  will  procure  it  for  you.'  '  You  will 
have  it,'  indicates  an  expectation  quite  independent  of  the 
speaker's  intentions.  When,  however,  will  is  emphatic,  so 
that  one  would  write  it  underscored,  or  in  italics,  as  denoting 
resolute  determination,  it  has  the  same  sense  in  all  three 
persons ;  as  for  instance,  —  '  I  [or  you,  or  he]  will  take 
this  course,  whatever  may  be  said  to  the  contrary.'  The 
opposite  to  '  will '  in  this  sense,  is  not  '  shall '  but  '  must ; ' 
as,  '  I  [or  you,  or  he]  must  submit  to  this,  however  un- 
willingly.' 

There  are  some  cases  in  which  either  '  shall '  or  '  will ' 
might  be  used,  but  in  which  the  meaning  would  be  modified 
according  to  the  word  employed.  In  answering  a  request, 
'/itfiVZ,'  indicates  compliance;  *■  I  shalV  would  convey  an 
intention  of  doing  the  thing  asked,  quite  independently  of 
any  wish  to  gratify  the  asker.  '  I  shall  go,'  indicates  simple 
futurity ;  '  I  loill  go,'  both  futurity  and  a  determined  inten- 
tion. '  I  shall  go,'  in  a  case  where  we  are  determined, 
expresses  therefore  less  than  we  mean  :  and  we  sometimes 
use  this  form  of  under-stating  our  meaning,  —  or  what  the 
Greeks  called  Eironeia,  —  to  express  very  strong  resolution. 
Hence  the  common  expression  — '  I  shall  do  no  such  thing  ' 
—  '  He  won't  make  me  do  so  '  —  which  are  often  used  to 
convey  the  strongest  idea  of  determination,  and  therefore, 
at  first  sight,  appear  exceptions  to  the  rules  here  laid  down. 

TO    REND,    TO    TEAK. 

'  To  rend '  differs  from  '  to  tear  ;  '  first,  in  implying  volun- 
tary action,  never  accidental,  while  '  tear '  may  apply  to 
either.  We  may  tear  a  dress  in  falling  down  :  an  eastern 
mourner  rends  his  garments  to  express  grief.  We  do,  in- 
deed, speak  of  rocks  being  rent  by  an  earthquake,  or  sails 


ENGLISH    SYNONYMS,  5? 

by  the  wind  ;  *   but  the  natural  agent  is  always  supposed  to 
be  personified. 

Secondly,  '  to  rend  '  always  implies  splitting  or  dividing  : 
we  are  said  to  tear,  not  rend  the  hair :  an  exile  is  torn,  not 
rent,  from  his  native  land.  A  tree  is  rent  by  lightning, 
and  torn  up  by  the  roots  by  a  high  wind. 

*  See  the  lines  in  Scott's  .Marmion,  canto  vi.  :  — 
*  The  pennon  sunk  and  rose  ; 
As  bends  the  bark's  mast  in  the  gale, 
When  rent  are  rigging,  shrouds,  and  sail. 
It  wavered  'mid  the  foes.' 


68  A    COLLECTION    OP 


ADJECTIVES. 

CIVIL,    rOLITE,     COURTEOUS,    POLISHED,    WELL-BEED. 

Civility  is  noic  something  less  than  politeness  or  courtesy. 
In  old  English  it  was  used  for  elegance,  or  polish  in  general 
(see  Pilgrim^ s  Progress).  It  now  implies  that  attention  to 
others  which  is  ahsolutely  necessary,  and  no  more.  If  a 
servant-maid,  or  a  workman,  is  spoken  of  as  being  civil,  it 
is  considered  as  a  term  of  approbation,  because  no  more  is 
expected  from  them ;  but  with  the  higher  classes  civility 
ought  to  be  taken  for  granted,  and  something  more  of  pre- 
venance and  polish  of  manners  is  expected. 

The  difference  between  '  courtesy '  on  the  one  hand,  and 
'  politeness '  and  '  polish '  on  the  other,  is,  that  courtesy  has 
more  reference  to  others,  politeness  to  ourselves.  We  may 
say  indifferently,  '  He  received  me  courteously,*  or  '  He  re- 
ceived me  politely ; '  but  in  the  one  case  we  should  be 
dwelling  on  the  attention  he  was  paying  to  us,  as  a  part 
of  his  duty  to  us  ;  and  in  the  other,  on  the  behavior  as- 
sumed by  him  from  proper  self-respect.  Courtesy,  then, 
seems  to  imply  more  kindliness  of  feeling.  Politeness  has, 
indeed,  been  defined  as  '  benevolence  in  trifles ' ;  but  this 
outward  benevolence  may  spring  merely  from  outward 
regard  for  the  opinion  of  the  world,  without  real  kindness 
of  heart.  Hence,  St.  Peter  does  not  recommend  us  to  be 
'  polite,*  but  to  be  '  courteous,'  because  he  is  treating  of  our 
duty  towards  our  neighbors,  not  of  what  is  due  to  ourselves. 
In  short,  a  man  is  polite  for  himself —  courteous  for  others. 


ENGLISH    SYNOXYMS.  59 

Polish  refers  even  more  completely  to  ourselves  than 
politeness.  We  should  not  speak  of  '  behaving  to  such  a 
person   in  a  polished   manner,'    but  '  politely.'     In  short, 

•  politeness  '  occupies  a  place  half-way  between  '  polish  '  and 
'  courtesy.'  '  Polish  '  also  implies  a  high  degree  of  elegance 
and  refinement,  and  cannot  exist  without  considerable  culti- 
vation ;  it  seems,  as  it  were,  to  belong  to  artificial  life. 

'  Well-bred  '  is  rather  referable  to  general  conduct  than 
to  particular  actions.  A  well-lred  person  will  behave  po- 
litely to  others.  It  also  implies  general  propriety  of  beha- 
vior whether  connected  with  others  or  not.  '  Ill-bred,'  on 
the  other  hand,  is  oftener  applied  to  individual  actions  than 
'  well-bred,'  though  it  applies  equally  to  general  conduct. 
We  say,  '  that  is  a  very  ill-bred  speech,'  but  we  should  not 
speak  of  a  well-bred  speech,  but  rather  of  well-bred  conduct 
and  deportment.  It  originally  referred  to  a  good  early  edu- 
cation, and  still  indicates  that  conduct  and  those  manners 
which  would  be  the  natural  effect  of  such  an  education. 

^  GRACEFUL,    ELEGANT. 

Grace  is  in  a  great  measure  a  natural  gift ;  elegance 
implies  cultivation,  or  something  of  a  more  artificial  charac- 
ter. A  rustic,  uneducated  girl  may  be  graceful  ;  but  an 
elegant  woman  must  be  accomplished  and  well  trained.  It 
is  the  same  with  things  as  with  persons ;  we  talk  of  a  grace- 
ful tree,  but  of  an  elegant  house  or  other  building.  Animals 
may  be  graceful,  but  they  cannot  be  elegant.  The  move- 
ments of  a  kitten,  or  a  young  fawn,  are  full  of  grace  ;  but 
to   call    them  elegant   animals    would   be    absurd.     Lastly, 

*  eleo-ant '  may  be  applied  to  mental  qualifications,  whigh 
'  graceful '  never  can.  Elegance  must  always  imply  some- 
thing that  is  made  or  invented  by  man.  An  imitation  of 
nature  is  not  called  so  ;  therefore  we  do  not  speak  of  an 
'  elegant  picture,'  though  we  do  of  an  elegant  pattern  for  a 
gown,  an  elegant  piece  of  work. 


60  A    COLLECTION    OF 

With  respect  to  the  other  fine  arts,  it  is  a  curious  fact, 
that  though  music  aud  poetry  are  both  reckoned  as  the 
offspring  of  the  mind,  yet  the  term  '  elegant,'  which  is  con- 
stantly applied  to  a  poem,  is  not  admitted  in  speaking  of  a 
piece  of  music.  The  reason  of  this  may  perhaps  be,  that 
poetry  is  really  more  emphatically  the  production  of  the 
mind  than  music.  If  disagreeable  images,  or  discordant 
metres,  are  introduced,  the  poetry  is  bad,  but  still  it  is 
poetry,  and  the  fault  that  we  find  with  it  rests  on  the  very 
fact  of  its  being  such.  On  the  other  hand,  musicals  called 
bad  if  it  is  feeble,  heavy,  or  tasteless ;  but  unless  the 
musical  notes  are  selected  in  obedience  to  certain  laws, 
they  are  not  music.  Strictly  speaking,  false  chords  should 
not  be  denominated  '  bad  music,'  but  no  music  at  all.  The 
laws  of  melody  and  harmony  are  laws  of  nature,  as  immu- 
table as  the  laws  of  gravitation.  The  musician  has  a  large 
choice  of  various  combinations,  but  not  an  unlimited  one ; 
he  must  adherfe  to  these  laws,  and  is  not  permitted  to  invent 
any  combination  of  notes  at  variance  with  them. 

But  whether  this  difference  between  music  and  poetry  be 
considered  as  altogether  holding  good  or  not,  certain  it  is 
that  music  seems  to  be  regarded  as  belonging  more  to  nature 
than  to  art.  Melodies  are  discovered,  rather  than  invented  ; 
and  hence,  while  '  graceful '  is  a  term  often  used  in  refer- 
ence to  them,  '  elegant '  is  not. 

When  used  in  connection  with  the  productions  of  the 
intellect,'  '  elegant '  is  always  applied  to  the  lighter  branches 
of  study.  '  An  elegant  scholar,'  '  elegant  literature,'  are 
terms  always  implying  a  reference  to  the  Belles  Leltres. 
Lastly,  '  elegant '  is  applied  to  a  kind  of  merit  which  con- 
sists rather  in  the  absence  of  glaring  faults  than  in  striking 
beauties.  An  elegant  poem  is  smooth  and  well  constructed, 
but  not  a  work  of  original  genius.  '  Graceful,'  on  the  other 
hand,   is   frequently   applied   to   bodily  movements ;  which 


ENGLISH    SYNONYMS.  61 

scarcely  ever  is  the  case  with  elegant.  Even  in  speaking 
of  movements  which  are  acquired,  and  therefore  to  a  cer- 
tain extent  artificial,  the  Avord  '  graceful '  is  used  instead  of 
'  elegant ; '  as  a  graceful  dancer ;  a  graceful  manner  of 
doing  the  honors  of  a  table.  This  sense  of  the  word  forms, 
perhaps,  an  exception  to  the  general  rule  —  that  elegance  is 
the  characteristic  of  art,  and  grace  of  nature. 

'  Grace  '  originally  meant '  favor,'  and  the  deri^-ative,  '  gra- 
cious,' has  preserved  the  same  meaning.  The  religious 
sense  of  the  word  was  evidently  from  the  same  origin. 


^ 


BEAUTIFUL,    HANDSOME,    PRETTY,    LOVELY,    FINE. 

'  Beautiful '  includes  all  the  other  terms  of  admiration 
mentioned  here  :  and  is  stronger  than  any  of  them,  except, 
perhaps,  '  lovely.'  From  being  generally  opposed  to  the 
sublime,  it  has  gradually  come  to  imply  a  certain  degree  of 
softness  and  delicacy  which  makes  it  inapplicable  to  a  man, 
for  whom  the  only  terms  of  admiration  are  '  handsome  ' 
and  *  fine.' 

'  Handsome  '  implies  —  1st.  Not  exactly  an  artificial  beau- 
ty, but  the  beauty  of  some  person  or  thing  which  is  trained 
or  cultivated.  We  speak  of  a  '  handsome  '  man  or  woman, 
a  '  handsome  '  house,  a  '  handsome  '  horse,  or  dog,  or  tree  ; 
but  we  should  not  speak  of  a  '  handsome  '  wild  animal,  or  a 
'  handsome  '  prospect :  (though  these  expressions  are  incor- 
rectly used  by  the  Irish  and  Americans.) 

2dly.  '  Handsome '  implies  beauty  on  a  large  scale.  A 
lady  who  is  very  petite  and  slight  in  figure,  an  infant,  or  a 
small  animal,  is  never  called  '  handsome.' 

3dly.  It  excludes  the  highest  degree  of  beauty  ;  and  the 
Kame  is  the  case  when  applied  to  moral  conduct.  '  Hand- 
some behavior '  is  behavior  that  is  liberal,  fair,  right,  honor- 
able ;  but  a  heroically  generous  action  would  never  be 
called  '  handsome.' 
6 


02  A    COLLECTION    OF 

'  Pretty  '  is  applied  to  external  beauty  on  a  small  scale, 
and  never  of  a  very  high  order.  It  implies  softness  and 
delicacy,  and  is  therefore  never  used  for  a  man  except  in 
contempt. 

'  Lovely '  implies  something  more  than  mere  external 
beauty.  It  may  be  applied  to  the  mind  as  well  as  the  per- 
son. We  usually  understand  by  it  personal  beauty  and 
pleasing  manners  combined.  A  woman  who  is  disagree- 
able and  ungraceful  would  never  be  called  a  '  lovely ' 
woman,  however  faultless  her  features  may  be, 

'  Fine '  is  perliaps  a  more  puzzling  word  than  any  of  the 
group.  Its  original  sense  was  that  of  something  delicate, 
subtle,  slender,  fin,  in  short  ;  and  this  has  been  preserved 
in  one  sense  of  the  word,  in  speaking,  for  example,  of  a 
•  fine  '  edge,  a  '  fine  '  sense  of  touch  or  hearing,  a  '  fine ' 
thread,  &c.  Bat  its  other  and  commonest  meaning  is,  — 
beauty  of  rather  a  large  and  coarse  kind — the  reverse  oi 
delicate.  A  '  fine  '  face  is  one  with  a  bold  and  strongly 
marked  contour  ;  a  '  fine '  child  is  a  stout,  rosy,  healthy 
child  ;  a  '  fine  '  woman  is  one  whose  features  and  figure  are 
rather  on  a  large  scale. 

'  BMne  '  in  its  third  sense  implies  over-fastidious,  proud, 
ready  to  give  oneself  airs.  The  conjugate  word,  finery,  is 
nearest  to  this  sense  of  the  word.  Its  origin  was  probably 
the  Latin  finis,  an  end  ;  it  was  first  transferred  to  an  edge 
or  sharp  pyiiit,  and  thence  to  something  subtle  and  delicate. 

'  Fine  '  in  the  sense  of  an  amende,  a  sum  of  money  paid 
down  as  a  penalty,  has  probably  tlie  same  root ;  the  end  of 
a  trial  or  lawsuit  being  the  payment  of  the  forfeited  sum. 

SIXCEEE,    nOXEST,    UPRIGHT. 

*  Sincerity  '  may  be  used  in  two  senses  ;  and  this  leads  to 
much  ambiguity  in  reasoning.  It  may  either  mean,  on 
the  one  hand,  reality  of  conviction  and  earnestness  of  pur* 


ENGLISH    SYNONYMS.  63 

pose,  —  or,  on  the  other,  purity  from  all  unfairness  or  dis- 
honesty. Many  people  overlook  this  ;  they  will  speak  of 
a  man's  being  '  sincere,'  when  they  mean  he  has  a  real 
conviction  that  his  end  is  a  good  one,  —  and  imagine  this 
must  imply  that  he  is  '  honest ;  '  whereas,  he  may  be  '  sin- 
cere '  in  his  desire  to  gain  his  end,  and  dishoticsl  in  the 
means  he  employs  for  that  end.  '  Honest,'  on  the  other 
hand,  is  not  an  ambiguous  term  ;  it  implies  straightforward- 
ness and  fairness  of  conduct.  '  Upright,'  implies  honesty 
and  dignity  of  character  ;  it  is  the  opposite  of  '  meanness,* 
as  '  honesty  '  is  of  '  shuffling  '  or  '  insincerity.'  '•'• 

"WONDERFUL,  STRANGE,  SUKPRISING,  ADMIRABLE,  CURIOUS. 

We  admire  what  is  excellent,  noble,  glorious,  eminent ; 
we  are,  properly  speaking,  surprised  simply  at  what  is 
unexpected ;  we  wonder  at  what  is  extraowlinary,  lofty, 
great,  or  striking,  although  it  may  not  be  unexpected. 

An  intelligent  mind  will  be  filled  with  wonder  while  con 
templating  many  of  the  works  of  nature,  although  they  may 
be  well  known,  and  even  familiar. 

The  word  '  strange  '  refers,  as  well  as  '  wonderful,'  to 
something  in  itself  imcommon  ;  but  '  wonderful  '  is  applied 
to  something  great  or  noble,  something,  in  short,  above  the 
common  ;  while  '  strange '  signifies  rather  what  is  beside 
the  common  —  in  short,  something  odd.  We  should  not 
say,  in  speaking  of  the  higher  and  more  sublime  phenomena 
of  the  creation,  that  they  are  '  strange,'  but  that  they  are 
'  wonderful ;  '  but  any  oddity  or  freak  of  nature,  on  a 
smaller  scale,  we  call  '  strange.' 

Nothing  that  awakens  any  feeling  of  awe  or  sublimity,  or 
xny  poetical  feeling,  would  be  called  '  strange  ;  *  hence   it 


•  •  Upriglit '  may  be  considered  as  the  conjugate  of  the  substantive 
» rectitude.' 


61  A    COLLECTION    OF 

often  happens  that  new  and  remarkable  natural  phenomena, 
or  striking  discoveries,  awaken  a  sentiment  of  wonder  in 
thoughtful  and  inquiring  minds,  while  the  vulgar  and 
thoughtless  designate  them  as  '  very  strange.' 

Lastly,  what  is  positively  unpleasant  to  the  eye  or  mind 
may  be  '  strange,'  but  not  '  wonderful.'  We  speak  of  '  won- 
derfully beautiful,'  but  of  '  strangely  ugly.' 

'  Curious  '  means  something  '  wonderful '  on  a  small  scale; 
it  is  perhaps  nearer  to  '  strange  '  in  its  meaning,  but  does 
not  exclude  the  idea  of  beauty.  The  minute  parts  of  a  leaf 
or  flower  are  at  once  '  curious '  and  beautiful.  In  old 
English,  '  strange  '  was  used  where  '  wonderful '  would  now 
be  employed.     Shakespeare  speaks  of  '  strange  swiftness.' 

SILLY,    FOOLISH,    ABSURD,  WEAK,    STUPID,    SIMPLE,    DULL. 

'  Silly'  is  most  commonly  applied  to  words,  writings, 
manners,  or  character  ;  '  foolish  '  to  actions.  We  speak  of 
a  '  silly '  book,  a  '  silly  '  speech,  a  '  silly '  manner ;  but 
seldom  of  taking  a  '  silly  '  step,  committing  a  '  silly  '  action  ; 
in  these  last  cases,  we  use  the  word  '  foolish.'  '  Silly '  very 
frequently,  though  not  always,  implies  deficiency  of  intellect 
or  feebleness  of  character  ;  '  foolish '  an  ahuse  of  intellect. 
A  '  foolish  '  man  is  one  who  does  not  make  use  of  the 
sense  he  possesses.  More  of  blame  is  implied  in  the  word 
'  foolish  ;  '  more  of  contempt  in  '  silly.' 

'  Weak '  implies  some  moral  deficiency ;  a  Aveak  man  is 
one  who  either  wants  sufficient  firmness  to  maintain  his 
principles,  or  wants  clearness  of  moral  sense  to  perceive 
distinctly  what  is  right. 

'  Absurd  '  applied  to  an  action,  implies  something  laugh- 
able. An  absurd  person  is  one  who  commits  ridiculous  acts 
of  folly. 

'  Stupid '  is    used  merely  to   express  a  lumpish,  heavy, 


ENGLISH    SYNONYMS.  65 

cloudy  perception  of  every  thing  proceeding  from  a  want  of 
intellect.     It  is  entirely  a  negative  quality. 

'  Dull '  is  not  quite  the  same  ;  it  implies  slowness,  but  not 
necessarily  deficiency  of  intellect.  A  boy  who  is  slow  and 
dull  in  learning,  may,  nevertheless,  be  not  wanting  in  sense, 
and  may  be  able  to  understand  a  subject  well,  when  once 
he  has  mastered  its  difficulties. 

'  Simple,'  when  it  is  applied  to  an  act  of  folly,  implies  a 
want  of  quicksightedness  —  of  what  the  French  call  savoir 
faire,  springing  either  from  natural  deficiency  or  want  of 
experience.  The  French  bonhommie  and  the  Greek  Euthes 
are  used  to  signify  the  same  thing. 

y 

JOYFUL,    GLAD,    PLEASED,    DELIGHTED,    GRATIFIED. 

'Joyful,'  and  its  conjugate  word,  'joy,'  are  used  for  the 
highest  degree  of  pleasure,  and  always  for  pleasure  excited 
by  some  external  event.  They  are  in  their  nature  transient ; 
though  'joys '  is  used  in  a  different  sense,  implying  a  very 
high  degree  of  pleasure,  whether  externally  excited  at  the 
moment  or  not. 

'  Glad  '  is  the  lowest  degree  of  pleasure  ;  it  answers  to 
'  sorry,'  as  an  opposite  term  —  like  '  sorry,'  too,  it  was  used 
in  a  stronger  sense  in  old  English :  '  Then  are  they  glad, 
because  they  are  at  rest.'     (Psalm  cvii.) 

'  Pleased '  may  imply  either  gladness  or  approbation. 
'  Delighted '  is  a  much  stronger  expression  of  tlie  same  feel- 
ing. 

'  Gratified  '  always  refers  to  a  pleasure  conferred,  by  some 
human  agent,  but  is  not  the  same  as  '  grateful.'  '  Grate- 
ful '  refers  to  the  feeling  of  the  recipient  towards  the  donor; 
'  gratified '  implies  a  sense  of  pleasure  modified  by  the  con- 
sideration that  in  part  we  owe  it  to  another. 

Conjugate  words.  —  '  Joyous  '  is   used  for  a  mood  of  the 
mind  —  a  state  of  feeling  occasioned  by  high  animal  spirits 
6* 


66  A    COLLECTION    OF 

'ICnjoy'  is  used  in  a  lower  sense;  it  merely  implies  a 
sense  of  the  pleasures  around  us.  '  Enjoyment,'  when 
used  alone,  is  rather  lower  still  —  more  connected  with  the 
pleasures  of  the  senses.  A  cow  grazing  in  a  rich  pasture 
would  be  said  to  he  in  a  state  of  '  enjoyment.' 

'To  rejoice'  is  nearly  the  same  as  'to  be  glad,'  but 
stronger.  '  To  gladden  '  is  decidedly  stronger  than  '  glad  : ' 
it  preserves  more  of  the  early  meaning  of  the  word ;  and  so 
does  '  gladness.' 

'  Gratification  '  is  not  exactly  the  same  as  '  gratified  ; '  it 
does  not  necessarily  imply  that  the  pleasure  is  conferred  by 
another  person.  It  is  frequently  used  for  sensual  enjoy- 
ment —  as,  '  the  gratifications  of  the  palate.'  '  To  gratify  ' 
is  sometimes  used  for  satisfying  a  desire  —  as,  '  to  gratify 
the  appetite  ; '  still  more  for  a  mental  passion  —  as,  '  to  g7'at- 
ify  vanity  or  ambition.' 

IDLE,  LAZY,  INDOLENT,  SLOTHFUL. 

'  Slothful '  and  '  indolent '  are  applied  to  a  general  slow- 
ness and  languor,  and  hatred  of  movement  or  exertion.  An 
'  indolent '  person  likes  always  to  remain  quiet.  A  '  lazy  ' 
person  is  one  Avho  is  disposed  to  be  idle.  It  is  more  applied 
to  the  disposition  itself:  'idleness'  to  a  tendency  to  yield 
to  it.  Eut  an  '  idle  '  person  may  be  active  in  his  way  ;  he 
may  even  be  very  persevering  in  following  up  some  scheme 
of  his  own  ;  but  he  will  be  reluctant  to  force  himself  to  do 
what  he  does  not  like,  and  he  will  seldom  like  continuous 
exertion  of  any  kind.  Many  idle  boys  will  work  very  hard 
at  their  own  sports,  and  take  great  pains  to  leap,  run,  or 
play  at  games ;  but  neglect  their  lessons.  A  lazy  person, 
on  the  other  hand,  may  employ  himself,  but  will  dislike  the 
trouble  of  getting  up  to  fetch  a  dictionary  if  he  is  learning 
a  lesson,  or  of  going  to  consult  some  person  who  might  help 
him  in  the  business  he  is  transacting ;  and  to  spare  himself 


ENGLISH    SYNONYMS.  67 

the  exertion,  he  will  be  obliged  to  work  harder  in  the  end  : 
hence  the  proverb,  that  '  lazy  people  take  the  most  trouble.' 
'  Lazy  '  may  be  considered  as  the  opposite  to  '  alert.' 
'  Slothful '  and  'indolent'  as  opposed  to  '  active.' 
'  Idle  '  as  opposed  to  '  busy,'  and   '  negligent '   to  '  dili- 
gent.' 

GRATEFUL,    THANKFUL. 

*  Grateful '  is  an  expression  most  commonly  used  in  refer- 
ence to  a  human  agent  who  has  conferred  some  special 
favor  on  us.  '  Thankful '  is  more  commonly  applied  to 
express  our  feeling  of  the  goodness  of  Providence.  One 
who  makes  an  ill  return  for  the  kindness  of  a  benefactor  is 
*  ungrateful ; '  one  v/ho  is  forgetful  of  the  mercies  shown 
him  by  his  Creator  is  '  unthankful.'  '  Thankfulness  '  and 
'  unthankfulness  '  are  more  used  to  describe  the  state  of  a 
person's  mind  :  '  gratitude,'  and  still  more,  '  ingratitude,' 
for  the  conduct  springing  from  the  state  of  mind.  This, 
perhaps,  follows  from  the  first  proposition,  as  we  cannot 
make  any  return  for  the  benefits  of  Providence,  and  can 
only  prove  our  gratitude  by  the  state  of  our  minds.  '  Grate- 
ful,' however,  is  more  applied  to  disposition,  and  less  to 
conduct,  than  '  ungrateful.' 

A^      FRUITLESS,    USELESS,    INEFFECTUAL,    VAIN. 

'  Fruitless  '  is  generally  applied  to  an  undertaking  which 
fails,  not  from  its  being  ill-calculated  to  produce  good  effects, 
but  from  some  unexpected  hinderance  or  calamity  arising  to 
frustrate  it.  For  example,  '  Such  an  one  has  made  a  fruit- 
less attempt  to  dissuade  his  friend  from  the  rash  step  he  was 
about  to  take  :  '  here  the  attempt  is  supposed  to  fail,  not  from 
its  being  unwise  or  ill-judged,  but  from  the  obstinacy  or 
folly  of  the  person  advised. 


68  A    COLLECTION    OF 

'  Useless,'  on  the  other  hand,  is  applied  to  undertakings 
which  are  in  themselves  ill-calculated  for  success. 

We  should  say  to  a  very  self-willed  person,  '  It  is  useless 
to  advise  you '  —  meaning,  '  your  character  makes  such 
attempts  utterly  hopeless,  and  it  is  ill-advised  of  any  one 
who  knows  you  to  make  them.' 

A  bad  crab-tree,  and  an  apple-tree  spoilt  by  a  blight,  are 
equally  unlikely  to  produce  good  fruit ;  but  the  first  it  is 
'  useless,'  the  second  '  fruitless,'  to  attempt  to  improve. 

'  Ineffectual '  nearly  resembles  '  fruitless,'  but  implies  a 
failure  of  a  less  hopeless  character.  We  might  say,  '  I  de- 
sisted, finding  all  my  efforts  fruitless : '  but  '  after  several 
ineffectual  efforts  I  at  last  succeeded.' 

'  Vain,'  in  the  sense  in  which  we  are  now  considering  it, 
is  nearly  synonymous  with  '  fruitless.' 

FKAJiTK,    OPEN,    CANDID,    INGENUOUS. 

'  Open '  is  generally  applied  to  dispositions,  not  to  speeches. 
An  '  open  '  disposition  merely  implies  a  disposition  to  speak 
out  what  is  in  the  mind  —  a  difficulty  in  concealment. 

'  Frank,'  on  the  other  hand,  is  oftener  applied  to  words  or 
manners,  though  a  disposition  is  sometimes  called  '  frank.' 
It  is  a  more  active  quality,  so  to  speak,  than  '  openness.' 
A  timid  person  may  be  open  ;  one  who  is  '  frank  '  must  be 
bold  and  fearless  :  it  is  sometimes  used  for  a  freedom  of 
speech  that  borders  on  bluntness. 

'  Ingenuous '  implies  a  moral  quality  ;  it  includes  both 
openness  and  candor.  A  person  who  is  open  merely  from 
deficiency  in  natural  reserve,  would  not  be  necessarily 
called  '  ingenuous  ;  '  and  '  cZtsingenuous  '  is  always  used  as 
a  term  of  blame. 

'  Candor '  signifies  fairness  of  mind  —  readiness  to  ac- 
knowledge an  error.     One  who  can  see  what  is  right,  and 


ENGLISH    SYNONYMS.  69 

cast  aside  all  prejudice  in  owning  it,  is  '  candid.'    It  implies, 
indeed,  nearly  the  same  disposition  as  '  ingenuous.'  * 

KASH,     FOOL-HARDY. 

'  Rashness  '  is,  correctly  speaking,  applied  to  some  risk 
encountered  for  the  sake  of  something  in  itself  important, 
though  not  so  as  to  be  adequate  to  the  danger  inciu'red. 
To  be  '  fool-hardy,'  on  the  other  hand,  is  to  run  a  risk  for 
the  sake  of  some  trifling  and  unimportant  object,  or  from 
mere  wantonness.  For  instance,  a  soldier  who  should 
charge  an  overwhelming  body  of  the  enemy  at  the  head  of 
a  handful  of  men,  would  be  '  rash  :  '  but  one  who  should 
expose  himself  to  a  battery  of  cannon,  merely  to  obtain  a 
draught  of  water,  would  be  '  fool-hardy.' 

'  TRANSIENT,    TRANSITORY,    FLEETING. 

What  is  '  transient '  is  in  itself  momentary  and  short  in 
duration  ;  what  is  '  transitory  '  is  liable  to  pass  away.  The 
one  expression  directs  attention  to  its  shortness,  the  other  to 
its  uncertainty.  All  earthly  pleasures  are  '  transitory  ;  '  the 
diversions  which  yield  but  momentary  amusements  are 
transient,'  or  '  fleeting.'  These  two  words  are  nearly 
alfke  :  but  '  fleeting  '  refers  rather  to  the  fact  of  their  being 
iti  the  act  of  passing  away,  '  transient '  to  their  shortness  of 
stay.  '  Transient '  and  fleeting '  may  also  be  applied  to 
objects  of  sight,  as  light  or  colors  :  '  transitory '  only  to 
abstract  thino^s. 


*  The  Greeks  do  not  appear  to  have  had  any  word  answering  to 
'  candid.'  In  the  Greek  Testament  the  word  gennaios,  noble,  or  gen- 
erous, is  used  in  describing  the  fairness  of  mind  with  which  the  Bereaug 
searched  the  Scriptures. 


70  A    COLLECTION    OP 


BKIGUT,    SHINING,    SPAKKLING,     BRILLIANT,    GLISTENING, 
GLITTERING. 

Of  these  words,  two,  '  sparkling  '  and  '  brilliant,'  especially 
the  latter,  are  very  frequently  used  in  a  figurative  sense. 
We  speak  of  '  brilliant  talents '  as  often  as  of  a  '  brilliant 
gem.'  The  two  first  words,  on  the  other  hand,  '  bright  ' 
and  '  shining,'  are  usually  applied  only  to  the  literal  cff'ects 
of  light ;  though  they,  too,  are  occasionally  used  figura- 
tively. *  Bright '  has  the  most  extended  signification  of 
all  these  words,  and  includes  them  all.  '  Shining  '  is  most 
commonly  applied  to  the  effect  of  light  on  a  smooth  or 
polished  surface. 

'  Sparkling  '  is  used  for  the  fitful  and  rapid  emission  of 
points  or  flashes  of  light.  It  is  figuratively  applied  to  those 
mental  powers  which  show  themselves  in  rapid,  sudden  scin- 
tillations :  as  '  sparkling  wit,'  or  gayety.  A  diamond,  or 
finely  cut  piece  of  crystal,  is  '  sparkling  ;  '  the  sea  often 
sparkles  in  the  sun  ;  a  plate  of  polished  metal  is  '  shining  ; ' 
but  both  would  be  called  '  bright.' 

'  Brilliant '  is  a  stronger  expression  than  '  bright,'  Avhen 
used  in  its  literal  sense.  '  Bright '  and  '  shining  '  are  now 
scarce  ever  used  figuratively,  (unless  the  modern  expres- 
sion, '  a  bright  face,'  '  a  bright  smile,'  be  considered  as 
such,)  except  in  a  negative  sense,  as  '  he  is  not  very  bright,' 
'  he  has  no  shining  talents.^ 

'  Glittering  '  implies  a  fitful,  scintillating  light,  but  less 
concentrated  and  intense,  and  more  broken  and  scattered 
than  what  ve  describe  as  '  sparkling.'  An  icicle  is  '  glitter- 
ing ;  '  a  diamond  is  '  sparkling.'  The  human  eye  is  not 
usually  said  to  '  glitter,'  but  to  '  sparkle,'  except  when  a 
wild,  unsteady  glance  is  indicated. 

'  Glistening,'  on  the  other  hand,  implies  a  soft  and  yet 


ENGLISH    SYNONYMS.  71 

fitful  liglit,  modified  by  moisture.     The  moonbeams  '  glis- 
ten '  on  the  water,  the  eyes  through  tears. 

TIMID,    COAVAKDLY,    TIMOROUS,    DASTARDLY. 

'  Timid  '  is  applied  both  to  the  state  of  mind  (sometimes 
transient)  in  which  a  person  may  happen  to  be  at  the  mo- 
ment, and  to  the  habitual  disposition  ;  '  timorous,'  only  to 
the  disposition.  '  Timid  '  is  therefore,  the  more  extensive 
term,  and  comprehends  the  meanings  of  '  timorous  '  as  well 
as  its  own.  Both  are  equally  applied  to  a  dread  of  personal 
danger  ;  but  '  timorous  '  is  oftener  used  for  inorai  danger 
than  '  timid.'  Both  are  equally  applied  to  character. 
'  Cowardly  '  and  '  dastardly  '  are  used  alike  for  character 
and  conduct,  and  both  as  terms  of  strong  reproach.  '  Das- 
tardly implies  meanness  as  well  as  cowardice.  '  Cowar- 
dice '  is  merely  timidity  carried  into  action.  A  timid  man 
may  be  led  by  strong  motives  to  perform  individual  acts  of 
bravery  ;  a  timid  mother  will  often  incur  great  risks  for  her 
children  ;  but  a  cowardly  person  can  never  on  any  occasion 
act  bravely ;  '  cowardice,'  therefore,  implies  a  character 
more  completely  governed  by  fear  than  mere  '  timidity.' 
'  Timid,'  in  short,  may  be  said  to  denote  the  disposition, 
and  '  cowardly  '  the  habit. 

'y    MILD,    GENTLE,    MEEK,    SOFT. 

Of  these  four  words,  '  meek '  is  the  only  one  which  is 
exclusively  employed  in  a  moral  sense  ;  the  other  three  may 
be  either  moral  or  physical  in  their  signification. 

'  Soft '  denotes  an  influence  which  is  weak  hut  pleasant. 
A  soft  voice,  a  soft  light,  are  in  themselves  agreeable.  But 
it  is  not  consistent  with  the  highest  degree  of  power,  or 
indeed,  with  great  force  of  any  kind.  A  powerful  voice, 
however  sweet-toned,  would  not  be  commonly  denominated 
'  «oft,'     A  soft   color   cannot   be    bright    or   intense.     The 


*2  A    COLLECTIOX    OF 

term  '  soft  music '  is  applied  generally  to  music  which 
pleases  without  exciting  or  enrapturing.  Milton  has  pre- 
served this  meaning  in  his  Allegro  — 

•  Lap  me  in  soft  Lydian  airs.' 

In  this  line  he  describes  music  as  an  agreeable  accompani' 
ment  to  other  pleasures  ;  he  uses  very  different  language 
when  he  describes  in  the  Penseroso  the  higher  effects  zi 
music. 

'  Mild  '  and  '  gentle  '  are  more  negative  in  their  meaning. 
In  their  primary  sense,  they  merely  imply  an  influence 
which  does  not  act  with  an  unpleasant  force.  A  gentle 
voice  is  one  that  is  not  land ;  mild  air,  air  that  is  not  sharp, 
or  cold.  If  there  is  an  exception  to  this  rule,  it  is  in  the 
case  of  disposition  or  temper,  in  which  '  gentleness  '  seems 
to  imply  a  more  positively  amiable  and  pleasing  quality  than 
•  mildness.'  (The  substantives  and  adjectives  have  here 
exactly  corresponding  meanings.) 

In  manners,  '  mildness  '  and  '  gentleness  '  are  consistent 
with  dignity  of  deportment,  which  '  softness '  is  not. 

'  Meekness  '  differs  from  the  other  three  words  in  being 
applied  to  the  temper  only,  never  to  mere  manners  and 
deportment.  It  is  a  word  which  has  undergone  some  change. 
In  former  times,  (as  may  be  seen  from  the  use  made  of  it 
in  the  Bible,)  it  denoted  a  religious  patience  and  submission 
to  injuries  and  humility  before  God.  It  is  evidently  in  this 
sense  that  Moses  is  spoken  of  as  the  '  meekest  of  men.' 
In  modern  times,  it  may  be  said  to  be  used  in  two  different 
senses,  and  while  the  strictly  theological  meaning  (if  we 
may  so  express  it)  is  pretty  much  what  it  formerly  was,  its 
secondary  and  ordinary  colloquial  meaning,  in  conformity 
with  the  tendency  to  degenerate  which  may  be  observed  in 
ail  words  descriptive  of  virtues,  has  come  to  signify  a  (es- 
pecially when  applied  to  a  man)  somewhat  excessive  dispo- 
sition to  yield  and  submit. 


ENGLISH    SYNONYMS.  73 

This  ambiguity  is  perhaps  to  be  regretted,  as  it  attaches 
a  ludicrous  or  contemptible  signification  to  a  word,  which 
originally  and  properly  denoted  a  virtue  peculiarly  belonging 
to  the  people  of  God.  In  its  oldest  and  most  correct  reli- 
gious sense,  it  always  implied  humility  ;  in  which  it  was 
distinguished  from  the  other  three  words  under  considera- 
tion. A  person  may  be  soft  and  mild  in  manners,  without 
real  humility  or  sweetness  of  temper.  Many  think  that  a 
woman  whose  manners  are  very  soft  must  necessarily  be 
meek,  whereas  softness  is  consistent  even  with  self-will  and 
obstinacy. 

DIFFEKENT,    UNLIKE,    DISSIMILAR,    DISTINCT. 

The  word  '  different '  calls  the  attention  to  the  separation 
into  classes.  Things  are  called  '  different,'  from  the  cir- 
cumstance that  they  cannot  be  mistaken  for  each  other,  or 
confounded  together ;  they  are  not  viewed  as  necessarily 
opposed,  but  as  having  qualities  which  keep  them  apart. 
We  may  say,  '  These  things  are  different,  and  yet  not 
unlike.'  The  word  '  unlike  '  calls  the  attention  to  opposition 
or  contrast  in  the  things  compared  ;  and  this  more  particu- 
larly when  they  do  not  belong  to  separate  classes.  We 
should  say,  '  These  two  sisters  are  so  unlike,  that  one  would 
suppose  they  belonged  to  different  families.'  In  short, 
things  are  said  to  be  unlike,'  when  they  might  be  expected 
to  be  '  like  ;  '  '  different,'  when  non-resemblance  is  in  the 
natural  course  of  things. 

'  Different,'  however,  is  rendered  more  puzzling  by  its 
having,  in  fact,  tivo  meanings,  corresponding  exactly  to  the 
two  meanings  of  the  word  same,*  one  of  which  implies 
similarity,  the  other  identity.  The  two  senses  of  the 
word  '  differenf '  are  precisely  opposed,  relatively,  to   these 


*  See  Appendix  to  Whately's  Logic. 


74  A   COLLECTION    OF 

meanings  of  '  same  '  —  one,  signifying  non- identity  ;  the 
other,  non-similar  it  ij.  In  the  first  sense,  we  might  say, 
'  These  arc  two  different  dresses,  made  of  exactly  the 
same  material ;  '  in  the  other,  '  They  are  of  very  different 
colors.' 

'  Dissimilar '  is  nearly  the  same  as  '  unlike,'  but  less 
strong,  as  is  generally  the  case  with  words  of  Latin  origin, 
when  contrasted  with  Saxon  ones. 

» Distijict '  is  nearly  the  same  as  '  different,'  but  is  chiefly 
used  with  abstract  terms. 

KOMANIIC,    SENTIMENTAL. 

Both  these  terms  are  used  to  express  the  effects  of  ill- 
directed  or  excessive  feeling  and  imagination ;  but  in 
romance  the  imagination,  in  sentiment  the  feelings  have 
the  predominance.  A  '  romantic  '  scheme  is  one  which  is 
wild,  impracticable,  and  yet  contains  something  which  cap- 
tivates the  fancy.  A  romantic  mind  loves  to  dwell  on 
adventures  and  dazzling  enterprises,  and  on  such  incidents 
as  would  grace  a  wild  fiction  or  a  poem,  and  delights  in 
every  action,  every  event,  that  can  be  invested  with  a  pic- 
turesque or  dramatic  character.* 

A  '  sentimental '  mind,  on  the  other  hand,  is  rather  prone 
to  over-wrought  feeling  and  exaggerated  tenderness.  The 
sickly  compassion  or  benevolence  which  expands  itself  in 
lamentations  instead  of  actions  —  the  weak  and  foolish 
manifestations  of  love  or  friendship,  come  under  the  head 
of  '  sentimentality.'  . 

The  '  romantic  '  may  be  considered  as  the  less  dangerous 
of  these  two  tendencies  :  a  certain  degree  of  romance  is 
commonly  found  in  young  people  when  the  imagination  is 
active  and  the   temperament    enthusiastic  ;  and  it  is  then 

*  See  Foster's  Essay  on  this  word. 


ENGLISH    SYNONYMS.  75 

easily  subdued  by  experience  and  reason.     '  Sentimentality 
is  the  characteristic  of  a  weaker  mind,  and  is  therefore  less 
curable.     It  is  easier  to   correct   an  abuse   of  imagination 
than  abuse  of  feeling. 

^      AUTHENTIC,    GENUINE. 

Bishop  Watson  thus  distinguishes  between  things  '  authen- 
tic '  and  things  '  genuine,' 

'  A  genuine  book  is  that  which  was  written  by  the  person 
whose  name  it  bears,  as  the  author  of  it.  An  autli€7ilic  book 
is  that  which  relates  matters  of  fact  as  they  really  happened ; 
a  book  may  be  genuine  without  being  authentic,  and  a  book 
may  be  authentic  without  being  genuine.  The  books  [writ- 
ten by]  Eichardson  and  Fielding  are  genuine  books,  though 
the  histories  of  Clarissa  and  Totn  Jones  are  fables.  The 
history  of  the  Island  of  Formosa  is  a  genuine  book  :  it  was 
written  by  Psalmanazar  ;  but  it  is  not  an  authentic  book, 
(though  it  was  long  esteemed  as  such,  and  translated  into 
different  languages  ;)  for  the  author,  in  the  latter  part  of 
his  life,  took  shame  to  himself  for  having  imposed  upon  the 
world,  and  confessed  that  it  was  a  mere  romance.  Anson's 
Voyage  may  be  considered  as  an  authentic  book  :  it  proba- 
bly contains  a  true  narrative  of  the  principal  events  recorded 
in  it ;  but  it  is  not  a  genuine  book,  having  not  been  written 
by  Walter,  to  whom  it  is  ascribed,  but  by  Robins.' 


'^ 


SECKET,    HIDDEN,    CONCEALED,    COVERT. 

What  is  '  secret '  may  be  accidentally  or  unintentially  so  : 
'hidden'  and  'concealed'  imply  something  intentionally 
kept  secret.  We  speak  of  '  a  hidden  plot,'  a  '  concealed 
intention.'  '  Covert '  is  something  not  avowed.  It  may  be 
intended  to  be  seen ;  '  a  covert  allusion  '  is  meant  to  be 
understood,  but  is  not  openly  expressed. 

'  Secret '  is  opposed  to  '  well-known  ; '  '  hidden  '  and  '  con- 
cealed '  to  '  open  ;  '   '  covert '  to  '  avowed  '  or  '  displayed.' 


76  A    COLLECTION    OP 


EVKRLASXIXG,    ETERNAL. 

Both  these  terms  imply  endless  duration :  but  '  eternal ' 
extends  to  something  more — that,  viz.,  which  has  always 
existed.  Many  infidel  writers  hold  that  the  world  is  '  eter- 
nal '  —  that  is,  that  it  never  had  a  beginning.  The  heathens 
believed  that  their  gods  were  '  everlasting  '  —  i.  e.,  immortal, 
but  not  '  eternal,'  for  their  birth  and  origin  were  always  re- 
corded. 

'  Everlasting '  is,  in  old  English,  used  improperly  foi 
« eternal ; '  as  in  the  Psalms,  '  Thou  art  from  everlasting," 
&c. 

DURABLE,    LASTING,    PERMANENT. 

*  Lasting '  is  generally  applied  in  an  abstract  sense  —  as, 
'  a  lasting  remembrance,'  '  a  lasting  effect :  '  '  durable  '  ofteri- 
er  to  sensible  objects  —  as,  '  a  durahle  material ; '  '  perma- 
nent,' to  both,  but  with  different  varieties  of  meaning.  When 
applied  to  abstract  subjects,  and  compared  with  '  lasting,'  it 
implies  something  which  is  established  and  intended  to 
remain  —  not  intended  to  be  removed  or  changed  ;  as,  '  a 
permanent  situation,'  '  a  permanent  resting-place.'  When 
applied  to  tangible  objects,  on  the  other  hand,  and  contrasted 
with  '  durable,'  '  permanent '  means  something  that  remains 
as  it  is,  and  will  not  wear  out  of  itself.  '  A  permanent  dye  ' 
or  color  in  painting  is  one  which  will  not  fade  or  be  changed 
by  time.  '  Durable,'  on  the  other  hand,  is  oftener  applied 
to  texture,  and  always  to  something  which  will  endure,  not 
time  alone,  but  wear  and  tear ;  a  '  durable  '  stuff  will  bear 
rough  handling,  and  can  be  worn  long. 

CONTINUAL,  CONTINUOUS,  PERPETUAL. 

A  '  continuous  '  action  is  one  which  is  uninterrupted,  and 
goes  on  unceasingly  as   long  as  it  lasts,  though   that   time 


ENGLISH    SYNONYMS.  711 

may  be  longer  or  shorter.  '  Continual '  is  that  which  is  con- 
stantly renewed  and  recurring,  though  it  may  be  interrupted 
as  frequently  as  it  is  renewed.  A  storm  of  wind  or  rain, 
which  never  intermits  an  instant,  is  '  continuous  ; '  a  succes- 
sion of  showers  is  '  continual.'  '  If  T  am  exposed  to  contin- 
ual interruptions,  I  cannot  pursue  a  continuous  train  of 
thought.' 

'  Perpetual '  is  sometimes  used  in  the  sense  of  '  continual,* 
but  has  rather  a  stronger  signification,  implying  something 
which  is  still  more  constantly  recurring.  It  also  means 
something  which  is  at  once  continuous  and  lasting  ;  as  '  the 
perpetual  motion.' 

TALKATIVE,    LOQUACIOUS,    GARRULOUS. 

A  little  child  just  learning  to  speak  may  be  '  talkative  ;  ' 
a  lively  woman  may  be  '  loquacious  ;  '  an  old  man  in  his 
dotage  is  often  '  garrulous.'  '  Talkative  '  implies  a  continual 
desire  to  speak,  which  may  exist  without  ever  saying  much 
at  a  time  ;  '  loquacious  '  includes  this,  and  also  implies  a 
great  flow  of  words  at  cominand.  A  '  garrulous  '  person 
indulges  in  prosy,  tiresome,  and  lengthy  talk,  with  frequent 
repetition  and  needless  minuteness  of  detail.  Justice  Shal- 
low is  represented  as  '  talkative,'  having  little  or  nothing  to 
say,  but  constantly  speaking.  Miss  Mitford,  in  her  picture 
of  '  the  talking  lady,'  gives  an  exact  picture  of  a  '  loqua- 
cious '  person.  Homer  represents  old  Nestor  as  '  garrulous.' 
'  Talkativeness  '  and  '  loquacity '  often  proceed  from  high 
animal  spirits,  and  often,  also,  from  that  combination  de- 
scribed by  phrenologists  as  an  active  temperament  with  an 
inferior  mental  development.  '  Garrulity  '  generally  arises 
from  feebleness  of  mind  and  uncontrolled  egotism. 

STRONG,    POWERFUL,    VIGOROUS,    FORCIBLE,    POTENT. 

Of  these  five  terms,   the  first  two   alone  are   applied  tc 
7* 


78  A    COLLECTIOJI    OF 

physical  force.  But  tlicy  arc  applied  to  it  in  somewhat  dif- 
ferent senses ;  '  strong  '  being  the  more  comi)rehcnsive  of 
the  two.  A  '  powerful  '  man  must  be  strong,'  but  a 
•  strong'  person  is  not  necessarily  '  powerful.'  '  Strong'  is 
more  appropriately  used  to  describe  a  person  of  sound,  firm 
constitution,  capable  of  enduring  fatigue ;  '  powerful,'  one 
who  is, able  to  exert  his  physical  force  actively,  and  to  per- 
form feats  of  strength.  '  Power  '  is  almost  always  active  in 
its  signification.  '  Strength '  is  both  active  and  passive. 
(The  two  substantives  exactly  correspond  to  their  adjectives, 
'  strong  '  and  '  powerful.')  The  same  analogy  is  preserved 
when  the  w'ords  are  applied  to  mental  qualifications.  A 
'  strong  '  mind  is  firm,  capable  of  sustaining  shocks  —  not 
easily  shaken  ;  a  '  pow^crful '  mind  is  something  more  —  ca- 
pable of  great  active  efforts,  as  well  as  passive  endurance, 
and  fitted  to  command  and  influence  others. 

'  Vigoroxis,'  in  accordance  with  its  root  '  vigere,^  implies 
powers  (either  of  mind  or  body)  in  an  active  state  :  hence 
we  speak  of  a  vigorous  (not  powerful)  shoot  of  a  tree. 
Thus,  too,  it  is  applied  to  temporary  conditions  ;  we  might 
say  '  he  has  a  powerful  (or  strong)  mind,  but  it  was  not  then 
in  a  vigorous  state.'  A  powerful  style,  implies  great  ability ; 
a  vigorous  style,  the  exertion  of  that  ability. 

'  Forcible  '  is  never  used  to  describe  qualities  of  either 
mind  or  bodj',  but  only  the  individual  efforts  which  those 
qualities  may  call  forth  ;  it  is  generally  applied  to  mental 
efforts  ;  we  speak  of  a  forcible  argument,  a  forcible  illustra- 
tion ;  but  it  is  sometimes  applied  as  the  adjective  correspond- 
ing to  the  noun  force,  implying  coercive  violence,  as  '  to 
make  a  forcible  entry,'  &c. ;  the  adverb  '  forcibly  '  is  also 
used  in  this  sense.  There  is,  however,  a  difference  between 
the  mental  efforts  designated  as  '  strong  '  and  '  forcible.'  A 
'forcible'  expression  is  one  both  strong  and  to  the  point 
A  '  strong  '  expression  is  merely  vehement. 


ENGLISH    SYXONYMS.  7S 

'  Potent '  is  occasionally  used  for  reasoning,  but  generally 
when  speaking  of  the  properties  of  drugs,  poisonous,  medi- 
cinal, or  intoxicating,  as  '  a  potent  drug,'  a  '  potent  dram.' 

INCONSISTENT,    INCONGRUOUS. 

'  Inconsistent '  is  almost  always  applied  either  to  character 
or  conduct,  though  we  sometimes  speak  of  '  two  inconsistent 
opinions  or  propositions.'  But  a  proposition  can  only  be 
inconsistent  as  compared  with  another  proposition  ;  if  we 
speak  of  an  inconsistent  opinion,  it  is  always  as  compared 
with  some  other,  previously  alluded  to,  or  understood  as 
being  held  by  the  same  person.  A  man  is  sometimes  taxed 
with  inconsistency,  from  having  changed  his  opinions ;  a 
charge,  which,  if  true,  would  cause  every  person  to  be 
inconsistent,  who  was  neither  foolishly  obstinate  nor  born 
perfect.  The  real  inconsistency  is,  not  the  '  being  wiser  to- 
day than  we  were  yesterday,'  but  the  holding  at  the  same 
moment  contradictory  opinions,  or  implying  by  our  conduct 
that  we  do  not  hold  them. 

At  first  sight  it  would  seem  as  if  consistency  in  conduct 
was  impossible,  since  every  one  who  professes  to  act  on 
principle  must  more  or  less  fall  short  of  the  standard  of  per- 
fection ;  and  in  this  sense  all  mortals  are  inconsistent.  But 
what  is  generally  regarded  as  emphatically  inconsistent,  is 
not  the  falling  occasionally  into  faults,  but  the  holding  two 
different  standards  of  action,  —  aiming  at  one  thing  and  pro- 
fessing another ;  as  when  a  person  professes,  in  the  abstract, 
a  great  horror  of  falsehood,  and  yet  holds  that  it  is  allowable 
to  lie  on  certain  occasions,  or  for  certain  reasons.  One  who 
is  at  the  same  time  religious  and  worldly  in  his  conduct,  pre- 
sents the  commonest  example  of  this  kind  of  inconsistency. 
There  is  a  difference  between  '  serving  Uoo  masters,',  and 
serving  one  from  whom  we  may  sometimes  stray. 

'  Incongruous  '  is  generally  applied  to  some  production, 


so  A    COLLECTIOX    OF 

viewed  as  a  whole,  whose  parts  do  not  agree  with  each 
other.  A  mixture  of  architectural  styles  in  one  building  — 
a  dress  which  is  in  j^art  homely,  in  part  elaborate  —  or  a 
selection  of  colors  which  do  not  harmonize,  are  all  incon- 
gruous. Thus  the  term  is  applied  to  all  works  of  art  or 
skill  in  which  this  defect  is  perceived. 

CRUEL,    BARBAROUS,    INHUMAN,    SAVAGE. 

A  '  cruel '  man  is  one  who  takes  pleasure  in  another's 
pain.  A  '  barbarous  '  man  is  one  who  inflicts  pain,  whether 
from  spite,  revenge,  or  interest,  in  a  wild  and  violent  man- 
ner. '  Savage  '  is  much  the  same  as  '  barbarous,'  but  rather 
an  exaggeration  of  it,  implying  even  more  violence. 

One  who  is  'inhuman,'  again,  is  utterly  dead  to  compas- 
sion —  he  may  not  take  delight  in  purposely  inflicting  suffer- 
ing ;  but  he  either  inflicts  it  if  he  sees  cause,  or  endures  the 
sight  of  it  without  either  compunction  or  pity  :  —  he  is  hard- 
hearted. 

SUBLIME,    MAGNIFICENT,    SPLENDID,    GRAND,    SUPERB. 

'  Sublime  '  is  the  highest  and  strongest  of  these  words. 
When  applied  to  the  productions  of  genius,  whether  in  art 
or  literature,  it  is  always  limited  to  such  as  are  in  the  loftiest 
style  of  excellence  —  of  such  kinds  as  inspire  awe  rather 
than  delight.  In  natural  scenery  it  is  the  same  ;  those  land- 
scapes which  are  called  '  sublime '  must  be  characterized  by 
the  most  awful  and  lofty  character,  and  it  is  never  applied 
to  anything  on  a  small  scale,  whether  in  art  or  nature.-''  It 
also  differs  from  all  the  other  words  under  consideration,  in 
being  applied  to  human  actions  and  sentiments ;  heroic  con- 
duct or  an  elevated  tone  of  feeling  or  principles  of  morality, 
are  sometimes  called  '  sublime.' 

*See  Burke's  remarks  in  the  Essay  on  the  Sublime  and  Beautiful. 


ENGLISH    SYNONYMS.  8l 

'  Magnificent '  is  also  applied  to  objects  of  beauty  on  a 
large  and  grand  scale,  but  it  is  never  properly  applied  to 
human  conduct,  nor  to  productions  of  the  fine  arts,  (except 
architecture,)  or  of  literature.  It  is  only  correctly  used  to 
qualify  —  1st,  scenery  and  natural  objects,  such  as  birds  and 
beasts,  and  even  human  beings,  considered  only  in  reference 
to  their  personal  and  material  endowments  ;  and,  2dly,  those 
artificial  productions  which  belong  rather  to  the  costly, 
pompous,  and  luxurious  in  the  artistic  class  ;  as  buildings, 
furniture,  jewelry,  &c.  For  example,  we  should  not  speak 
correctly  of  a  statue  or  picture,  when  considering  it  in  the 
light  of  a  work  of  art,  as  being  magnificent,  but  we  might 
speak  of  a  magnificent  palace  or  set  of  jewels.  On  the 
other  hand  we  might  speak  of  a  beautiful  woman,  if  on  a 
large  scale,  so  that  the  material  is  prominent,  as  '  magnifi- 
cent.' We  might  also  call  her  voice,  if  possessing  much 
volume  and  richness  of  tone,  '  magnificent,'  but  not  her  style 
of  singing. 

Architecture  forms  an  exception  to  the  other  fine  arts,  in 
this  respect ;  the  terms  '  magnificent '  and  '  splendid  '  may  be 
applied  to  it ;  but  it  does  not  in  reality  form  an  exception  to 
the  rule  before  mentioned  ;  as  a  simple  and  grand  style 
of  building  would  never  be  called  '  magnificent ;  '  it  is  only 
in  so  far  as  its  gorgeous  and  costly  character  strikes  us  that 
we  use  that  term,  as  in  the  rich  and  complicated  florid  Gothic 
architecture. 

'  Splendid  '  is  like  '  magnificent,'  but  rather  less  strong  in 
its  signification  ;  it  differs  also  in  this  point,  that  it  is  applied 
to  abstract  qualities,  which  '  magnificent '  never  is ;  we 
speak  of  '  splendid  talents,'  '  a  splendid  display  of  genius,' 
«fec.  It  always  implies  something  brilliant,  gorgeous,  oi 
striking. 

'  Grand '  is  merely  used  for  something  in  a  great  or  loftj 
style. 


t*2  A    COLLECTION    OF 

'  Superb  '  is  nearly  the  same  as  'magnificent,'  but  has  been 
less  completely  adopted  into  our  language,  being  still  some- 
what Frenchified. 

■  .  PLEASING,  AGREEABLE,  PLEASANT. 

'  Pleasing  '  is  generally  applied  to  manners  and  personal 
appearance.  ♦  Agreeable  '  is  used  in  a  more  extended  sense ; 
when  applied  to  manners  and  conversation  it  differs  from 
'  pleasing,'  and  means  rather  clever  and  entertaining,  than 
winning  or  attractive.  Many  persons  are  '  agreeable  '  who 
are  not  '  pleasing ;  '  and  a  '  pleasing  '  person  may  not  have 
sufficient  spirit,  or  variety  of  conversation,  to  constitute  him 
'  agreeable.'  '  Pleasing  '  refers  more  to  the  person  himself; 
'  agreeable  '  to  the  impression  made  on  others. 

'  Pleasant '  was  formerly  used  to  describe  merry  and 
playful  conversation,  or  a  jocose  and  lively  person  ;  now  it 
is  in  a  great  measure  withdrawn  from  persons  and  applied 
to  things,  —  to  weather,  scenery,  situations,  &c. 

'  Pleasantry  '  is  a  relic  of  the  old  meaning.  The  French 
plaisant  has  changed  in  a  reverse  way.  Formerly  it  meant 
what  we  noio  call  '  pleasant,'  as  may  be  seen  from  the  '  La- 
ment of  Mary  Queen  of  Scots  :  '  — 

•  Adieu,  plaisant  pays  de  France  ! ' 

Now  it  has  come  to  mean,  as  it  formerly  did  with  us,  '  funny' 
or  'jocose.' 

CALM,    TRANQUIL,    QUIET,    PLACID. 

'  Calm '  applies  cither  to  the  outward  manner,  to  the 
temperament,  or  to  the  mood  of  mind  at  the  moment. 
'  Tranquil,'  properly  speaking,  only  to  the  mood  of  mind. 
There  is  also  a  difflerence  in  the  state  which   they  describe. 

Tranquillity  implies  not  only  outward  serenity,  but  ease 
of  mind.     If  we  exhort  a  person  '  to  be  calm,'  we  are  merely 


ENGLISH    SYNONYMS.  8{> 

advising  him  to  practise  self-control  :  the  expression,  '  you 
may  be  tranquil,'  implies,  '  you  need  feel  no  alarm.'  A 
strong-minded  person  will  be  calm  in  the  midst  of  dangers 
and  calamities  ;  but  if  we  say,  '  He  saw  his  country  ruined 
with  a  tranquil  eye,'  it  would  imply,  not  firmness  of  soul, 
but  apathy. 

'  Quiet '  is  more  applicable,  in  general,  to  external  circum- 
stances than  to  temper  or  manner  ;  when  applied  to  these, 
it  implies  a  silent,  retiring  disposition. 

'  Placid  '  is  something  like  '  tranquil,'  but  implies  less  of 
quiescence,  and  more  of  cheerful  ease  and  smoothness.  If 
we  speak  of  '  a  placid  sea,'  it  implies  a  more  settled  state 
than  '  tranquil.'  The  sea  might  be  both  tranquil  and 
gloomy. 

'^"     DELIGHTFUL,    DELICIOUS. 

'  Delightful  '/is  applied  both  to  the  pleasures  of  the  mind 
and  those  of  the  senses  :  '  delicious  '  only  to  those  of  the 
senses.  An  excursion,  a  social  circle,  a  place  of  abode, 
may  be  '  delightful  ;  '  a  perfume,  or  a  fruit,  '  delicious.' 
'  Delightful '  may  be  used,  however,  for  all  pleasures  con- 
nected with  the  bodily  senses,  except  taste  ;  a  climate,  a 
breeze,  a  scent,  may  be  either  '  delightful '  or  '  delicious.' 
'  Delicious  '  is  limited,  in  general,  to  the  lower  senses  — 
taste,  smell,  or  feeling. 

Some  people  do  sometimes  speak  of  music  as  '  delicious ; ' 
but  they  are  generally  those  who  regard  music  chiefly  as  a 
sensual  pleasure,  or  what  the  Germans  call  an  ohrenschmaus, 
or  banquet  for  the  ears  —  something  that  does  not  concern 
the  mind.  No  one  possessing  a  musician's  soul  ever  de- 
nominated music  as  '  a  delicious  art.' 

'  Delighful '  is  also  applied  to  moral  gratification.  A 
well-ordered  and  happy  family  —  a  joyful  reunion  —  are 
delightful  to  witness. 


84  A    COLLECTION    OP 


% 


OBSTINATE,    STUBBOKX. 


'  Both  ohstinacy  and  stubhornness  imply  an  excessive  and 
vicious  pcrseverence  in  pursuing  our  own  judgment  in  oppo- 
sition to  that  of  others  ;  but  to  be  ohstinale  implies  the 
doing  what  we  ourselves  chose.  To  be  sluhhorn  denotes 
rather,  not  to  do  what  others  advise  or  desire.  An  olsLinate 
man  will  pursue  his  own  foolish  purpose,  in  spite  of  the 
wisest  and  kindest  counsel.  A  stubborn  child  will  not  com- 
ply with  the  advice,  or  obey  the  commands  of  a  parent. 
Obstinacy  requires  a  positive  idea  ;  stubbornness  merely  a 
negation.  Obstinacy  is  generally  applied  to  the  superior ; 
stubbornness  to  the  infeiior.  An  obstinate  king,  under  a 
false  appearance  of  firmness,  brings  ruin  on  his  country  ;  a 
stubborn  people  is  insensible  to  beuevolcnce,  and  can  only 
be  subdued  by  punishment.  Obstinacy  refers  more  to  out- 
ward acts,  and  stubbornness  to  disposition.'  —  Sib.  J.  Mack- 
intosh. 

fickle,  capkicious,  vakiable,  changeable. 

The  first  two  of  these  adjectives  are,  properly  speaking, 
limited  to  persons,  and  only  applied  to  things  by  a  kind  of 
metaphor  :  the  two  latter  are  applied  indifferently  to  persons 
and  things. 

The  chief  difference  between  '  fickle  '  and  '  capricious  ' 
is,  that  '  fickle  '  refers  rather  to  a  want  of  constancy^  whether 
in  tastes  or  attachments  —  while  '  capricious  '  not  only  in- 
cludes this,  but  also  a  disposition  to  take  violent  and  short- 
lived fancies  or  antipathies  to  persons  or  things. 

A  friend  whose  affection  cools  speedily  is  '  fickle  ;  '  one 
who  takes  sudden  and  unreasonable  likings  or  dislikes  is 
'  capricious.'  In  short,'  '  fickle  '  conveys  the  idea  of  a  pre- 
ference being  short-lived  ;  '  capricious  '  of  its  being  also 
suddenly  formed,  and  without  suflScient  cause. 


ENGLISH    STNONYMb.  8jK 

'  Variable  '  and  '  changeable  '  refer  for  the  most  part  to 
climate  ;  when  applied  to  persons  they  preserve  an  analogy 
to  their  original  meaning,  implying  a  change  rather  in  the 
mood  of  mind  than  in  the  affections  ;  a  variable  tempera- 
ment is  distinguished  rather  by  rapid  transitions  from 
grave  to  gay,  from  hot  to  cold,  than  by  actual  want  of  con- 
stancy. 

'  Changeable  '  is,  however,  often  used  to  describe  thai 
kind  of  fickleness  or  caprice,  which  is  also  denominated 
*  whimsicality.' 

DEEP,    PROFOUND. 

'  Deep'  and  '  profound  '  are  often,  but  not  always,  synony- 
mous. They  differ,  first,  in  this  respect  —  that  '  profound  ' 
is  almost  limited  to  abstract  subjects,  while  '  deep  '  includes 
also  natural  objects.  We  may  speak  indifferently  of  '  a 
deep  well,'  '  a  deep  color,'  or  '  a  deep  feeling,'  '  deep  learn- 
ing.' '  Profound '  could  only  be  applied  in  these  last 
cases. 

In  matters  of  sentiment  and  reflection  '  deep  '  is  generally, 
though  not  uniformly,  preferred  to  '  profound  ;  '  in  cases  in 
which  the  particular  intellectual  faculties  are  in  question, 
'  profound '  is  more  generally  used.  "We  speak  of  '  deep 
sorrow,'  '  rfeey?  thought,' — but.  of  '  ^jro/ownd  contempt,'  'a 
profound  knowledge  of  a  subject.' 

WEIGHTY,    HEAVY. 

These  words  bear  somewhat  the  same  relation  to  each 
other  as  '  deep  '  and  '  profound.'  We  speak  of  '  weighty 
reasons,'  but  '  heavy  cares.'  As  a  term  of  blame,  '  heavy  ' 
is  always  the  word  employed  ;  we  should  say,  '  This  man's 
speech  contained  weighty  arguments,  but  his  opponent's 
was  a  very  heavy  discourse.' 


86  A    COLLECTION    OF 


FAULTLESS,    BLAMELESS,    SPOTLESS,    INNOCENT. 

A  '  faultless '  character  is  not  only  free  from  imputation 
of  evil,  but  also  free  from  defects  :  one  who  is  blameless  or 
spotless  is  one  whose  character  has  never  had  any  charge 
brought  against  it. 

Spotless  and  faultless  apply  to  the  general  character  only ; 
blameless  may  be  used  in  reference  to  particular  points. 
We  might  say,  '  He  is  blameless  in  this  respect '  —  'in  this 
instance  I  can  declare  that  I  am  blameless '  —  in  such 
phrases  we  could  not  use  the  words  '  faultless '  or  '  spotless.' 

'  Faultless '  may  also  be  applied  (which  the  other  two 
cannot  be)  to  personal  appearance  as  well  as  mind. 

'  Innocent '  is  sometimes  used  to  indicate  a  state  of  utter 
ignorance  of  evil,  like  that  of  a  child  ;  at  other  times  it  is 
used  in  opposition  to  '  guilt '  —  to  imply  that  a  person  is 
free  from  the  fault  with  which  he  is  charged.  Innocent,  in 
this  last  sense,  (like  guilty,)  is  used  in  reference  to  actions 
and  not  feelings  or  intentions  :  thus  differing  from  '  spotless  ' 
and  '  faultless,' 

Our  first  parents  were  innocent  till  the  moment  of  their 
tasting  of  the  forbidden  tree  ;  but  they  coulcf  not  be  called 
'  spotless  '  or  '  faultless,'  since  as  sin  evidently  lies  in  the  in- 
tention, they  incurred  it  as  soon  as  the  wish  to  commit  the 
act  had  been  fully  formed.  From  a  want  of  comprehension 
of  this,  and  an  inattention  to  the  meaning  of  the  word  inno- 
cent, much  confusion  of  thought  is  produced.  Adam  and 
Eve  being  often  spoken  of  as  if  they  were  not  only  innocent, 
but  faultless  and  spotless,  before  the  fall. 

WICKED,    SINFUL,    CRIMINAL,    DEPKA  TED,    GUILTY. 

The  word  '  wicked '  affords  a  curious  exemplification  of 
the  kind  of  change,  through  which  words  now  indicative 
of  evil  have  frequently  passed.     It  originally  meant  '  alive,' 


EXGXISH    SYNONYMS.  8  I 

Ho  '  wick '  still  does  in  the  north  of  England.  The  '  wick  ' 
of  a  candle  has  the  same  origin,  meaning  the  living  or  flam- 
ing part  of  it ;  and  the  word  '  quick  '  was  the  same.  From 
'  alive  '  and  '  lively,'  '  wicked  '  came  to  signify  restless  and 
turbulent,  and  at  last  assumed  its  present  sense,  expressive 
of  unmitigated  moral  evil,  either  of  character  or  actions. 

'  Criminal '  always  implies  the  commission  of  some  fault 
which  is  considered  as  such  in  the  sight  of  man  ;  and  gen- 
erally, with  reference  to  human  laws,  supposed  to  be  just ; 
for  transgressions  of  iniquitous  laws,  though  in  one  sense 
they  may  be  termed  crimes,  are  not  correctly  designated  as 
criminal.  Under  the  earlier  Roman  emperors,  the  profes- 
sion of  Christianity  Avas  punished  as  a  crime  :  but  it  would 
never  be  described  as  criminal.  The  laws  to  which  such 
actions  are  ideally  referred,  must  be  supposed,  then,  to  be 
just  and  equitable. 

Whatever,  in  this  sense,  then,  is  criminal,  must  also  be 
sinful  ;  but  '  sinful  '  designates  faults  only  as  they  incur  the 
divine  displeasure  ;  hence  the  word  is  far  more  extended  in 
meaning  than  '  criminal  :  '  it  extends  to  thoughts  and  words 
as  well  as  actions  ;  while  '  criminal,'  if  ever  used  in  reference 
to  thoughts,  is  only  so  employed  in  as  far  as  they  are  sup- 
posed to  lead  to  actions. 

We  occasionally  speak  of  '  a  criminal  thirst  for  ven- 
geance,' &c.,  but  it  is  always  with  reference  to  this  passion 
as  naturally  leading  to  the  crime  of  murder  ;  and  the  con- 
jugate word  crime  is  never  correctly  used  except  to  designate 
an  action  ;  while  the  word  '  sin '  may  not  only  refer  to  a 
thought,  but  even  quite  as  frequently  to  general  evil  propen- 
sities and  tendencies. 

'  Depraved  '  implies  not  only  positive  wickedness,  but  an 
entire  corruption  of  nature. 

One  who  is  depraved  must  originally  have  been  capable  of 


88  A    COLLECTION    OF 

sometliing  better."'     It  is   extended   to   cliaracter  as  well  aa 
actions. 

•  Guilty,'  like  '  criminal,'  always  has  reference  to  some 
positive  action,  and  to  human  condemnation ;  whereas 
'  wicked  '  and  'depraved  '  may  apply  to  the  whole  character, 
as  well  as  to  individual  acts.  But  '  guilty  '  refers  chiefly  to 
the  question  of  a  person's  having  or  not  having  actually 
eommitled  a  certain  action,  while  '  criminal '  may  be  con- 
sidered rather  as  describing  the  character  of  that  action. 
We  might  say,  '  He  is  guilty  of  such  and  such  a  fault ;  but 
he  is  not  as  criminal  as  some  of  his  companions  in  so  acting.' 
Guilt  does  not  admit  of  degree,  though  it  docs  of  amount. 
A  person  may  be  guilty  of  more  or  of  less  crime,  but  can- 
not be  more  or  less  guilty  in  what  he  has  committed;  though 
he  may  be  more  or  less  wicked,  sinful,  or  criminal. f 

BENEVOLENT,    BENEFICENT,    CHARITABLE,    MUNIFICENT, 
LIBERAL,    BOUNTIFUL,    PHILANTHROPIC. 

Benevolent  and  beneficent,  together  with  their  conjugates, 
have  curiously  diverged  from  their  original  meaning.  Ety- 
mologically,  '  benevolent '  implied  merely  wishing  well  to 
others,  and  '  beneficent '  doing  well  ;  %  now,  '  benevolent ' 
includes  both  kinds  of  feelings  and  actions,  and  '  beneficent' 
is  restricted  to  acts  of  kindness  on  a  great  scale,  and  gen- 
erally performed  by  some  one  of  exalted  station  and  char- 
acter ;  hence  we  speak  of  the  '  beneficence '  rather  than 
the  '  benevolence  '  of  the  Creator.  It  may  perhaps  be  said 
to  follow  from  this,  that  '  benevolent '  draws  our  attention 
more  to  the   character  of  the  agent,  '  beneficent,'  to  that  of 

*It  is  in  this  sense  that  we  speak  of  the  depravity  of  human  nature. 
It  was  a  fall  from  a  better  state. 

t  See  Archbishop  Whately's  Charge  on  Infant  Baptism. 

X  The  French  uss  the  corresponding  words  '  bienvcillance  '  and 
•  bienfaisance  '  more  correctly  according  to  their  etymology. 


ENGLISH    SYNONYMS.  8^ 

tlie  act  performed  ;  retaining,  so  far,  a  tinge  of  their  ety- 
mology. 

'  Charitable  '  (when  not  used  in  reference  to  a  mild  and 
candid  judgment  of  others)  seems  to  be  restricted  to  one 
kind  of  benevolence,  that  which  consists  in  almsgiving. 

'  Munificent '  resembles  '  beneficent,'  in  referring  always 
to  favors  on  a  large  scale,  and  conferred  by  superiors  ;  but 
there  is  this  important  difference,  that  '  beneficent '  always 
implies  some  real  and  essential  good  done,  while  '  munifi- 
cent' (as  its  derivation  implies)  m.ay  be  applied  equally  to 
any  gift,  whether  really  useful  or  not.'^'  One  who  makes  a 
present  of  jewelry  or  pictures  to  a  friend  is  munificent, 
but  would  not  be  called  '  beneficent.'  If  he  raised  a  dis- 
tressed family  from  starvation,  the  word  '  beneficent '  Avould 
be  more  appropriate.  But  one  who  gives  largely  to  the 
public,  or  to  some  institution,  is  called  munificent.  It  seems 
to  convey  the  idea  of  splendor ;  no  one  can  be  called  muni- 
ficent who  does  not  give  on  a  large  scale. 

Any  one  who  is  ready  to  give  freely,  as  the  etymology 
implies,  on  whatever  scale,  is  '  liberal.'  '  Bountiful,  '  again, 
is  stronger  than  '  liberal,'  and  implies  giving  in  abundance  ; 
it  also  differs  from  '  liberal,'  in  being  restricted  to  giving ; 
while  '  liberal  '  is  applied  to  any  easy  style  of  expenditure 
in  general ;  to  the  reverse,  in  short,  of  '  stingy,'  or  '  miserly.* 
Many  people  live  in  a  liberal  style,  who  are  very  far  from 
being  '  bountiful.'  Bountiful  always  seems  to  imply,  giving 
out  of  an  ample  store. 

♦  Philanthropic  '  (as  its  etymology  indicates)  implies  benev- 
olence solely  in  reference  to  the  human  race  —  and  always 
to  masses,  not  to  individuals.  One  who  devises  some  plan 
to  benefit  numbers  is  called  '  philanthropic  ; '  but  we  should 

*  '  Munificent '  nearly  answers  to  the  Greek  word  megaloprepes,  as 
described  by  Aristotle. 
8* 


90  A    COLLECTION    OF 

not   talk   of   '  philanthropically   giving   a  loaf    to   a  hungrj 
child.'  —  (Sec  note  to  Preface.) 

BENIGNANT,  KINJ?,    GOOD-NATURED. 

'  Benignant '  is  an  expression  more  generally  used  to 
describe  manner  than  actions  ;  and  almost  always  refers  to 
the  manners  of  a  superior.  It  seem  to  imply  a  conde- 
scending amenity  of  deportment.  '  Kind '  is  used  to  de- 
scribe both  manners  and  conduct,  and  has  by  far  the  most 
extended  signification  of  the  three  words  :  it  includes  almost 
every  manifestation  of  benevolence,  small  or  great.  '  Good- 
nature,' on  the  other  hand  is  limited  to  its  lowest  exercise, 
to  kindness  in  trifles,  and  always  to  kindness  springing  from 
constitutional  obligingness  and  amiability.  A  person  who  is 
kind  from  conscientiousness  alone,  is  never  called  '  good- 
natured.' 

The  old  original  word  was  '  tcell-natured,'  which  is  gram- 
matically more  correct  than  the  modern  word ;  for  the 
adverb  is  properly  used  to  qualify  the  adjective.  We  speak 
of  '  well-born,'  '  well-bred,'  not  of  '  good-born,'  &c.  A 
person  of  a  good  disposition  is  said  to  be  u-'cZZ-disposed,  not 
goorf-disposed.  In  old  English,  the  word  '  ?/;eZZ-tempered ' 
was  used  instead  of  '^oorf- tempered.' 


^] 


TEGLECTFUL,    NEGLIGENT. 

'  Neglectful  '  has  reference  generally  to  our  conduct 
towards  persons ;  '  negligent '  towards  things.  A  person 
is  said  to  be  neglectful  of  his  friends  ;  negligent  of  his 
business,  A  negligent  correspondent  is  one  who  is  careless 
in  writing,  mislays  letters,  and  forgets  whether  he  has 
•mswered  them  or  no  ;  a  neglectful  correspondent  is  one 
who  forgets  his  friends  when  away  from  them,  and  act? 
on  the  maxim  —  •  Out  of  sight,  out  of  mind.' 

Hence,  if  we  reproach  a  person  with  neglect  (*,he  sub. 


ENGLISH    SYNONYMS.  91 

stantives  '  neglect '  and  '  negligence  '  correspond  witu  the 
adjectives),  we  are  supposed  to  charge  him  with  real  un- 
kindness  or  coldness  ;  while  only  carelessness  is  implied  ii 
he  is  charged  with  negligence. 

The  verb  '  to  neglect '  is  a  conjugate  of  both  these  adjec- 
tives and  substantives.  We  might  say,  '  He  did  not  use  to 
neglect  his  business,  but  he  has  been  very  negligent  of  it 
lately  ;  '  '  I  did  not  think  he  would  neglect  his  friends,  but 
he  has  been  very  neglectful  of  me.' 

ABSENT,    ABSTKACTED. 

'  Absent '  refers  merely  to  the  circumstance  of  the  atten- 
tion being  withdrawn  from  outward  objects  ;  '  abstracted  ' 
implies  also  concentration  of  the  thoughts  on  something 
foreign  to  what  is  before  us.  One  who  is  '  absent '  does  not 
attend  to  what  is  around  him  —  it  may  be  from  languor  of 
mind  or  carelessness  ;  but  one  who  is  '  abstracted '  is  inat- 
tentive because  he  is  thinking  of  something  else.  '  Ab- 
sence '  is  therefore  a  habit ;  '  abstraction  '  an  accident.  We 
do  sometimes,  indeed,  speak  of  an  habitually  absent  person 
as  '  abstracted  ;  '  but  one  who  is  from  any  particular  cause 
in  an  abstracted  state  of  mind  would  not  be  called  an  '  ab- 
sent '  person.     Byron's  Dying  Gladiator,  who 

•Heard  it,  but  he  heeded  not  ;  his  thoughts 
Were  with  his  heart,  and  that  was  far  away, 

was  then  abstracted  ;  but  to  call  him  absent  would  be  ludi- 
crous. 


"jItri] 


CRIFXING,  TRIVIAL. 

A-^riJling  matter  is  one  merely  of  small  importance  :  a 
trivial  matter  is  a  small  matter  made  too  much  of.  The 
word  '  trivial  '  implies  contempt,  which  '  trifling  '  does  not. 
By  saying,  '  He  never  neglects  a  trijling  matter,'  we  are 
rather   supposed   to    praise ;    but  in    blaming  a  person   fol 


92  A.    COLLECTION    OF 

frivolity,'  we  often  say,'  '  He  is  always  engrossed  with  trivial 
concerns.'     The  suhstantive  '  trifle'  is  conjugate  to  both. 

FATHERLY,    PATERNAL  ;    MOTHERLY,    MATERNAL  ;    BRO- 
THERLY,   FRATERNAL  ;    KINGLY,    REGAL. 

These  pairs  of  words  are  formed  from  corresponding 
roots  in  Latin  and  Saxon  ;  and,  as  has  been  already  observed, 
they  all  bear  nearly  the  same  relation  to  each  other ;  the 
Latin  word  being  the  more  polite  and  cold,  the  Saxon  the 
more  hearty  and  cordial.  In  these  groups  of  words,  also, 
the  Latin  word  is  always  used  to  express  the  office,  the  Saxon 
the  manners  and  deportment.  We  speak  of  '  a  paternal 
government '  —  '  maternal  duties  ;  '  but  of  '  a  fatherly  kind- 
ness of  manner  '  —  'a  motherly  tenderness.'  The  same 
may  be  said  of  the  relation  between  the  words  '  kingly '  and 
'  regal.'  We  speak  of  the  '  regal  state  '  —  the  '  regal  pre- 
rogative '  —  but  of  a  '  kingly  deportment '  —  '  kingly  splen- 
dor.' 

FRIENDLY,    AMICABLE. 

The  same  relation  exists  between  these  two  words ; 
neither  denote  any  strong  affection,  neither  are  conjugate  to 
the  noun  '  friendship  ;  '  but  '  friendly '  implies  something  of 
real  cordiality,  while  '  amicable  '  hardly  signifies  more  than 
that  the  persons  specified  are  not  disposed  to  quarrel ;  thence 
we  speak  of  '  amicable  relations  between  foreign  States.' 

RIGHTEOUS,    JUST. 

We  have  here  again  a  Saxon  ■•'  and  a  Latin  term,  whose 
roots  exactly  correspond  in  meaning;  but  they  have  even 
more  curiously  diverged  than  many  other  pairs  of  words. 

*  The  root  of  the  word  '  righteous '  is,  in  fact,  both  Latin  and 
Saxon,  the  words  'rccht'  and  'rectus'  belug  evidently  of  kindred 
origin. 


ENGLISH    SYNONYMS.  J3 

'  Righteous  '  is  now  exclusively  applied  to  rectitude  of 
conduct  drawn  from  religious  principle,  while  'just'  is 
simply  used  for  moral  uprightness.  A  heathen  or  atheist 
may  be  called  just,  but  not  righteous.  But  many  are  apt  to 
overlook  the  fact,  that  these  v/ords  were  really  and  originally 
the  same.  For  instance,  in  the  Douay  version  of  the  Bible, 
made  from  the  Vulgate,  the  words  of  Latin  derivation  are 
invariably  preferred  to  the  Saxon;  and  we  find  'just'  con- 
stantly used  for  '  righteous,'  as  the  translation  of  the  Greek 
dikaios. 

CALCULATED,    FIT,  SUITABLE,    APT. 

'  Calculated  '  is  always  so  employed  as  not  to  lose  the 
force  of  the  figure.  It  must  be  read  with  an  emphasis,  and 
followed  by  words  wliich  direct  and  qualify  its  meaning,  or 
explain  its  application  ;  as  '  These  plants  are  calculated  for 
our  climate.' 

'  Suitable,'  and  '  fit,'  may  be  used  by  themselves,  which 
coidd  not  be  the  case  with  '  calculated.'  We  might  say  in- 
differently —  '  Do  you  think  him  calculated  —  fit —  or  suit- 
able, for  this  situation  ?  '  but  we  might  also  say  more  briefly, 
'  Do  you  think  him  suitable  or  fit  ? '  In  this  last  case,  '  cal- 
culated '  would  be  inadmissible.  '  Calculated  '  must  also 
be  diff"erently  qualified :  we  speak  of  '  very  fit '  —  but  of 
'  very  well  calculated.' 

'  Apt '  is  somewhat  different  from  the  others.  It  rather 
implies  readiness  than  suitability  :  and  it  is  used  to  qualify 
a  simile  or  illustration ;  in  which  sense  it  implies  not  only 
'  suitable  *  but  '  happy  '  —  or  '  pointed.'  It  is  also  used  in 
the  sense  of  '  liable,'  as,  '  I  am  very  apt  to  forget.' 

ACCURATE,    EXACT,    PKECISE. 

What  is  accurate  must  be  exact ;  but  exactness  does  not 
necessarily  imply  accuracy.     An  account  of   any   transaC' 


94  A    COLLECTION    OF 

tion  may  be  accidentally  exact,  but  to  be  accurate,  care 
must  have  been  bestowed.  An  accurate  writer  is  one  who 
aiins  at  exactness. 

We  speak  of  an  '  exact  coincidence,*  —  we  should  not 
use  the  word  '  accurate  '  in  this  sense.  '  Precise,'  when 
ajjplied  to  things,  is  nearly  the  same  as  '  exact,'  but  less 
extended  in  signification.  A  likeness  may  be  exact,  but 
could  not  be  precise.  It  is  most  correctly  applied  to  any- 
thing which  is  within  certain  defined  limits,  thus  adhering 
to  its  etymology,  which  signifies,  '  cut  to  a  patcrn,'  (from 
the  Latin  prcC'Cido.) 

It  is  curious  that  the  expression,  '  an  exact  person,'  is 
synonymous  with  '  an  accurate  person  ; '  but  '  a  precise  per- 
son '  always  implies  one  who  is  over-strict  and  scrupulous 
in  ti'ifies. 


■s 


^FAMOUS,    CELEBRATED,    ILLUSTRIOUS,    RENOWNED. 

Famous  and  celebrated  approach  the  nearest  to  each 
other  in  meaning  of  this  group  ;  but  '  famous  '  seems  to 
convey  the  idea  of  a  name  being  more  '  blazoned  abroad,' 
and  loudly  praised,  than  '  celebrated,'  '  Illustrious  '  always 
implies  fame  of  a  lofty  and  elevated  character.  We  may 
speak  of  'a  famous  juggler,'  'a  celebrated  chess-player,' 
but  we  should  not  call  them  illustrious.  '  Illustrious '  is  also 
used  for  distinguished  rank  and  station. 

'  Renowned  '  resembles  '  famous,'  but,  like  illustrious,  is 
used  for  a  high  and  dignified  kind  of  reputation.  '  A  re- 
nowned chess-player  '  could  be  so  called  only  in  irony. 

SLY,    CUNNING,    CRAFTY,    DECEITFUL. 

'  Sly  '  differs  from  '  cunning  '  and  '  crafty,'  first,  by  in- 
dicating manifestations  of  deceit  on  a  small  scale,  and, 
secondly,  from  its  being  generally  of  a  negative  character, 
implying  rather  concealment  than  invention.     We  speak  of 


ENGLISH    SYNONYMS.  95 

'  sly  humor  ;  '  this  seems  to  imply  humor  that  is  furtive  and 
covert,  in  opposition  to  '  broad  humor.' 

'  Cunning  '  has  departed,  in  some  degree,  from  its  origi- 
nal meaning,  '  knowing '  (from  a  word  cognate  with  the 
German  kennen,  to  know,)  and  now  implies  deceit,  united 
with  a  low  kind  of  skill  or  cleverness. 

'  Crafty  '  (according  to  its  etymology)  implies  some  high- 
er degree  of  mental  power,  united  with  deceit.  A  states- 
man is  called  crafty  ;  a  fortune-teller,  cunning  ;  a  child,  sly. 

'  Deceitful '  differs  from  these  in  applying  more  to  char- 
acter than  to  individual  acts  ;  while  the  three  other  worda 
would  equally  suit  both.  It  may  also  (like  the  substantive 
'  deception,'  which  is  in  fact  its  real  conjugate)  be  applied 
to  illusory  appearances. 

We  might  say,  '  These  appearances  are  deceitful ;  the 
cause  of  the  deception  is  so  and  so.'  —  (See  the  head  de- 
ceit,   DECEPTION.) 


96  A   COLLECTION    OF 


NOUNS.  .^ 

DILIGENCE,    INDUSTEY. 

'  Industky  '  includes '  diligence ;  *  but  it  includes  also  some- 
thing more.  An  industrious  *  man  not  only  labors  perse- 
veringly  at  any  given  task,  but  is  constantly  on  the  watch 
for  opportunities  to  improve  his  condition  or  his  mind,  as  the 
case  may  be.  The  term  is  therefore  applied  to  the  design, 
as  well  as  to  the  execution.  The  industrious  man  is  always 
ready  for  employment  —  always  looking  out  for  fresh  work. 
The  diligent  man  merely  performs  steadily  the  individual 
task  he  may  be  set.  No  one  could  be  called  industrious 
who  was  not  also  diligent  in  the  execution  of  his  task ;  but 
if  we  set  a  child  some  lesson  to  learn,  we  do  not  usually 
exhort  him  to  '  industry,'  but  to  '  diligence.'  They  are  often, 
however,  used  synonymously. 

CONTENTMENT,    SATISFACTION. 

'  Contentment '  may  be  classed  among  those  words  in 
the  English  language  which  adhere  strictly  to  their  etymol- 
ogy. Its  root  was  undoubtedly  the  verb  '  to  contain,'  and 
the  substantive  and  its  adjective  have  not  departed  from  this 
meaning.  A  contented  person  does  not  indulge  in  fruitless 
wishes  for  what  is  beyond  his  reach  ;  his  desires  are  limited 
by  what  he  possesses. 

'  Satisfaction  implies  more  :  this  word  has  likewise  re- 
tained the   signification  of  its  root,  and  means  that  we  have 

*  The  nouns  and  adjectives  here  correspond. 


ENGLISH    SYNONYMS.  97 

obtained  all  we  want ;  not  that  our  desires  are  limited,  but 
that  they  have  been  gratijied.  A  poor  and  needy  man 
may  be  '  contented,'  but  he  cannot  feel  '  satisfaction  '  with 
his  condition.  We  might  say,  '  Since  I  cannot  obtain  satis- 
faction, I  must  be  content  without  it.' 

'  Satisfaction  '  also  implies  an  amende  honoralle.  Some- 
times, when  applied  to  conduct,  it  indicates  approbation  — 
as,  '  Your  behavior  gives  me  great  satisfaction.'  '  Satisfied  ' 
implies  a  less  amount  of  gratification  :  '  I  am  satisfied  with 
your  conduct,'  implies  less  of  praise  than,  '  It  gives  me  satis- 
factio7i.' 

'  Not  content '  and  '  not  satisfied  '  differ  in  this  in  modern 
usage,  that  the  latter  often  signifies  not  being  pleased  at  all, 
which  the  former  does  not  in  English,  though  it  does  in 
French.  The  Pope  was  not  satisfied  with  the  Reformation 
of  Henry  VIII. ;  but  the  reformers  were  not  content  with  it. 

ANGER,    INDIGNATION,    DISPLEASTJUE,    KESENTIIENT. 

The  difference  between  '  anger '  and  '  indignation  *  is, 
that  '  anger  '  is  always  personal,  and  always  applies  to  in- 
juries inflicted,  or  supposed  to  be  inflicted,  on  ourselves,  or 
on  others  so  nearly  connected  by  ties  of  kindred  or  friend- 
ship, as  to  be  regarded  almost  as  a  part  of  ourselves. 

'  Indignation '  is  more  generally  used  in  reference  to 
some  injustice  or  oppression  shown  to  others,  whether  to 
strangers  or  friends ;  though  it  also  includes  anger  on  our 
own  account.  It  may  be  considered  as  denoting  sympathetic 
anger  ;  —  a  feeling  that  such  and  such  conduct  might  justly 
provoke  anger.  And  hence  it  is  that  a  person,  under  the 
influence  of  anger  at  some  wrong  done  him,  often  prefers 
describing  himself  as  feeling  'indignation;'  meaning  there- 
by to  disavow  selfish  personal  feelings,  and  to  imply  that  he 
is   affected  merely  by  the  character  of  the  act  in  itself,  just 


08  A    COLLECTION    OF 

as  he  would  have  been,  had  the  wrong  been  done  to  a 
stranger. 

'  Displeasure '  is  a  calmer  feeling  than  either  '  anger '  oi 
'  indignation.'  It  implies  a  sentiment  scarcely  stronger 
than  simple  disapproval,  and  is  generally  applied  to  the 
faults  of  an  inferior,  either  in  age  or  station.  We  should 
not  speak  of  being  '  displeased  '  at  the  conduct  of  a  supe- 
rior, however  ill  we  might  think  of  him. 

'  Resentment '  is  a  stronger  feeling  than  any  of  those 
before  mentioned.  It  generally  implies  a  long- continued 
feeling.  It  may  be  defined  as  a  long-continued  anger  felt 
against  some  one  who  has  knowingly  injured  us  ;  in  no  other 
case  can  the  word  be  correctly  applied. 

We  may  feel  '  anger '  against  a  child  for  behaving  ill, 
though  his  conduct  may  do  us  no  harm  ;  we  may  be  angry 
with  some  one  who  is  the  innocent  cause  of  annoyance  to 
us ;  but  in  neither  of  these  cases  should  we  be  said  to  feel 
'  resentment.' 

RECOMPENSE,    REWABD,    MEED. 

A  '  recompense '  implies  a  reward  equivalent  to  the  action 
done  (etymologically,  a  compensation). 

A  '  reward  '  includes  a  recompense,  but  does  not  imply  it 
—  its  simple,  primary  meaning  is  merely  a  pleasure  or 
benefit  (whether  adequate  or  not)  conferred  in  return  for 
some  action.  We  may  say  :  'I  cannot  recompense  you  for 
this  ;  '  meaning,  '  I  cannot  make  any  fitting  return  to  you.' 
Hence  it  is  incorrect  to  speak  of  recompensing  a  child 
for  good  behavior ;  '  reward  '  would  be  the  correct  term. 
'  Meed  '  is  a  reward  which  we  earn  by  our  own  exertions, 
and  to  which  we  are  fairly  entitled  :  A  free  gift  cannot  be  a 
meed. 


ENGLISH  SYNONYMS.  99 


APPROVAL,  APPROBATION. 

*  Approbation  '  is  used  in  a  much  more  extended  sense 
than  '  approval.'  '  Approval '  generally  implies  a  formal 
sanction  of  some  plan  or  mode  of  action  ;  as,  '  I  proposed 
such  a  measure  to  the  Prime  Minister,  for  his  approval.''  It 
implies  also  such  a  sanction  as  can  only  come  from  a  supe- 
rior ;  whereas,  '  approbation  '  requires  no  such  distinctions. 
A  private  man  may  give  his  '  approbation  '  to  the  measures 
of  government ;  but  we  could  not  say  that  he  gave  them  his 
'  approval.' 

Lastly,  some  consequences  must  follow ybr  an  '  approval ; ' 
while  '  approbation  '  does  not  necessarily  imply  anything  of 
the  kind. 

TIMIDITY,    BASHFULNESS,    SHYNESS,    DIFFIDENCE. 

'  Timidity  '  implies  a  liability  to  fear  of  any  kind,  whether 
personal  or  moral.  '  Bashfulness,'  '  shyness,'  and  '  diffi- 
dence,' all  refer  to  the  fear  of  blame  or  disapprobation.  But 
a  person  may  be  shy  or  bashful  without  being  diffident. 
'  Diffidence  '  implies  a  real  distrust  of  our  own  powers, 
combined  with  a  fear  lest  our  failure  should  be  censured  ; 
for  a  dread  of  failure  unconnected  with  censure  is  not  usu- 
ally called  '  diffidence.'  We  should  not  say  that  Robinson 
Crusoe  on  his  island,  if  he  distrusted  his  own  powers  of 
building  a  canoe,  was  diffident.  The  word  seems  to  imply 
spectators,  and  the  companionship  of  others.  It  is  generally 
applied  to  a  reluctance  to  attempt  some  undertaking,  or  a 
fear  of  exhibiting  our  own  powers ;  but  '  shyness  '  and 
'  bashfulness  '  are  more  applicable  to  general  deportment 
and  manners. 

'  Bashfulness  '  is  generally  applied  to  an  awkward,  sheep- 
ish kind  of  '  timidity  ;  '  '  shyness  '  to  an  excessive  self- 
consciousness,  and  a  continual  impression  that  every  one  is 


100  A    COLLECTION    OF 

looking  at  iis.  Bashfulncss  would  be  shown  by  hanging 
back  timidly,  or  sitting  silent  and  stupefied.  Shyness  is 
often  manifested  by  an  apparent  haughtiness  and  statelinesa 
of  manner,  (hence  it  is  almost  proverbially  mistaken  for 
pride,)  or,  still  oftener,  by  an  affected  smile,  and  a  frequent 
forced  laugh. 

In  short,  '  shyness '  invariably  arises  from  thinking  too 
much  about  oneself,  '  diffidence  '  generally  from  underrat- 
ing one's  own  powers,  (which  is  compatible  with  perfect  self- 
possession,)  and  '  bashfulness  '  and  '  timidity  '  from  a  fear- 
ful disposition  and  a  want  of  presence  of  mind.  Shynesa 
and  bashfulness,  however,  imply  awkwardness,  which  tim- 
tdit}  does  not. 

SORROW,    GRIEF,    AFFLICTION,    DISTRESS,  REGRET, 
SADNESS,    MELANCHOLY. 

'  Sorrow  '  and  '  affliction  '  are  used  generally  —  '  grief ' 
only  for  particular  cases.  We  speak  of  '  such  an  one  having 
known  sorrow  '  or  '  affliction,'  but  not  of  '  having  known 
grief. ^  'Grief  is  usually  applied  to  'sorrow'  for  some 
definite  causes,  and  always  for  the  past.  We  speak  of  feel- 
ing '  grief  for  the  death  of  a  friend,  but  not  for  his  illness 
or  misconduct  at  this  present  moment.  In  such  a  case, '  sor- 
row '  or  '  affliction  '  would  be  better  words. 

'  Sorrow  '  and  '  grief  always  imply  mental  distress  ;  '  af- 
fliction '  is  used  in  a  more  extended  sense,  and  is  sometimes 
applied  to  one  class  of  bodily  evils,  —  to  those,  namely, 
which  are  occasioned  by  the  privation  of  a  sense,  or  the  loss 
of  a  bodily  power.  Pain  and  sickness,  however  severe,  are 
not  called  afflictions,  though  a.  person  suffering  from  them 
may  be  said  to  be  afflicted ;  but  blindness,  deafness,  or  loss 
of  the  use  of  any  of  the  limbs,  are  constantly  spoken  of  as 
'  afflictions.' 

'  Distress  '  may  be  used  either  generally,  or  particularly. 


ENGLISH    SYNONYMS.  101 

It  includes  a  wider  range  of  evils  than  affliction,  —  foi 
poverty,  sickness,  and  pain,  come  under  this  head.  When 
applied  in  particular  to  any  one  kind  of  evil,  it  usually  ex- 
presses an  uneasy,  restless  suffering,  whether  of  body  or 
mind  —  or  else  very  pressing,  griping  poverty  ;  —  and  it 
almost  always  implies  a  struggle.  One  who  is  sunk  in 
despair  wovdd  not  be  said  to  be  in  '  distress.' 

'  Sadness  '  and  '  melancholy  '  are  both  applied  to  moods 
of  the  mind  exclusively. 

'  Regret '  is  used  for  a  slighter  kind  of  sorrow  than  any 
of  the  words  above  mentioned  ;  when  used  in  speaking  of 
losses  by  death,  it  implies  the  mildest  degree  of  sorrow.  In 
its  stronger  sense,  it  is  chiefly  used  when  speaking  of  our 
past  conduct,  and  in  this  case  its  meaning  is  very  limited. 
We  feel  remorse  or  repentance  for  deep  and  heavy  faulte, 
♦  regret '  only  for  follies  or  carelessness.  But  '  regret '  has 
a  special  reference  to  one  particular  kind  of  repentance  — 
that  which  is  felt  for  having  lost  an  opportunity. 

Conjugate  words.  — '  Grief '  was  formerly  used  in  the 
sense  of  the  French  '  grief,'  for  a  subject  of  complaint  or 
injury.  It  has  preserved  this  sense  in  two  of  its  pseudo- 
paronymes,  or  conjugates  —  '  to  aggrieve  '  and  '  grievance.' 
'  Grievous '  was  formally  used  for  an  illness  or  accident, 
where  we  now  say  '  severe,'  and  now  is  used  to  qualify  an 
event  at  which  we  feel  '  sorrow  '  mingled  with  a  degree  of 
vexation.  Grieved  is  a  far  less  strong  expression  than 
'  grief.'  We  say  to  a  child  who  has  behaved  ill,  —  '  I  am 
grieved  at  your  conduct,'  but  we  should  not  speak  of  being 
in  grief  for  such  a  cause. 

'  Sorry,'  again,  is  a  much  weaker  expression  than  '  sor- 
row.' The  description  once  given  by  a  foreigner  of  the 
grief  of  some  friends  of  his  for  the  loss  of  their  only  child 
— '  They  are  very  sorry, ^  would  almost  raise  a  laugh  in 
England  ;  and  yet  in  old  English,  as  we  see  by  our  Bible 
9* 


102  A    COLLECTION    OP 

translation,  '  sorry  '  was  regarded  as  answering  (o  '  sorrow. 
••  And  when  his  fellow-servants  heard  that,  they  were  ver} 
sorry.' 

'  Afflicted  has  a  double  meaning.  It  is  used  for  *  being 
visited  with  affliction,'  or,  for  the  state  of  mind  naturally 
produced  by  it  —  the  state  of  '  grief  '  or  '  sorrow.*  This 
last  meaning  is  applied  by  metonymy,  just  as  the  adjective 
'  melancholy  '  was  formerly  used  for  a  sad  disposition,  and 
now  for  incidents  or  speeches  which  may  occasion  '  sadness.* 
Sad  has  also  acquired  this  secondary  meaning.  This  word 
has  undergone  some  curious  changes.  Being  derived  from 
the  verb  to  sit,  it  was  formerly  used  very  much  in  the  sense 
of  settled,  as  now  applied  to  conduct ;  indeed,  in  old 
times  it  signified  fir7n,  as  in  WickliiSfe's  translation  of  the 
Bible,  where  the  '  house  built  upon  a  rock,'  is  said  to  be 
built  upon  a  sad  stone.  Hence  it  came  to  signify  serious- 
ness, both  of  character  and  of  material  objects  ;  thus  sad 
garments,  for  what  the  French  called  un  habit  serieux.  Its 
meaning  at  present,  as  well  as  that  of  the  noun,  still  verges 
upon  the  idea  of  earnestness,  as  in  the  rather  old-fashioned 
expression,  '  in  soher  sadness,''  —  that  is,  '  in  collected  ear~ 
nestnessJ 

FEAK,  TRIGHT,  TEBKOB,  ALARM,  DKEAD,  APPREHENSION. 

'  Fear '  is  a  general  term,  which  includes  many  of  the 
rest.  It  is  sometimes  spoken  of  as  a  passion  ;  sometimes  as 
a  mere  intellectual  consciousness  of  danger.  It  is  also  used, 
as  far  as  this  latter  is  concerned,  in  tv/o  senses  :  1st,  the  ap- 
prehension of  actual  danger ;  2dly,  the  hypothetical  appre- 
hension. For  instance,  '  I  have  a  great  fear  of  catching 
cold,'  implies  the  actual  apprehension  of  an  evil  —  i.  e., 
'  catching  cold  ; '  but  '  I  have  a  great  fear  of  being  out  in 
the  rain,'   implies  a  hypothetical  apprehension.     What   is 


ENGLISH    STNONYMS.  10«J 

understood  by  it  is,  '  I  tave  a  fear  of  the  evil  which  may  ie 
produced  by  going  out  in  the  rain  —  viz.,  catching  cold.'* 

'  Friglit '  implies  a  degree  of  fear  which  paralyzes  and 
takes  complete  possession  of  the  mind.  '  Terror  '  is  the 
same  thing  in  a  stronger  degree.  '  Alarm  '  merely  signifies 
a  sudden  apprehension  of  immediately-impending  danger, 
probably  derived  from  the  Italian  '  AlV  armi  !  '  a  common 
cry  of  soldiers  when  surprised.  A  brave  man  may  be 
'  alarmed,'  (for  it  implies  nothing  unreasonable  or  cowardly 
in  its  primary  sense,)  and  he  may  feel  '  fear  ;  '  but  he  could 
not  be  '  frightened.' 

'  Dread '  differs  from  '  fear  '  in  being  more  definite  and 
more  intense  :  we  may  speak  of  '  being  in  a  state  of  fear  ' 
without  reference  to  the  object  feared;  but  not,  of  '  being  in 
a  state  of  dread.'  f 

'  Fear,'  '  fright,'  and  '  alarm  '  are,  in  general,  only  used 
for  apprehension  of  some  painful  or  destructive  physical 
evil ;  the  two  last  constantly  :  but  '  fear  '  is  often  used  in 
reference  to  the  opinion  of  others,  especially  those  whom 
we  respect.  Men  are  said  to  be  '  governed  by  the  fear  of 
the  world,  the  fear  of  their  superiors,'  «Sic. ;  and  '  fear  '  has 
always  been  the  most  appropriate  expression  that  is  used  in 
reference  to  our  Creator. 

The  conjugate  verbs,  '  to  fear'  and  '  to  dread,'  do  not 
exactly  correspond  with  the  nouns.  '  To  fear  '  is  generflly 
used  for  a  hypothetical  apprehension ;  and  '  to  dread  '  is 
mostly  applied  in  reference  to  some  impeiiding  evil.  The 
expression,  '  I  dread  crossing  the  sea,'  would  imply  that  we 


*  The  adjective  '  afraid  '  has  the  same  varieties  of  meaning.  It 
maybe  said  to  be  conjugate  to  the  noun  'fear.*  'To  Ve  afraid,' 
however  when  used  alone,  means  nearly  the  same  as  '  to  be  frightened.' 

t  '  Dread  '  was  formerly  used  more  as  '  fear  '  is  now.  It  was  us<jd 
towards  the  Deity,  as  we  may  see  in  our  liturgy. 


104  A    COLLECTION    OF 

expected  soon  to  cross.  '  To  dread  '  may  also  be  applied  to 
any  evil,  whether  connected  with  positive  pain  or  danger,  or 
not.  '  I  dread  the  meeting  with  such  an  one,'  might  be  used 
by  one  who  expected  to  be  afflicted  with  sorrow  or  agitation 
at  the  meeting.  '  I  fear  meeting  him,'  would  imply  that  the 
meeting  would  be  the  cause  of  some  physical  evil  or  danger. 
We  should  not  say,  '  I  fear  committing  a  crime,'  unless  we 
meant  that  we  feared  the  punishment  the  crime  might  bring 
on  us  ;  if  our  fear  was  based  on  conscientious  or  honorable 
motives,  we  should  use  the  word  '  dread.'  •'-  With  regard 
to  the  faults  of  others,  hov/ever,  we  say  '  fear  :  '  '  I  fear  he 
be  may  be  led  into  such  and  such  an  action.' 

'  Apprehension  '  sim[)ly  implies  the  consciousnesd  of  dan- 
gfr.  It  is  a  word  which  has  undergone  some  change  in  its 
meaning.  Originally,  it  was  used  merely  to  express  expec- 
tation, or  simple  consciousness,  without  implying  necessarily 
the  expectation  of  consciousness  of  danger  ;  and  this  original 
sense  has  been  preserved  in  its  derivative  or  conjugate  verb, 
'  to  apprehend.'  By  degrees,  the  idea  of  fear  or  danger 
came  to  be  understood  in  ohe  case  of  the  noun  substantive, 
and  also  the  adjective,  'apprehensive.' 

The  conjugates  belonging  to  this  group  have  most  of  them 
preserved  their  original  meaning  ;  but  '  fearful  '  may  either 
be  applied  to  one  who  feels  fear,  or  to  circumstances  calcu- 
lated to  inspire  the  feeling.  And  '  frightful,'  which  is  now 
limited  in  its  meaning  to  that  which  is  likely  to  inspire 
fright,  was  formerly  used  in  speaking  of  persons  who  were 
easily  frightened.  This  change  of  expression  by  metonymy 
has  taken  place  with  many  words  in  our  language. 


*The  expression  *  to  be  afraid/ conveys  the  same  idea  as  *  dread,' 
with  respect  to  committing  a  fault.  A  brave  and  conscientious  persor 
will  be  '  afraid  '  of  nothing  so  much  as  of  doing  wrong. 


ENGLISH    SYNONYMS.  103 


PATIENCE,    FORTITUDE,    RESIGNATION. 

'  Fortitude '  may  be  classed  in  two  ways :  it  may  either 
be  reckoned  with  courage,  intrepidity,  &c.,  on  the  one  hand, 
or  with  '  patience  '  and  '  resignation  '  on  the  other.  It  may 
be  called  a  link  between  two  classes  of  virtues.  It  is  always 
used,  however,  in  the  same  sense ;  as,  a  resistance  to  evil 
rather  than  a  sxihnission  to  it ;  it  is  shown  in  sustaining 
ilrmly  some  violent  and  overwhelming  shock,  whether  bodily 
or  mental.  '  Patience,'  on  the  other  hand,  implies  a  gentle 
submission  to  the  lesser  evils  of  life,  and  an  endurance  of 
continuous  suffering,  whether  of  body  or  mind. 

'  Fortitude  '  would  be  shown  in  sustaining  some  great 
calamity  or  sudden  reverse  of  fortune,  or  in  enduring  a  severe 
operation  without  a  groan. 

'  Patience  '  is  manifested  rather  in  bearing  a  lingering 
illness  with  serenity  and  gentleness  —  in  enduring  some 
continuous  and  wearying,  though  not  violent  pain  —  or  trials 
from  the  bad  temper  or  ill  conduct  of  others.  It  is  also 
applied  to  unremitting  perseverance  in  some  disagreeable  or 
discouraging  task  or  duty.  A  person  is  spoken  of  as  being 
a  patient  teacher  of  stupid  or  inattentive  pupils  —  as  not 
losing  '  patience  '  when  trying  to  conquer  some  difficulty. 
In  this  sense,  '  patience'  is  active;  but  'fortitude'  is  always 
passive. 

The  opposite  of  '  fortitude  '  is  the  weakness  which  yields 
and  is  conquered  by  circumstances  :  a  want  of  it  is  mani- 
fested by  giving/  way  to  uncontrolled  grief,  terror,  or  out- 
ward expressions  of  pain.  The  opposite  of  '  patience,'  on 
the  other  hand,  is  irritability,  querulousness,  or  peevishness. 
Both  are  equally  necessary,  but  '  patience  '  is  more  frequent- 
ly so  than  'fortitude.'  The  common  evils  of  life  should  be 
submitted  to  ;  the  greater  and  rarer  ones  require  to  be  met 
with  resolution. 


106  A    COLLECTION    OF 

'  Resignation  '  more  nearly  resembles  '  patience  '  than 
'  fortitude,'  inasmuch  as  it  implies  submission,  and  not  resist- 
ance ;  but,  on  the  other  hand,  it  is  always  passive.  It  is 
generally  applied  either  to  those  mental  evils  commonly 
called  ajjliclions,  or  to  bodily  evils,  which,  being  of  a  nearly 
hopeless  character,  are  also  classed  under  the  same  head. 
A  person  is  not  said  to  be  resigned  under  a  violent  tooth- 
ache ;  but  under  hopeless  blindness,  or  incurable  illness,  the 
term  would  be  properly  applied.  It  therefore  refers  more  to 
the  mental  suffering  which  accompanies  these  evils  than  to 
the  evils  themselves ;  and,  in  particular,  it  implies  a  readi- 
ness to  resign  hope.  '  Resignation  '  always  implies  a  relig- 
ious submission  ;  in  this,  it  differs  from  the  two  words  be- 
fore mentioned.  A  stoic  might  display  fortitude  ;  patience 
is  often  the  result  of  a  sluggish  tameness  of  character  ;  but 
nothing  short  of  Christian  principle  can  inspire  resignation ; 
its  essential  character  is  submission  to  the  will  of  our 
Maker. 

UTILITY,    USEFULNESS. 

'  Utility  '  is  employed  in  a  more  general  and  abstract 
sense  than  '  usefulness.'  We  speak  of  the  '  utility '  of  an 
invention  or  discovery ;  of  the  '  usefulness '  of  the  article 
discovered  or  invented  :  of  the  '  utility  '  of  a  society  or  in- 
stitution ;  of  the  '  usefulness '  of  an  individual.  *  Usefulness,' 
however,  is  sometimes  employed  in  the  sense  of  '  utility  ; ' 
'  utility  '  much  seldomer  in  the  sense  of  '  usefulness.'  The 
abstract  quality  is  always  called  '  utility.'  '  Beauty  and 
utility,'  for  example,  are  placed  in  opposition  to  each 
other. 

EXPENSE,    COST. 

Strictly  speaking,  '  expense '  should  be  applied  to  the 
purchaser,  and  '  cost '  to  the  thing  purchased.     A  splendid 


ENGLISH    SYNONYMS.  107 

carriage  is  a  costly  article  ;  the  person  who  bought  it  is  an 
expensive  liver,  or  one  of  expensive  habits.  But  the  original 
meaning  of  these  words  (both  adjectives  and  nouns)  has 
been  so  corrupted,  that  they  are  now  used  almost  indiscrimi- 
nately one  for  the  other.  Still,  '  expensive  '  is  generally 
and  most  correctly  used  with  reference  to  the  means  of  the 
purchaser ;  and  '  costly '  with  reference  to  the  value  of  the 
article  bought.  Many  persons  are  tempted  to  buy  articles 
of  dress  or  furniture  because  they  are  not  costly,  forgetting 
that,  if  their  means  are  small,  these  purchases  may  still  be 
too  expensive ;  and,  generally  speaking,  there  are  few  ways 
in  which  more  '  expense  '  is  incurred  than  in  constantly 
buying  what  are  called  '  great  bargains.' 

■WISDOM,  PKUDENCE. 

'  Wisdom,'  in  the  words  of  one  writer,*-  '  consists  in  the 
ready  and  accurate  perception  of  analogies :  '  and  in  those  of 
another,  '  in  the  employment  of  the  best  means  for  the 
attainment  of  the  most  important  ends : '  the  one  being  the 
description  of  the  faculty,  the  other  of  its  operation. 

'  Prudence  '  is  a  lower  kind  of  '  wisdom  ; '  it  consists  in 
the  employment  of  the  best  means  for  the  accomplishment 
of  any  one  particular  ead,  whether  it  be  important  or  no. 
A  man  may  therefore  be  prudent  in  some  things  and  not  in 
others  ;  for  example,  if  his  careful  and  diligent  pursuit  of 
riches  should  peril  his  soul.  Prudence,  again,  is  of  a  more 
negative  character  than  wisdom :  it  rather  consists  in  avoid- 
ing danger  than  in  taking  a  decided  step  for  the  accomplish- 
ment of  any  object.  A  prudent  general  is  one  who  -mW 
not  let  himself  be  surprised  or  taken  at  disadvantage  ;  but 
not  always  one  who  gains  victories.  A  prudent  statesman 
will  keep  out  of  war  and   debt,  but   will  not  always  pass 

*  See  Archbishop  Whately's  Rhetoric. 


108  A    COLLECTION    OF 

important  laws  or  make  improvements.  He  may  not  even 
show  foresight  in  respect  of  very  distant  evils.  Sir  Hubert 
Walpolc  appears  to  have  been  a  prudent  statesman  for  his 
0W71  day  ;  but  he  showed  a  want  of  real  wisdom  in  taking 
no  measures  to  allay  the  irritation  which  existed  in  the  High- 
lands, and  which,  though  it  did  not  break  out  in  /lis  time, 
was  a  source  of  great  evils  a  few  years  afterwards.-'* 

'  Prudence,'  in  short  takes  a  lower  range  than  '  wisdom.' 
I'he  Greeks  had  only  one  word  for  both,  plironimos.  The 
word  sophos  is  sometimes  translated  '  wise,'  but  incorrectly  : 
it  meant  rather  '  skilful  in  the  arts  ;  '  and,  used  as  a  general 
term,  answered  to  what  we  call  pldlosopliicul. 

SELF-CONCEIT,  PKIDE,  VANITY,  ARROGANCE,  HAUGHTINESS. 

To  be  '  self-conceited,'  is  to  entertain  an  overweening 
opinion  of  oneself.  A  person,  however,  may  be  conceited 
in  some  things  and  not  in  others  ;  he  may  greatly  overrate 
his  own  capacity  in  some  one  particular  point,  while  in 
others  he  has  a  just  estimate,  or  even  perhaps  too  low  an 
estimate  of  himself. 

'  Pride,'  on  the  other  hand,  may  be  defined  as  a  disposi- 
tion to  rate  one's  own  claims  to  respect  or  attention  too 
highly,  and  to  disdain  others  —  viewing  our  equals  as  our 
inferiors,  and  our  superiors  as  our  equals.  A  proud  man,  in 
short,  rates  very  highly  what  he  himself  really  possesses  — 
a  self-conceited  man  imagines  himself  to  possess  what  he 
really  does  not.  An  so,  the  term  '  pride  of  birth,'  '  pride 
of  wealth  or  rank,'  &c.,  means,  rating  the  claims  of  birth  or 
rank  very  highly.  Hence  we  may  see  men  of  high  rank 
and  great  wealth  who  look  down  on  those  who  are  far  su- 
perior in  mind  to  themselves  ;  this  does  not  proceed  from 
their  overrating   their  own  abilities,  but  merely  from  their 


*  See  Macaulay's  Essay$. 


ENGLISH    STNONTMS.  109 

overrating  the  claims  of  that  very  wealth  and  rank,  and 
thinking  it  entitled  to  more  respect  and  veneration  than  the 
greatest  talents  or  the  most  eminent  virtues. 

'  Haughtiness  '  proceeds  from  pride,  but  is  applied  almost 
exclusively  to  manners  and  deportment.  A  proud  dispo- 
sition will  often  show  itself  in  haughty  manners. 

'  Vanity '  may  exist  along  with  pride  or  self-conceit,  hut 
is  not  implied  by  either  of  them.  It  is  a  word  which  has 
undergone  a  great  variety  of  changes.  Originally  it  ineant 
emptiness,  hollowness,  (from  the  Latin  vanus,)  thence  it 
came  to  signify  something  unreal,  fictitious,  false.  This 
was  its  meaning  in  Shakespeare's  time  ;  he  speaks  of  '  lying 
vainness.'  By  degrees  its  meaning  was  modified,  till  it 
came  to  be  used  in  the  sense  which  it  has  now  acquired  — 
an  excessive  desire  of  applause  and  approbation  for  qualities 
we  do  possess,  as  well  as  for  those  we  do  not.  Persons  are 
said  to  be  vain  of  their  talents  or  beauty,  when  they  really 
possess  these  qualifications. 

Many  extremely  vain  persons  nevertheless  underrate 
themselves  ;  indeed,  a  high  opinion  of  oneself  acts  rather  as 
a  check  than  an  incentive  to  vanity. 

'  Arrogance  '  is  often  confounded  with  self-conceit,  though 
totally  different  from  it.  The  quality  is,  in  fact,  consistent 
with  a  very  low  opinion  of  oneself,  and  a  high  admiration 
and  respect  for  others.  It  has  been  defined  *  as  '  an  habitual 
and  exclusive  self -deference.'  An  arrogant  man  is  without 
deference,  even  for  those  of  whom  he  himself  thinks  most 
highly.  He  may  say,  and  think,  that  he  is  extremely  in- 
ferior to  certain  persons ;  he  may  hold  them  in  the  highest 
esteem  and  admiration,  but  were  they  to  differ  from  him  on 
any   point,  even  in  a  matter  in   which  ihey  were  fully  con- 

*See  Archbishop  Whately's  Rhetoric,  7th  edit.  p.  119.    See  also  the 
article  in  this  work  under  the  head  deflrenoe,  &c. 
10 


110  A    COLLECTION    OF 

versant  and  he  wholly  ignorant,  he  would  set  their  opinions 
utterly  at  nought.  He  may  not  have  a  high  estimation  of 
his  own  powers  in  general ;  but  practically,  on  each  par- 
ticular occasion,  he  appears  to  consider  himself  infallible  : 
and  this  is  what  leads  many  to  attribute  to  self-conceit  what 
in  reality  springs  from  arrogance. 

EFFECTS,  CONSEQUENCES,  RESULTS. 

'  Effects  '  are  the  genus,  —  '  consequences  '  and  '  results  ' 
the  species,  —  therefore  '  consequences  '  and  '  results  '  must 
also  be  '  eflfects,'  —  since  the  species  includes  the  genus,  — 
but  '  effects  '  are  not  necessarily  '  consequences  '  or  '  results.' 
'  Effects,'  as  distinguished  from  the  otlier  terms  we  have 
mentioned,  are  applied  to  something  which  immediately 
follows  from  any  cause,  whether  mental  or  physical.  They 
can  therefore  be  to  a  certain  extent  calculated  on  before- 
hand. '  Consequences  '  are  more  remote,  and  spring  less 
directly  from  causes  ;  they  rather  follow  in  the  train  of  an 
event.  We  may  foresee  the  '  consequences  '  of  any  thing, 
but  we  always  act  vnth  a  view  to  its  '  effects.'  For  instance, 
the  effect  of  wearing  clothes,  is  to  cover  one  ;  the  conse- 
quence is,  that  they  wear  out ;  we  foresee  this  consequence 
in  buying  them,  but  it  is  with  a  view  to  the  immediate  effect 
(the  covering  us)  that  we  act. 

Again,  we  should  say,  '  His  conduct  had  a  bad  effect  on 
those  around  him  ; '  but  not  '  bad  consequences,'  although 
we  might  add,  '  that  the  consequence  of  this  conduct  Avas,  — 
such  and  such  an  event.'  Hence  we  see  how  much  more 
remote  are  '  consequences '  than  '  effects,'  simply  so  called, 
although  a  '  consequence  '  must  he  an  '  effect,'  as  before 
stated.  •  Effects  '  likewise  often  imply  some  direct  agency 
or  design,  which  '  consequences  '  never  do. 

'  Results '  are  still  more  remote  than  '  consequences.' 
'  Consequences  '  and  '  effects  '  are  both  applied  to  a  change 


ENGLISH    SYNONYMS.  Ill 

which  is  in  the  act  of  taking  place,  while  '  result '  implies 
the  state  of  things  when  the  change  has  taken  place. 
Hence,  it  is  both  more  remote  and  more  general  than 
either  '  consequences  '  or  '  effects.'  We  should  say,  '  My 
entreaties  produced  a  powerful  effect  on  him,  and  the  result 
was  that  he  granted  my  request.'  The  '  effect '  of  plough- 
ing is  the  loosening  of  the  soil ;  the  '  consequences  '  are 
that  seed  can  be  sown  on  it ;  the  '  result '  is,  the  fertility  of 
the  land. 

CONFLICT,    COMBAT,    CONTEST,    CONTENTION. 

Formerly,  the  first  two  of  these  terms  were  applied  to  the 
striving  together  of  foes  in  battle  ;  now,  '  combat '  is  the 
only  one  used  in  this  sense,  though  it  is  sometimes  aleo 
applied  figuratively  to  the  strife  of  words,  or  of  mental  and 
moral  feelings  and  emotions.  But  'conflict'  has  almost 
entirely  lost  its  original  meaning  of  a  battle  or  skirmish,  and 
is  only  applied  to  it  figuratively.  A  '  contest '  was  never 
used  for  fighting.  '  Contest '  is  generally  used  for  a  hot 
argument  or  verbal  dispute.  A  '  conflict '  is  now  more 
frequently  applied  to  an  inward  struggle  of  the  mind,  —  to 
the  strife  of  contending  opinions  or  feelings.  We  speak  of 
'  undergoing  a  mental  conflict '  —  'of  conflicting  passions,' 
&c. ;  but  it  is  sometimes,  though  more  rarely,  used  in  the 
sense  of  '  contest.' 

'  Contention  '  was  formerly  used  in  the  same  sense  as  '  con- 
test,' as  in  Acts,  xv.  39  :  —  '  and  the  contention  was  so  sharp 
between  them,'  &c.  Now,  '  contest '  is  used  for  the  act  of 
disputing  or  quarrelling,  and  '  contention '  for  the  halit.  We 
speak  of  '  a  spirit  of  contention,'  (meaning  a  tendency  to 
habitual  striving  and  disputing,)  or  of  'a  contentious  dispo- 
sition ;  '  but  never  of  a  '  spirit  of  contest.' 


112  A    COLLECTION    OF 


DETESTATION,  AYERSIOX,  ANTIPATHY,  DISLIKE,    ABUCK- 
EENCE,    HATRED,    REPUGNANCE. 

*  Aversion '  is  merely  a  stronger  form  of  '  dislike  ;  '  they 
differ  only  in  degree,  not  in  kind.  We  have  a  dislike  to 
what  is  unpleasant  to  ns  —  we  have  an  aversion  to  some- 
thing that  shocks,  disgusts,  or  inspires  us  with  horror. 

'  Antipathy  '  is  always  used  for  a  causeless  '  dislike,'  or 
rather  for  one  of  which  we  cannot  define  the  cause.  !Many 
persons  have  an  '  antipathy  '  to  a  cat ;  this  is  perhaps  not 
utterly  without  cause,  and  may  be  accounted  for  by  the 
electricity  which  resides  in  that  animal ;  but  being  without 
any  certain  and  obvious  reason,  and  unaccountable  even  to 
the  person  who  feels  it,  it  is  denominated  an  '  antipathy.'  * 

'  Repugnance  '  is  a  feeling  akin  to  disgust  ;  but  it  is  often 
applied  to  an  extreme  reluctance,  or  shrinking  from  some 
particular  course  of  action. 

'  Hatred '  implies  enmity,  or  a  desire  for  the  destruction  of 
its  object.  It  is  generally  applied  to  qualities  of  a  personal 
kind,  though  not  always  strictly  personal.  It  may  be 
directed  against  abstractions  of  qualities  ;  as  for  instance, 
we  may  hate  a  liar,  a  traitor,  an  ungrateful  man,  in  the  ab- 
stract ;  but  it  is  rarely  directed  —  perhaps  never  correctly 
-T—  against  qualities  belonging  to  things,  whether  in  the  ab- 
stract or  otherwise.  In  this  respect  it  differs  from  some  of 
the  other  words  classified  here,  f 

*  When  the  discoveries  of  science  shall  have  thrown  more  light  on 
the  subject,  an  explanation  will  doubtless  be  afforded  of  many  at 
present  unaccountable  antipathies,  both  with  regard  to  persons  and 
things. 

t  Aristotle,  in  his  Rhetoric,  has  given  an  admirable  parallel  be- 
tween '  anger '  and  '  hatred  ;  '  in  which  he  points  out  that  •  anger ' 
can  only  be  directed  against  an  individual  or  individuals,  while 
*  hatred  '  may  be  felt  towards  a  class  or  nation  ;  that  '  anger  '  only 


ENGLISH    SYXONYMS.  11& 

'  Detestation  '  is  somewhat  like  '  aversion,'  but  is  oftenei 
applied  to  jiersons  or  personal  qualities  in  the  abstract.  We 
talk  of  '  detesting  '  cruelty  or  lying  —  we  should  not  speak 
of  having  an  '  aversion  '  to  them  —  because  '  aversion  '  is 
scarcely  ever  applied  to  qualities  in  the  ahstract. 

'  Abhorrcncs  '  is  as  strong  a  term  as  '  aversion,'  but  it  is 
differently  applied.  '  Aversion  '  may  be  felt  either  towards 
individual  persons  or  things,  but  never  towards  actions. 
'  Abhorrence '  is  applied  generally  in  reference  to  actions. 
The  proper  object  of  abhon-ence  is  guilt  or  crime  ;  we  may 
speak,  indeed,  of  our  '  abhorrence '  of  such  and  such  a 
man ;  but  it  is  always  applied  to  him  as  the  author  of  some 
criminal  action,  and,  strictly  speaking,  it  applies  only  to  bad 
conduct. 

EXEMY,    ANTAGONIST,    ADVEKSAEY,    OPPONENT. 

Of  these  four  words,  '  enemy  '  is  the  only  one  which 
implies  general  personal  hostility.  We  may  be  adversaries, 
antagonists,  or  opponents  of  those  with  whom  we  are  in 
general  on  friendly  terms.  The  chief  difference,  indeed, 
between  an  '  enemy  '  and  an  '  adversary  '  is,  that  the  word 
'  enemy  '  is  oftcner  applied  to  one  who  is  personally  hostile, 
and  '  adversary  '  to  one  who  happens  for  n  time  to  be  placed 
in  the  position  of  an  '  enemy,'  as  in  war  or  in  argument. 
'  Antagonist '  and  '  opponent '  are  generally  used  in  speak- 
ing of  a  single  combat,  or  a  debate  or  dispute  between  two. 

seeks  retaliation,  which  shall  be  known  and  understood  as  such  by  iti' 
object,  while  'hatred'  desii-es  destruction;  and  lastly,  that  'anger 
cannot  subsist  at  the  same  moment  with '  fear,'  though  '  hatred  '  ai>d 
'  fear '  are  quite  compatible.  His  example,  however,  has  not  been  fol- 
lowed in  this  work,  in  classing  '  anger '  and  '  hatred  '  together, 
because,  though  the  two  passions  may  often  be  confounded  together, 
and  mistaken  one  for  the  other,  the  two  words  are  not  liable  to  b«  ima 
taken  ;  and  it  is  with  words  that  we  have  now  to  do. 
10* 


114  A    COLLECTION    OF 

*  Antagonist '  (as  its  etymology  implies)  is  applied  to  one 
\/ho  is  actively  struggling  with  another,  whether  literally  or 
in  argument.  '  Opponent '  simply  denotes  one  who  differs, 
or  who  opposes  a  passive  resistance.  '  Antagonist '  may  be 
used  either  for  real  fighting,  or  for  verbal  disputes  ;  '  oppo- 
nent,' almost  exclusively  for  the  last. 

Of  these  four  words,  two,  '  antagonist '  and  '  adversary  ' 
are  exclusively  personal.  The  first,  '  enemy,'  may  be  used 
for  one  who  has  a  hatred  and  utter  dislike  for  certain  tilings  ; 
as,  an  '  enemy  to  luxury '  —  'an  enemy  to  such  and  such  a 
course.'  '  Opponent '  is  sometimes  also  used  in  the  same 
way  ;  we  may  speak  of  '  an  opponent  of  such  and  such 
measures,'  but  always  particularly  and  never  generally,  — 
we  could  not  speak  for  instance,  of  an  oppojienl  to  luxury  or 
avarice. 

REPROOF,  REBUKE,  REPRIMAND,  CENSURE,  REMON- 
STRANCE, EXPOSTULATION,  REPROACH. 

A  '  reproof '  is  a  simple  admonition,  expressive  of  our 
disapprobation,  generally  addressed  to  some  one  beneath 
us  in  age  or  station.  '  Rebuke  '  is  now  used  nearly  in 
the  same  sense,  but  is  a  stronger  term.  It  w'as  formerly 
applied  rather  as  a  '  remonstrance  '  to  an  equal,  or  even  to 
a  superior  ;  as  in  the  Bible,  '  Peter  took  him  and  began  to 
rebuke  him.'  '^• 

'  A  '  reprimand  '  is  always  addressed  to  inferiors,  and  has 
a  stronger  sense  than  either  of  the  former  words.  It  is 
understood  to  imply  something  of  an  official  reproof,  and 
from  one  having  authority. 

'  Censure '  has  less  of  personality  than  any  of  these 
words  ;  it  is  rather  the  expression  of  an  unfavorable  opinion 

*  The  nouns  and  verbs  are  here  used  indifferently,  as  they  precisely 
correspond. 


ENGLISH    SYNONYMS.  lit 

than  a  direct  '  reproof.'  The  conduct  of  a  public  man  is 
*  censured  '  in  the  papers ;  an  author  is  '  censured '  in  a 
review.  It  always  applied  to  the  opinion  of  equals,  or  to 
those  who  judge  as  equals,  even  if  they  are  not  really  so. 
We  never  '  censure  '  an  inferior,  and  in  '  censuring  '  a  supe- 
rior, we  place  ourselves  for  the  time  on  an  equality  with 
him. 

'  Remonstrance  '  and  '  expostulation  '  are  both  more  argu- 
mentative, and  have  more  of  the  character  of  advice  than 
any  of  the  other  words  mentioned.  They  have  also  this 
characteristic,  that  they  always  imply  an  attempt  to  dissuade 
their  object  from  some  action  or  line  of  conduct  which  is 
either  taking  place,  or  about  to  take  place,  —  some  step 
which  a  person  is  about  to  take  ;  while  '  censure  '  applies  to 
what  is  past.  We  might  say,  '  His  conduct  deserves  censure, 
for  he  acted  as  he  did  in  spite  of  the  remo7islrances  (or 
expostulations)  of  his  friends.' 

The  chief  difference  between  these  two  words  is,  that 
a  '  remonstrance '  may  be  used  with  a  superior,  while  '  ex- 
postulation '  is  more  generally  applied  to  an  equal  or  in- 
ferior. 

A  '  reproach  '  differs  from  all  the  other  words  mentioned 
in  three  ways.  First,  it  is  more  personal.  A  '  reproof '  is 
always  supposed  to  be  given  for  the  benefit  of  the  person 
reproved  ;  a  '  reproach  '  is  often  merely  a  vent  to  the  feel- 
ings of  the  person  who  gives  it.  Secondly,  it  is  not  limited 
to  any  grade  or  relation,  but  may  be  given  to  equals,  supe- 
riors, or  inferiors.  A  child  may  reproach  a  parent  with  his 
neglected  education  ;  a  king  may  reproach  his  subjects  for 
their  desertion  —  his  allies  for  their  faithlessness.  Thirdly, 
'  reproach  '  differs  in  respect  of  its  object.  To  reproach  a 
person,  is  to  attribute  a  fault  to  him  which  he  does  not  admit :' 
while  to  reprove  him  is  to  dwell  on  the  wrong  he  has  done 
in  committing  it.     Thus,  we  reprove  the  Romanists  for  their 


116  A    COLLECTION    OF 

idolatry  ;   wc  reproach  some  professed  members  of  our  own 
Church  with  being  Romanists  at  heart. 

ANSWER,    KETLY,    KEJOINDER. 

An  '  answer  '  and  a  '  reply  '  may  be  synonymous,  but  are 
not  always  so.  In  general  we  are  said  to  '  answer  '  a  ques- 
tion, and  to  '  reply '  to  an  attack.  The  first  time  a  question 
is  responded  to,  it  is  always  called  an  '  answer; '  but  if  this, 
again,  is  *  answered,'  the  '  answer '  to  the  '  answer  '  is  called 
a  '  reply.'  A  '  rejoinder  '  is  an  '  answer  '  given  in  support 
of  some  former  '  answer.'  It  is  chiefly  used  as  a  law-term, 
but  in  general  it  implies  something  said  in  a  later  stage  of 
the  debate  or  discussion,  rather  than  a  '  reply.'  But  '  an- 
swer '  (whether  used  as  a  noun  or  as  a  verb)  is  used  in  a 
secondary  sense,  to  imply  something  which  serves  the  pur- 
pose for  which  it  was  said  —  which  satisfies  the  questioner, 
confutes  or  silences  the  objector,  defeats  the  opponent,  &c. 

A  '  reply  '  is  merely  something  said  in  return,  or  by  way 
of  an  'answer'  to  some  question,  attack,  &c.  Hence  we 
say,  '  This  reply  is  no  answer ; '  '  Many  books  have  been 
written  in  reply  to  this  autlior,  but  he  has  never  yet  been 
answered.'' 

A    COMMAND,    INJUNCTION,    ORDER. 

'  Command '  is  the  most  general  term  of  the  three.  We 
speak  of  a  '  divine  command,'  rather  than  '  injunction  '  or 
'  order.'  '  Injunction  '  relates  more  to  general  conduct ; 
'  order  '  to  particular  acts.  A  child  receives  '  orders  '  to  learn 
his  lesson,  but  '  injunctions  '  to  be  diligent  and  attentive. 
We  should  not  speak  of  giving  a  servant  '  orders,'  but 
'  injunctions  '  to  be  tidy.  A  '  command,'  though  not  more 
absolute  or  despotic  than  an  '  order '  or  '  injunction,' gen- 
erally indicate  persons  of  a  higher  station  :  a  king  or  gen- 
eral issues  '  commands  ;  '  an  inferior  officer  gives  '  orders.' 


ENGLISH    SYNONYMS.  U* 

.    '  Commandment,'  the  other  noun  derived  Horn  the  verb 

*  to  command,'  is  now  nearly  obsolete,  and  used  only  for 
the  laws  laid  down  in  the  Bible.  The  original  meaning  ol 
our  word  '  command  '  seems  to  have  been  '  power  '  or  au- 
thority.    (See  Shakespeare,  Ki7ig  Lear.) 

DEFEKENCE,  RESPECT,  VENERATION. 

'  Deference  '  may  be  felt  for  those  whose  general  charac- 
ter we  neither  '  respect '  nor  '  venerate.'  It  is  often  enter- 
tained unconsciously,  and  is  nothing  move  than  an  liabitual 
presumption  in  favor  of  a  person's  opinions ;  a  feeling 
rather  than  an  opinion,  that  he  is  more  likely  to  be  right 
than  another.  "We  may  feel  '  deference  '  for  a  person  on 
particular  points  only  ;  for  instance,  we  should  defer  to,  or 
feel  deference  for,  a  sailor  in  matters  connected  with  the 
sea,   or  a  lawyer  in  questions  of  law.     But  '  respect '  and 

*  veneration  '  must  be  felt  for  the  whole  character  of  their 
object.  These  two  last  words  approach  each  other  in  their 
meaning ;  but  '  veneration '  is  a  much  stronger  sentiment 
than  '  respect.'  We  may  both  '  respect '  and  '  venerate  ' 
those  for  whom  we  have  no  '  deference  ; '  but  this  is  a  cir- 
cumstance rarely  if  ever  acknowledged,  even  to  ourselves.* 

Lastly,  '  respect '  and  '  veneration  '  are  felt  exclusively  for 
moral  qualities,  to  which  *  deference '  is  not  confined.  We 
should  not  think  of  respecting  such  a  man  for  his  mathe- 
matical talents,  or  venerating  another  for  his  skill  in  some 
work  of  art ;  but  in  both  these  cases  we  might  feel  '  defer- 
ence.' 

Conjugate  words.  —  The  conjugates  '  respectable  '  and 
'  venerable  *  have  considerably  diverged  from  the  meaning 
of  their  roots.  •  Respectable  '  is  almost  the  lowest  term  of 
approbation  we  can  use  ;  and  '  venerable  '  is  always  applied 

*See  Whately's  Rhetoric,  under  the  head  •  Deference.* 


118  A    COLLECTION    OP 

to  something  ancient ;  whereas,  we  may  '  venerate  '  virtue, 
whether  in  youth  or  age.  '  Deferential '  is  merely  applied 
to  manners.     The  verbs  strictly  correspond  with  the  nouns. 

ILLUSION,    DELUSION. 

'  Illusion  '  has  most  to  do  with  visions  of  the  imagination : 
'  delusion  '  with  some  decided  mental  deception.  An  '  illu- 
sion '  Is  an  idea  which  is  presented  before  our  bodily  or 
mental  vision,  and  which  does  not  exist  in  reality.  A  '  de- 
lusion '  is  a  false  view  entertained  of  something  which 
really  exists,  but  v.b.ich  does  not  possess  the  quality  or  attri- 
bute erroneously  ascribed  to  it. 

'  Delusions  '  may  likewise  be  applied  to  perverted  opin- 
ions. A  fanatic  sectarian  is  said  to  be  possessed  by  '  delu- 
sions.' '  Illusions,'  on  the  other  hand,  are  solely  applied  to 
the  visions  of  a  distempered  imagination,  the  chimerical 
ideas  of  one  blinded  by  hope,  passion,  or  credulity  —  or, 
lastly,  to  spectral  and  other  ocular  deceptions,  to  which 
the  word  '  delusion '  is  never  applied. 

FALSEHOOD,    TALSITY. 

'  Falsity '  is,  properly  speaking,  the  quality  of  a  false 
proposition  ;  '  falsehood,'  the  proposition  itself.  When  we 
have  found  out  that  a  person  has  told  a  '  falsehood,'  we  are 
convinced  of  the  '  falsity  '  of  his  assertion.  The  educated 
classes  are  very  apt  to  use  the  word  '  falsehood '  for  '  falsity ; ' 
as  '  I  perceive  the  falsehood  of  your  declaration.'  The 
vulgar  fall  into  the  reverse  error,  and  sometimes  speak  of 
'  telling  a  falsity.' 

DECEIT,    DECEPTION,    FRAUD. 

'  Deception '  is  used  for  individual  instances,  or  acts,  of 
one  who  deceives  ;  '  deceit,'  for  the  acts,  and  also  from  the 
habit  of  mind,  or  for  the  act  when  continued  and  repeated. 


ENGLISH    SYNONYMS.  ""19 

We  speak  of  '  a  long  course  of  deceit,''  but  of  '  an  act  of 
deception.''  '  Deception  '  is  likewise  used  more  in  respect 
of  the  effect  produced  on  the  person  deceived ;  '  deceit ' 
with  regard  to  the  agent,  or  deceiver.  '  Deception '  may 
therefore  be  used  in  cases  where  no  guilt  is  implied  ;  we 
speak  of  a  '  deception  '  of  the  senses,  an  optical  '  decep- 
tion,' &c.*  '  Deceit '  could  not  be  used  in  these  instances, 
as  it  always  has  a  reference  to  the  intention  of  the  agent. 
The  conjugate  '  deceptive  '  is  generally  applied  to  illusions 
of  the  senses. 

'  Fraud  '  is  always  used  for  an  individual  act  of  deceit  : 
'  a  system  of  fraud  '  is  a  series  of  such  individual  acts. 

ADMITTANCE,    ADMISSION. 

'  Admittance '  is  almost  invariably  applied  to  a  liter'il 
permission  to  enter  some  place,  and  is  never  used  figura- 
tively. '  Admission '  is  more  general  in  its  signification, 
and  is  used  both  in  a  literal  and  in  a  figurative  sense  ;  as. 
'to  make  some  admissions  on  a  disputed  subject.'  Bu*. 
even  in  the  literal  sense,  in  which  either  '  admittance  '  cr 
'  admission  '  may  be  used,  they  somewhat  diifer  izx  their 
shades  of  meaning. 

'  Admittance  '  is,  in  fact,  a  right  to  '  admission.'  When 
a  ticket  of  '  admittance  '  to  some  show  or  sight  is  given,  it 
implies  merely  a  permission  to  enter  :  when  we  have  entered, 
we  have  obtained  '  admission  ;  '  '  admittance  '  was  gained 
as  soon  as  the  ticket  was  ours. 

COMPULSION,    COERCION,    RESTRAINT,    CONSTRAINT. 

'  Compulsion '  and  '  coercion  '  are  more  active  -n  theii 
eitJiification  than  the  two  other  terms  mentioned  ;  that  is  to 
say,  they  imply  a  positive  as   well  as  negative  force.     Wa 


*  See  the  article  jn  the  adjectives,  deceitful,  &c. 


120  A    COLLECTION    OF 

are  '  restrained '  fro7n  doing  something  we  should  wish  to 
do ;  but  we  are  '  coerced,'  or  *  compelled,'  to  act  in  some 
way  against  our  will,  A  prisoner  is  compelled  to  work  in  a 
house  of  correction  ;  he  is  restrained  from  escaping.* 

Secondly,  '  compulsion '  and  '  coercion  '  are  never  used 
to  express  the  force  a  person  exercises  on  himself,  but  only 
in  relation  to  others  ;  '  restraint '  and  '  constraint '  may  be 
applied  to  ourselves. 

There  is  a  difference  again,  between  '  compulsion '  and 
•  coercion.'  '  Compulsion  '  is  actual  force,  used  directly  to 
induce  others  to  act  as  we  would  have  them  do  :  '  coercion  ' 
is  a  more  remotely  exercised  force,  being  an  appeal  to  the 
passion  of  fear,  &;c.  A  government  is  said  to  use  '  coercion  ' 
to  make  its  subjects  profess  the  established  form  of  religion  ; 
a  traveller  in  the  bands  of  robbers  gives  up  his  purse,  or  signs 
an  order  for  a  ransom,  under  '  com.pulsion.'  It  is  true  that, 
in  both  cases,  the  object  may  be  gained  by  awakening  the 
same  kind  of  fear  :  but  the  word  '  coercion '  directs  tbe 
attention  rather  to  tbe  moral  or  mental,  and  '  compulsion  ' 
to  the  physical  force  employed. 

'  Constraint '  differs  from  '  restraint,'  chiefly  in  implying 
a  resistance  of  the  will  to  the  force  used.  '  Restraint,' 
when  applied  to  the  power  we  exercise  on  ourselves,  gener- 
ally implies  that  force  which  is  exerted  by  an  inward  princi- 
ple of  self-control  ;  wbile  '  constraint,'  though  it  may  be 
exercised  on  ourselves,  proceeds  from  some  external  cause, 
supplying  tbe  motive.  A  man  of  frail  temper  '  restrains ' 
himself  to  a  sense  of  duty ;  but  he  is  '  constrained'  to  con- 
trol himself  by  the  presence  of  those  whom  he  fears,  re- 
spects, or  regards  with  suspicion.  We  exercise  '  constraint ' 
on  ourselves  umoillingly  :  a  '  constrained '  manner  always 
implies  a  manner  acted  upon  by  some  influence  from  without, 

*  The  verbs  here  correspond  with  the  nouns. 


ENGLISH    STNONTMS.  121 

not  by  any  inward  motive  —  a  curb  put  on  tbe  manner. 
It  is  therefore  generally  applied  to  oulward  indications ; 
whereas  '  restraint '  may  be  exercised  on  the  feelings  or 
passions. 

'  Constraint '  is  always  personal ;  '  restraint '  may  be 
applied  to  the  emotions  or  feelings.  A  man  is  himself 
'  constrained  ; '  we  should  not  say  that  his  feelings  were 
'  constrained  ;  '  his  feelings,  or  emotions,  are  '  restrained.' 

Again,  '  constraint '  is  positive,  '  restraint '  negative  ;  hence 
the  passage  in  the  Bible,  '  The  love  of  Christ  conslraineth 
us.'  *■'  We  could  not  say,  '  restraineth  '  us,  unless  it  were 
from  doing  anything  to  which  we  Avere  tempted.  A  person 
is  'restrained  'from  some  action,  and  '  constrained  to  do  it. 

DETEK]MINATION,    RESOLUTION",    DECISION. 

*  Decision  '  differs  from  the  other  two  words  in  implying 
a  choice  between  several  courses  of  action,  which  the  others 
do  not. 

We  '  decide  '  f  between  opposite  courses,  wc  '  determine  ' 
what  to  do,  and  '  resolve  '  to  carry  out  our  '  determination.' 
'  Determination  '  is  a  lower  kind  of  '  decision.'  '  Resolu- 
tion '  has  more  of  a  moral  character.  A  '  resolution  '  taken 
is  a  promise  made  to  oneself.  A  stubborn  man  is  '  deter- 
mined.' A  firm  man  is  '  resolved.'  A  man  who  is  quick 
in  forming  a  judgment,  and  firm  in  adhering  to  it,  is  '  decid- 
ed.' A  '  resolute  '  or  a  *  decided '  character  both  imply 
something  higher  than  a  '  determined  '  one. 

These  three  substantives  have  in  fact  two  meanings  ;  one 
implying  the  act  of  '  resolving,*  or  '  deciding,'  or  '  determin- 

*  In  eld  English,  the  verb  '  constrain '  was  used  in  a  wider  sense 
than  it  is  now,  being  often  used  whei'e  we  should  now  use  the  words 
'  urge  '  or  •=  persuade.' 

tThe  conjugate  verbs  and  adjestives  have  corrcspon  ling  senses  with 
the  substantives. 
11 


122  A    COLLECTIOX    OF 

ing,'  the  other,  the  habit.  We  have  been  considering  the 
latter,  which  woiikl,  however,  be  better  expressed  by  '  reso- 
lutcncss,'  '  decisiveness,'  &c. 

NARRATION,    NARllAXIVE,     RELATION,     ACCOUNT,    HISTORY, 
TALE. 

*  Narrative  '  and  '  narration  '  are  nearly  the  same,  and  are 
the  widest  in  their  meaning  of  all  the  group.  '  Relation 
is  also  nearly  synonymous  with  them,  but  is  less  frequently 
used,  being  more  French  than  English.  An  '  account '  is 
always  a  report  of  some  individual  event,  and  is  only  used 
when  its  connection  with  the  event  alluded  to  is  decidedly 
expressed.  We  may  speak  generally  of  an  interesting 
'  narrative '  or  '  narration,'  but  an  account  must  always  be 
of  some  incident,  its  connection  with  which  is  never  lost 
sight  of  or  left  to  be  understood. 

A  '  record  '  is  a  report  of  some  event,  or  series  of  events, 
made  for  the  purpose  of  reference,  —  something  of  the 
nature  of  a  memorandum  of  a  fuller  kind. 

A  '  history '  must  always  be  a  connected  account  of  a 
series  of  events,  generally  one  of  some  length.  The  inci- 
dents recorded  in  it  must  be  of  some  importance  in  them- 
selves —  we  should  not  speak  of  the  '  history  '  of  any  trivial 
occurrence,  except  ironically.  The  expression  '  family  his- 
tory '  is  no  exception  to  this  rule,  for  it  has  a  relative  impor- 
tance, though  only  of  a  private  character  ;  but  '  history  '  is 
more  usually  and  correctly  appropriated  to  public  events. 
It  is  always  used  for  a  general  outline,  whereas  '  account ' 
must  be  particular.  We  should  say,  '  In  the  history  of  this 
author  we  have  an  account  of  such  and  such  a  battle.' 

The  events  related  in  history  are  always  at  least  supposed 
to  be  true ;  whereas  the  word  '  story  '  is  generally  (though 
not  universally)  applied  to  evident  and  apparent  fiction,  or  to 
something,  at  all  events,  of  doubtful  truth.     For  instance, 


ENGLISH    SYNONYMS.  12>V 

we  say,  '  I  will  tell  you  the  history  of  my  life  ; '  but  '  He 
told  me  a  long  story  of  what  had  happened  to  him,  which  I 
did  not  believe.' 

The  three  words,  '  history,'  '  story,'  and  '  narrative,*  are, 
however,  often  used  synonymously. 

'  Tale  '  is  nearly  the  same  as  '  story,'  but  implies  fiction 
still  more  decidedly  and  necessarily.  We  always  speak  of 
a  '  fairy-tale,'  '  a  legendary  tale,'  —  '  story  '  in  this,  case 
would  not  be  used.  The  expression,  '  He  told  me  the  whole 
story, ^  would  not  necessarily  imply  fiction  ;  if  the  word  '  tale* 
were  substituted,  it  certainly  would.  The  only  exception, 
indeed,  to  this  word's  implying  fiction,  is  the  expression, 
'  tale-bearing,'  or  '  tale-telling.' 

DISPLAY,    SHOW,    PARADE,    OSTENTATION. 

'  Display  '  is  the  only  one  of  these  four  terms  which  d:.es 
not  necessarily  imply  excess ;  for  though  the  expressicii  '  e. 
love  of  display  '  is  sometimes  used  in  that  sense,  yet  we 
frequently  speak  of  '  a  display'  of  talent  or  beauty,  without 
meaning  to  convey  the  idea  of  blame  by  the  term.  '  Dis- 
play '  is  not  limited  to  any  one  class  of  subjects,  but  is  equal- 
ly used  ill  material  and  in  abstract  cases.  '  This  man  is 
clever,  but  is  too  fond  of  the  display  of  his  talents  ; '  '  The 
song  she  sang  was  well  fitted  for  the  display  of  her  powers 
of  voice  :  '  '  The  peacock  seems  to  delight  in  the  display  of 
his  fine  plumage.' 

'  Show,'  when  used  hy  itself,  is  always  applied  to  an 
appearance  of  outward  and  material  splendor  —  either 
something  that  indicates  wealth,  or  an  imitation  of  it ;  "' 
we  say,  for  instance,  '  V"i  ealth  is  too  often  wasted  in  idle 
show — a  love  of   shcid  £,nd   brilliancy  has   ruined  many.' 

♦  The  adjective  '  showy  '  corresponds  with  this  sense  of  the  word 
'  show,' 


12-1  A    COLLECTION    OP 

'  Show,' however,  when  used  in  conjunction  with  anothei 
substantive,  is  more  like  '  display  '  in  meaning,  but  con- 
veys also  the  idea  of  fiction.  A  '  show '  of  piety  must  be 
feigned.  One  who  really  gives  munificently  may  make  a 
'  display  '  of  his  liberality ;  but  if  he  were  said  to  '  make  a 
shoio  of  liberality,'  it  would  imply  that  he  only  appeared  to 
give,  while  he  really  kept  back  his  money. 

•  I'arade  '  may  be  applied  either  to  material  objects  or  to 
mental  qualifications ;  in  both  cases  it  indicates  an  excessive 
and  absurd  display  and  boasting  —  which  forces  the  things 
'  displayed  '  upon  the  public  notice  in  an  offensive  manner. 
A  refined  person  may  be  fond  of  •  show,'  or  inclined  to 
'  display  :  '  '  parade '  is  always  vulgar.  '  Ostentation,'  which 
was  the  same  in  its  original  sense  as  '  show,'  now  generally 
indicates  a  parade  of  virtues  or  other  qualities  for  which  we 
expect  to  be  honored.  The  conjugate  adjective,  •  ostenta- 
iioue,'  is  more  commonly  applied  to  outward  and  material 
splendor,  and  the  substantive  to  a  display  of  virtue  ;  but 
either  may  be  used  for  either. 

IMAGINATION,    CONCEPTION,    FANCY. 

*  Imagination  '  and  '  fancy  '  are  frequently  confounded 
together,  but  are,  nevertheless,  very  distinct  in  their  signi- 
fication. In  the  first  place,  '  imagination  '  implies  more  of 
a  creative  power  than  *  fancy ; '  it  requires  a  greater  com- 
bination of  various  powers,  and  is  therefore  a  higher  exer- 
cise of  genius.  ♦  Fancy,'  on  the  other  hand,  is  nuore  an 
employment  of  ingenuity  and  taste,  though  it  also  requires 
inventive  power.  Secondly,  '  imagination  '  implies  a  longer 
flight  ;  '  fancy,'  rather  a  succefision  of  short  efforts  :  the 
one  is  a  steady  blaze,  the  other  »;  snies  of  sparkles.  An 
epic  poem  would  require  an  exercise  of  the  first ;  a  ballad, 
or  other  lighter  production,  of  the  last.     Hence  we  may  see 


ENGLISH    SYNONYMS.  125 

that,  as  it  has  been  well  remarked,*  the  difference  between 
the  two  is,  in  some  measure,  one  of  subject-matter  ;  for  the 
same  power  which  we  call  '  fancy,'  when  employed  in  a 
melody  of  Moore,  would  be  called  '  imagination '  in  the 
works  of  Dante  or  Milton. 

In  short,  the  efforts  of  '  fancy  '  bear  the  same  relation  to 
those  of  '  imagination  '  that  the  carving  and  polishing  of  a 
gem  or  seal  does  to  sculpture. 

In  the  third  place,  wit  may  come  into  works  of  '  fancy,' 
and  could  not  be  admitted  into  the  province  of  '  imagina- 
tion.'    The  same  with  what  are  called  conceits. 

*  Conception  '  has  something  in  common  with  imagination, 
but  it  implies  more  decidedly  a  creative  power,  and  is  refer- 
red to  something  tangible  and  real ;  whereas,  in  efforts  of 
fancy  and  imagination,  there  is  always  a  consciousness  of 
unreality.  The  province  of  '  conception  '  is  that  which  has 
a  real  existence.  Hence,  the  productions  of  painters,  sculp- 
tors, and  musicians  are  called  '  conceptions,' 

'  Conception '  also  denotes  something  framed  and  origi- 
nated in  our  own  mind  ;  whereas  the  imagination  or  fancy 
may  be  acted  on  merely  from  without.  The  poet  or  writer 
of  fiction  exercises  his  own  conceptions,  but  awakens  the 
imagination  of  his  readers. 

CONVICTION,    PERSITASION. 

'  Conviction  '  is  the  act  of  the  understanding ;  '  persua- 
sion '  of  the  will.  '  Conviction  '  is  effected  by  such  a  train 
of  argument  as  Avill  bring  the  understanding  to  admit  the 
conclusion  to  which  it  leads  ;  '  persuasion  '  is  effected  I  y 
exhortation,  whose  office  it  is  to  enlist  the  feelings  and  wili 
in  the  orator's  service.     The  first  is  the  province   of  logic, 

*  See  an  interestingarticlein  the  Edinburgh  Review  fcr/..pru,  ]S4i!, 
on  Moore's  Poems. 

11* 


126  A    COLLECTION    OF 

the  second  of  rhctjric  ;  but  it  is  a  mistake  to  suppose,  aj 
manj  do,  that  they  can  be  exercised  independently  of  each 
othci,  in  reference  to  action. 

Tc  induce  men  to  act  as  we  would  liave  them  do,  two 
conditions  are  requisite  :  first,  they  must  be  shown  that  cer- 
tain means  are  essential,  or  at  least  the  best  possible, 
towards  a  certain  end  ;  and,  secondly,  that  the  end  to  be 
attained  is  desirable. ^'^  It  would  be  no  use  to  prove  to  an 
army  that  such  and  such  means  were  likely  to  enable  them 
to  conquer  the  enemy,  unless  they  were  inspired  with  the 
desire  of  victory  ;  and,  on  the  other  hand,  the  most  ani- 
mating exhortations  to  bravery  and  daring  would  not  induce 
them  to  a  certain  mode  of  procedure,  unless  they  thought  it 
conducive  to  that  object. 

But  often  one-half  of  the  desired  effect  has  been  already 
accomplished,  and  we  have  only  the  other  half  to  perform : 
the  auditors  are  already  convinced,  and  we  have  only  to  ex- 
hort ;  or,  their  feelings  or  desires  sufficiently  excited,  and 
we  have  only  to  convince  them  of  the  best  means  for  ac- 
complishing the  end  in  view. 

Hence,  it  is  a  mistake  to  say  that  the  wisest  of  mankind 
are  governed  by  reason,  and  the  majority  by  their  feelings  ; 
for  the  wise  could  not  act  on  their  convictions,  unless  their 
will  were  influenced ;  and  the  multitude  are  convinced  as 
well  as  impelled  by  feeling,  though  they  are  often  led  by 
their  passions  to  accept  bad  and  inconclusive  reasoning  as 
con^dncing. 

The  real  state  of  the  case  is,  that  the  wisest  and  best  of 
mankind  use  their  reason  to  bring  their  will  and  feelings 
under  control,  while  the  unthinking  crowd  allow  their  feel- 
ings to  take  captive  their  reason,  and  are  first  excited,  and 
then  convinced  on  insufficient  grounds. 

*  See  Whately's  Rhetoric,  Part  II.,  chap.  i.  §  1. 


ENGLISH    SYNONYMS.  12T 

'  Persuasion,'  then,  is  the  wider  term  of  the  two  :  it  ii- 
cludes  both  'conviction,'  and  that  excitement  of  feelings 
which  leads  to  action  ;  while  '  conviction '  alone  is  inactive. 
Formerly,.  '  persuasion  '  was  used  much  as  '  conviction  '  is 
now,  as  we  may  see  in  some  passages  of  our  Bible  transla- 
tion. From  the  old  use  of  the  word  probably  arose  the 
expression,  '  religious  persuasion ; '  though  it  might  almost 
pas-s  for  a  satire  on  the  proneness  of  mankind  to  follow  their 
feelings  rather  than  their  reason  in  matters  of  religious 
belief. 

GOODNESS,  YIRTUE. 

These  words  are  used  indiscriminately ;  but  when  their 
meaning  is  distinct,  '  goodness '  is  usually  applied  to  that 
which  is  natural  and  without  effort,  and  '  virtue '  to  the 
merit  which  springs  from  self-discipline,  and  steady  resist- 
ance to  temptations  which  are  felt  to  be  strong.* 

One  who  had  been  brought  up  as  a  thief  would  be  doing 
a  virtuous  action  in  abstaining  from  depredation  ;  if,  by  long- 
continued  efforts,  his  character  at  last  so  improved  that  theft 
was  odious  instead  of  tempting  to  him,  he  would  perform 
fewer  virtuous  acts,  but  his  '  goodness  '  v^^ould  be  greater. 
'  Goodness  of  heart '  is,  indeed,  used  to  express  a  mere  pas- 
sive benevolence ;  but  '  goodness,'  in  the  abstract,  is  used 
to  express  a  higher  excellence  than  '  virtue.'  We  can  ven- 
ture to  apply  the  term  to  the  Supreme  Being  ,  whereas 
'  virtue '  is  purely  a  human  quality.     As  long  as  w' e  live  on 

*  A  very  pleasing  description  of  untutored  natural  goodness  of  dis- 
position may  be  found  in  Wordsworth's  Ode  to  Duty  : 
'  Glad  liearts,  without  reproach  or  blot, 
AVho  do  thy  will  and  know  it  not. ' 
The  word   'virtue'   could  rot  be  applied  to  this  instinctive  kind  ol 
goodness :   nor  could  it  be  applied  to  the  highest  kind ;  't  seems  to 
indicate  a  middle  state. 


128  A    COLLECTION    OF 

(his  oavtli,  the  best  must  spend  their  lives  in  resisting  and 
struggling  against  temptations,  and  controlling  evil  tenden- 
cies ;  but  in  sinless  perfection  there  can  be  no  virtue. 

HINDRANCE,  OBSTACLE,  IMPEDIMENT. 

A  '  hindrance'  holds  ns  back  when  we  are  about  to  start 
forward  ;  an  '  obstacle  '  is  found  in  our  path,  and  opposes  us 
when  we  hace  started  ;  an  *  impediment '  makes  our  furthei 
progress  more  difficult,  and  hampers  us  in  what  we  wish  t.. 
do :  whence  the  Romans  called  their  baggage  itnpcdimenta. 
A  weight  carried  is  an  '  impediment  ; '  a  bar  thrown  across 
the  road  is  an  '  obstacle  ; '  an  importunate  visitor  who  pre- 
vents our  sitting  out  is  a  '  hindrance.'  We  might  say,  '  I 
had  so  many  hindrances  before  starting  that  I  could  not  set 
out  as  early  as  I  wished  ;  I  had  many  things  to  carry  vvith 
me,  and  this  was  an  impedimeriL  to  my  speed  ;  the  obstacles 
I  met  with  on  the  road  tempted  me  to  turn  back.' 

A  '  hindrance  '  or  '  impediment '  may  be  merely  of  a  ma- 
terial kind  ;  an  '  obstacle  '  is  something  decidedly  hostile, 
and  set  in  opposition  to  us.  Even  when  the  '  obstacle  '  is 
inanimate,  we,  as  it  were,  personify  it  for  the  time,  and 
consider  it  in  the  light  of  something  intentionally  hostile. 
Hence,  the  expressions  we  use  in  connection  with  these 
words  are  different.  We  remove  an  '  impediment '  or  '  hin- 
drance ;  '  we  surmount  an  '  obstacle.'  We  proceed  notwith- 
standing an  '  impediment '  or  hindrance  ;  '  in  spite  of  an 
'  obstacle.' 

ALLEGIANCE,    LOYALTY. 

'Allegiance'  is  a  principle  of  action  ;  'loyalty 'a  senti- 
ment. '  Loyalty  '  is  also  more  personal,  and  is  more  limited 
to  our  relation  to  a  hereditary  monarch  :  '  allegiance '  would 
apply  equally  to  any  form  of  government,  merely  implying 
fidelity  and  obedience.     In  short,  '  loyalty  '  is  a  faithful  ad' 


ENGLISH    STNONTMS.  129 

herence  to  some  individual  monarch  or  ruler  as  such , 
'  allegiance,'  fidelity  to  any  government,  old  or  new,  monar- 
chical or  republican,  to  which  we  have  sicorn  obedience. 
The  words  are  originally  the  same,*  indicating  obedience 
to  law,  and  thereby  showing  how  little  the  light  thrown  by 
derivations  on  the  modern  meaning  of  a  word  can  be 
trusted. 


^: 


SECURITY,    SAFETY,    SURETY. 

'  Security  '  has  preserved  something  of  its  etymological 
meaning  (^securus,  without  care) ;  it  implies  an  absence  of 
all  fear  or  anxiety,  but  not  necessarily  absence  of  danger ; 
for  there  may  be  a  false  security. 

By  '  safety  '  we  understand  a  well-grounded  security  ;  an 
absence  of  danger,  not  merely  of  the  sense  of  danger.  We 
might  say,  '  They  believed  themselves  in  a  place  of  safety, 
but  theirs  was  a  false  security.' 

'  Security '  has,  however,  another  sense,  which  is  nearly 
synonymous  Avith  '  surety ; '  both  referring  to  precautions 
taken  to  ensure  safety.  The  adjective  '  secure,'  and  the 
verb  '  to  secure,'  are  not  conjugate  with  the  noun  '  security,' 
but  rather  with  '  safety.' 

The  adjective  '  sure  '  is  a  contraction  of  '  secure,'  and 
when  applied  to  things  and  places  is  synonymous  with  it ; 
when  to  persons  it  implies  a  strong  convt^t'^n,  but  not 
certain  knowledge. 

REFORMATION,    REFORM;. 

'  Reformation  '  is  generally  applied  to  great  occasions  ;  to 
the  amendment  of  principles,  articles  of  belief  or  points 
affecting  the  highest  and  gravest  interests   of  a  nation  ur  In- 

*  Some  consider  •  allegiance  '  to  be  derived  from  alligc  to  bind:  thia 
derivation,  however,  is  by  others  considered  doubtful. 


130  A    COLLECTION    OF 

dividual.  '  Reform  '  is  oftcner  applied  to  practical  details 
"We  speak  of  a  '  reformation  '  in  religion,  but  of  a  '  reform  ' 
in  government ;  of  the  '  reformation  '  of  a  criminal,  but  of 
a  '  reform '  in  the  management  of  a  household,  or  adminis- 
tration of  business.  A  man  whose  character  has  undergone 
a  complete  '  reformation,'  will  gcncraly  effect  a  '  reform '  in 
his  habits  and  way  of  life. 

It  is  a  recent  custom  to  speak  of  '  reforming  '  abuses  ;  but 
this  is  an  impropriety  of  language  ;  abuses  may  be  reme- 
died, or  extirpated,  but  they  cannot  be  '  reformed.'  In  the 
same  way,  we  speak  improperly  of  '  curitig  diseases  ;  '  it  is, 
correctly  speaking,  the  patient  who  is  cured. 

FAITH,    BELIEF,    CEETATNTY. 

'Belief  is  merely  an  assent  of  the  understanding,  in 
which  the  2oiU  is  not  concerned :  and  this  is  the  chief  dis- 
tinction between  it  and  faith. 

Faith  may,  however,  be  said  to  have,  besides  this,  three 
distinguished  characteristics. 

First,  —  It  must  be  a  belief  founded  on  authority :  this 
does  not  imply  a  blind  assent,  in  the  absence  of  proof :  for 
we  may  have  good  and  sufficient  evidence  for  the  trust- 
worthiness of  our  authority.  It  is  often  supposed  that  faith, 
to  be  perfect,  requires  that  reason  should  be  put  aside  or 
kept  in  subjection  :  but  this  would  be  to  make  credulity  a 
necessary  accompaniment  of  faith.  It  is  too  often  found 
so  combined ;  but  the  highest  faith  is  not  of  this  nature. 
The  true  test  of  its  merit  and  virtue  is,  not  assenting  to 
anything  against  our  reason,  but  against  our  prejudices  or 
interests. 

Secondly,  —  Faith  implies  an  assent  to  a  system  or  series 
of  propositions,  not  to  one  insulated  fact.  Our  trust  in  the 
assertion  of  some  one  who  was  administering  medicine  to 
us,  that  he  had  taken  a  certain  bottle  from  a  certain  shelf, 


EITSiieK    iTNONYMS.  131 

would  not  be  called  faith  ;  tl'.:ugli  our  reliance  on  his  gen- 
eral mode  of  practice  would  be  so  designated^' 

Thirdly,  —  Faith  is  ger.erally  of  a  practical  nature.  We 
do  not  speak  of  having  '  faith  '  in  the  Copernican  system, 
though  we  may  believe  it  firmly  on  authority,  because  it 
does  not  directly  lead  to  any  course  of  action  :  but  one  who 
had  been  induced  by  the  representations  of  its  earliest 
followers  to  attempt  ft.  Toyage  round  the  world,  would  be 
justly  said  to  have  '  faith'  ia  what  they  told  him,  because  he 
not  only  held  their  opinions  in  theory,  but  followed  them  up 
in  practice. 

Hence  a  mere  assent  to  the  truths  of  Christianity,  such  as 
we  give  to  any  mere  historical  fact,  and  which  does  not 
affect  the  conduct,  cannot  be  called  '  faith.' 

'  Certainty '  is  generally  applied  to  a  firm  conviction  of 
the  truth  of  any  proposition  :  but  when  opposed  to  '  belief ' 
or  '  faith,'  it  describes  more  correctly  that  conviction  which 
is  only  produced  by  demonstration,  or  the  evidence  of  the 
senses. 

'  Certainty  '  has  come  to  be  applied  by  a  metonymy  to  the 
thing,  which  is  the  object  of  a  certain  belief. 

FORGIVENESS,    PARDON. 

As  is  usually  the  case  where  a  Saxon  and  a  Latin  word 
are  used  in  nearly  the  same  sense,  the  Saxon  word  gives 
the  more  forcible,  homely,  and  serious  meaning ;  the  Latin, 
on  the  other  hand,  the  more  polite  and  colloquial  one. 

Both  '  forgiveness '  and  '  pardon  *  are  alike  used,  it  is  true, 
in  a  religious  sense  ;  but  in  ordinary  life  '  pardon  '  is  applied 
in  more  trifling  matters  than  '  forgiveness.'  We  beg  a  per- 
son's '  pardon  '  for  jostling  him  in  a  crowd  :  we  ask  his  '  for- 
giveness '  for  having  seriously  injured  him. 

•  The  primary  notion  of  faith  would  seem  to  be,  trust  in  a  person. 


132  A    COLLECTION    OF 

It  is  remarkable  that  the  words  in  all  European  languages 
which  express  '  forgiveness  '  or  '  pardon,'  all  imply ^ree  gift. 

FEELINGS,    SENTIMENTS.  t 

'  Sentiments '  are  used  in  a  wider  sense  than  '  feelings,' 
including  not  only  what  arc  strictly  called  '  matters  oi  feel- 
ing,' but  also  matters  of  opinion  of  one  kind  ;  viz.,  those  in 
which  feelings  are  concerned.  Thus,  we  speak  of  out 
sentiments  on  religious,  political,  or  moral  questions  ;  but 
we  should  not  speak  of  'sentiments'  on  chemistry  or  mathe- 
matics. '  Sentiments  '  are  never  spoken  of  alone  and  in  the 
abstract  except  in  reference  to  the  natural  moral  faculties, 
in  a  physiological  sense.  We  speak  of  a  person  as  having 
'  strong '  or  '  lively '  feelings,  but  never  as  having  strong 
'  sentiments.' 

SPEECH,    OKATION,    HARAXGUE,    DISCOURSE. 

A  member  of  Parliament  makes  a  '  speech  ; '  a  king  is 
received  by  a  deputation,  whose  leader  makes  an  '  oration ' 
in  his  honor ;  a  popular  leader  makes  an  '  harangue  '  to  a 
mob.  A  '  speech  '  is  the  simplest  mode  of  delivering  one's 
sentiments  ;  an  '  oration '  is  an  elaborate  and  prepared 
speech  ;  an  '  harangue '  is  a  vehement  appeal  to  the  passions 
of  the  persons  addressed,  or  a  speech  which  has  something 
disputatious  and  combative  in  it. 

A  '  discourse '  is  a  set  speech  on  some  subject  which  is 
intended  to  convey  instruction  to  the  listeners.  It  differs 
from  the  other  three  in  being  applied  to  what  is  written ; 
the  others  are  only  spoken. 

PITY,    COMPASSION,    SYMPATHY. 

'  Pity  '  and  '  compassion '  resemble  each  other  very  nearly 
in  their  signification  ;  but  there  is  a  shade  of  difference. 
'  Pity  '  often  implies  an  approach  to  contempt ;  '  compassion ' 


ENGLISH    SYNONYMS.  133 

has  more  of  tenderness  in  it.  We  may  speak  of  pitying 
the  wicked,  or  the  hopelessly  foolish  ;  Ave  only  speak  ol 
compassionating  those  into  whose  feelings  we  can  enter, 
and  whose  actions  we  may  conceive  ourselves  performing. 
Again,  '  compassion '  is  sometimes  felt  for  imaginary  sor- 
rows ;  '  pity  '  seldomer. 

'  Sympathy  '  implies  more  of  fellow-feeling  than  either  of 
the  other  terms,  and  is  not  restricted  to  subjects  of  pain,  but 
may  be  equally  felt  for  the  pleasures  of  others. 

A  certain  degree  of  equality  in  station,  age,  mind,  or 
qualities,  is  essential.  We  cannot  feel  sympathy  with  any 
but  one  who  is  nearly  an  equal ;  we  may  feel  compassion 
for  a  superior  or  inferior  likewise ;  we  pity,  generally,  only 
one  whom  we  regard  as  in  some  way  an  inferior.*  Great 
admiration  and  pity  cannot  be  felt  at  the  same  time  for  the 
same  person.  No  one  could  pity  a  martyr,  or  a  hero  nobly 
dying  for  his  country.  The  proper  object  of  '  pity,'  as  has 
been  well  observed  by  an  eminent  writer,f  is  suffering  not 
wholly  immerited,  but  occasioned  rather  by  weaknesses  than 
faults  ;  its  most  fitting  subject  is  a  character  of  mixed  good 
and  evil,  being  neither  of  very  high  nor  low  order  —  like 
Shakespeare's  Lear,  for  example,  or  Scott's  Amy  Robsart. 

MODESTY,    DIFFIDENCE,    HUMILITY. 

'  Modesty  '  and  '  humility  '  are  virtues  ;  •  difiidence  '  is 
not  itself  a  virtue  ;  and,  in  some  cases,  even  amounts  to 
a  defect.     It  implies  a  great,  sometimes  even  an  excessive, 

*  Hence,  a  high-spirited  person  feels  it  a  degradation  to  be  the 
object  of  pity.  Scott  has  alluded  to  this  feeling  in  the  Lady  of  the 
Lake,  — 

•  And  last,  and  worst  to  spirit  proud, 
Had  borne  the  pity  of  the  crowd.' 

tin  one  of  the  numbers  of  the  Quarterly  Review.     The  doctrine  ig 
Aristotle's,  to  whom  the  reviewer  refers. 
12 


134  A    COLLECTION    OF 

distrust  of  our  own  powers.  A  diffident  man  will  shrink 
from  doing  that  which  he  is  perfectly  equal  to  perform,  from 
an  unreasonable  dread  of  failure.  '  Modesty '  does  not 
imply  self-distrust,  but  simply  an  unwillingness  to  put  our- 
selves forward,  and  an  absence  of  all  over-confidence  in 
our  own  powers.  A  modest  man  may  feel  a  proper  confi- 
dence in  his  own  powers,  but  he  will  not  be  eager  to  display 
them.  He  will  rather  shrink  from  notice  than  court  it,  and 
when  called  to  any  post  of  distinction,  he  will  '  bear  his 
honors  meekly,'  and  make  no  attempt  to  claim  even  the 
deference  which  might  fairly  be  due  to  him. 

And  here  it  may  be  remarked,  that  the  jealousy  felt  by 
the  generality  of  mankind  towards  superior  talents  is  such, 
that  a  man  of  eminent  abilities  is  scarcely  forgiven  for  rating 
himself  as  he  deserves  ;  though  one  of  moderate  intellect 
is  allowed  to  do  so. 

'  Humility  '  somewhat  resembles  '  modesty,'  but  it  implies 
rather  a  readiness  to  yield  our  claims,  than  a  reluctance  to 
court  notice.  '  Humility  '  is  often  falsely  defined  to  be  a 
disposition  to  underrate  ourselves  ;  but  this  is  a  mistake. 
There  is  no  humilily  in  a  clever  man's  thinking  himself  a 
fool  ;  in  fact,  such  a  mistaken  estimate  is  more  likely  to 
lead  to  a  restless,  irritable  vanity.  Real  humility  consists 
in  rating  our  own  claims  low;  in  being  willing  to  waive  our 
rights,  and  descend  to  a  lower  place  than  might  be  our  due ; 
in  being  ready  to  admit  our  liability  to  error,  and  listening 
patiently  to  objections,  even  when  they  thwart  our  views  ;  in 
freely  owning  our  faults  when  conscious  of  having  been 
wrong  ;  and,  in  short,  in  not  being  over-careful  of  our  own 
dignity. 

Finally,  we  may  consider  that  the  opposite  to  '  diffidence ' 
is  confidence ;  the  opposite  to  *■  modesty,'  impudence  oi 
assurance  \  the  opposite  to  '  humility,'  pride  or  ccmceit. 


ENGLISH    SYNONYMS.  liJD 

AUSTERITY,    SEVERITY,    SIGOR,    STERNNESS,    STRICTNESS. 

*  Austerity  '  and  '  strictness  '  are  the  only  ones  among 
these  terms  which  apply  to  the  mode  of  life.  '  Strictness ' 
is  '  rigor,'  in  the  sense  of  a  particular  adherence  to  rules, 
and  steadiness  in  enforcing  them.  It  also  usually  implies  a 
disposition  to  multiply  rules  and  prohibitions,  —  to  restrict 
liberty.  '  Austerity '  is  chiefly  used  in  reference  to  the 
person  characterized.  '  Severity  '  is  almost  exclusively  ap- 
plied to  our  judgments  of,  or  conduct  to,  others.  '  Rigor  ' 
may  either  mean  an  excess  of  severity,  or  great  strictness  irj 
adhering  to  rules. 

A  hermit  leads  a  life  of  austerity ;  a  parent  or  teacher 
may  treat  his  children  or  pupils  with  severity ;  the  laws 
under  a  despotic  government  are  enforced  with  rigor. 
'  Rigor  '  does  not  necessarily  imply  severity,  but  only  strict- 
ness ;  a  govei'nment  may  enforce  moderate  rules  with  rigor. 

The  opposite  to  '  rigor '  is  '  relaxation,'  as  •  lax '  is  to 
'  rigorous  ;  '  the  opposite  of  '  severity  '  is  '  mildness  ;  '  that 
of  '  austerity  '  —  as  relating  to  our  conduct  with,  others  —  is 
'  indulgence  ; '  but  personal  austerity  has  no  opposite,  except 
that  which  points  out  a  blameable  excess  on  the  one  side,  as 
self-indulgence,  or  luxuriousness.  The  medium,  in  which, 
as  Aristotle  says,  virtue  lies,  is  nameless.* 

'  Sternness  '  is  more  applicable  to  character  and  manners 
than  to  judgment  and  actions.  A  man  of  stern  disposition 
shows  it  to  all  with  whom  he  comes  in  contact,  whether 
offenders  or  not. 

*  It  may  perhaps,  be  suggested,  that  the  word  '  temperance  '  would 
express  this  medium  ;  but  the  use  of  this  word  by  itself  is  almost 
entirely  confined  to  moderation  in  eating  and  drinking;  and  it  would 
therefore,  be  more  appropriately  described  as  a  medium  between  '  m- 
temperance '  and  '  abstemiousness,'  than  between  '  austerity '  and 
'  self-indulgence,'  which  apply  to  every  part  of  a  person's  life,  and 
are  not  restricted  to  the  gratification  of  the  appetite. 


186  A    COLLECTION    OF 

The  two  following  groups  of  synonyms  (with  the  excep- 
tion of  the  paragraph  on  'cleverness  ')  arc  quoted  from  the 
Diary  of  Sir  James  Mackintosh,  whose  definitions  cannot 
be  improved  upon  :  — 

•  GENIUS,    "WISDOM,     ABILITIES,    TALENTS,    PAUTS,    INGE- 
NUITY,   CAPACITY,'    CLEVERNESS. 

*  Genius  is  the  power  of  new  combination,  and  may  be 
shown  in  a  campaign,  a  plan  of  policy,  a  steam-engine,  a 
system  of  philosophy,  or  an  epic  poem.  It  seems  to  require 
seriousness,  and  some  dignity  in  the  purpose ;  on  ludicrous 
subjects  it  is  called  wit ;  and  in  weaving  together  the  parts 
of  an  argument,  or  the  incidents  of  a  tale,  it  receives  the 
inferior  name  of  ingenuity. 

'  Wisdom  is  the  habitual  employment  of  a  patient  and 
comprehensive  understanding  in  combining  various  and 
remote  means  to  promote  the  happiness  of  mankind.  It  is 
most  properly  applied  to  him  who  actually  renders  signal 
services  of  the  niost  difficult  nature  to  society.  It  is  well 
used  to  denote  the  teachers  of  moral  and  political  truth, 
because  the  inculcation  of  such  truth  must  in  process  of 
lime  produce  its  practical  application.  It  is  also  applied  to 
those  who  improved  the  general  modes  of  exerting  intellect, 
from  a  just,  though  not  perhaps  distinct,  perception  of  the 
ultimate  tendency  of  intellectual  cultivation  to  increase  the 
means  of  happiness,  and  to  improve  the  moral  nature  of 
man.  But  to  mere  speculation,  or  to  those  sciences  of 
which  the  professors  have  no  immediate  reference  to  human 
improvement,  this  high  and  august  term  cannot  be  applied. 
It  is  the  loftiest  and  most  venerable  of  all  terms  of  com- 
mendation, because  it  is  the  only  word  for  intellectual  supe- 
riority, which  necessarily  includes  a  moral  tendency,  if  not 
a  virtuous  purpose.  It  is  the  highest  exertion  of  reason  for 
the  most  pure  end. 


ENGLISH    SYNONYMS.  1S7' 

*  Abilities  may  be  exerted  in  conduct,  or  in  the  arts  and 
sciences,  but  rather  in  the  former ;  and  when  the  term  is 
applied  to  the  latter,  it  is  rather  in  the  practical  sense  of  at- 
taining a  particular  object,  than  in  that  of  general  excellence. 

'  Talents  are  the  power  of  executing  well  a  conception, 
either  original  or  adopted.  They  may  be  possessed  in  a 
degree  very  disproportioned  to  general  power,  as  habit  may 
strengthen  a  mind  for  one  sort  of  exertion  far  above  its 
general  vigor. 

'  Parts  have  lost  a  considerable  portion  of  their  dignity. 
They  were  used  in  the  last  century  perhaps  almost  in  the 
sense  in  which  wc  now  rather  employ  talents.  They  at 
present,  if  at  all  used,  might  signify  a  specious  sort  of 
smartness. 

*  Capacity  is  a  power  of  acquiring.  It  is  most  remarkable 
in  the  different  degrees  of  facility  with  which  different  men 
acquire  a  language. 

'  Sir  Isaac  Newton  and  Milton  are  equally  men  of  genius. 
Bacon  is  the  wisest  of  writers,  not  only  because  he  is  so 
great  a  teacher  of  moral  and  civil  wisdom,  but  because  he 
has  contributed  more  than  any  other  man  to  the  general 
improvement  of  the  human  understanding.  Sir  Isaac  New- 
ton had  the  highest  philosophical  genius,  but  the  sciences  on 
which  he  employed  it  do  not  allow  the  praise  of  wisdom. 
Sir  Robert  Walpole  and  Lord  Godolphin  were  ministers  of 
great  abilities,  though  they  did  not  possess  either  the  bril- 
liant talents  of  Bolingbroke,  or  the  commanding  genius  of 
Chatham.' 

'  Cleverness  '  (derived  evidently  from  the  verb  to  cleave''''') 

*  It  is  curious  to  observe,  that  several  of  the  words  which  describe 
the  various  mental  powers  are  derived  from  words  signifying  to  split, 
cleave,  or  separate  ;  as  science  from  scio,  probably  the  same  as  scindo, 
to  cut:  cleaver,  from  cleave  :  distinguish,  discriminate,  both  signifying 
a  dividing  or  shifting  process,  &c. 

12* 


138  A    COLLECTION    OF 

is  « orrectly  applied  to  a  certain  quickness  and  readiness  in 
the  opaiations  of  the  mind,  and  especially  in  the  act  f  f 
acquiring  knowledge.  But  the  loose  way  in  which  ideas 
are  expressed  in  ordinary  conversation  has  led  to  a  consid- 
erable abuse  of  this  word,  which  is  not  seldom  applied  to 
every  kind  of  talent. 

'   FORTITTTDE,    COUKAGE,    VALOR,     BRAVERY,    INTREPIDITY, 
GALLANTRY,    HEROISM. 

'  Fortitude  is  the  most  comprehensive  of  these  words. 
It  is  always  used  morally,  and  is  the  name  of  a  virtue  which 
consists  in  the  habit  of  bearing  pain  and  encountering  dan- 
ger. It  is  often  confined  to  the  endurance  of  pain,  and  is 
used  almost  synonymously  with  patience,  though  it  rather 
indicates  a  spirit  that  resists  pain,  than  one  which  submits  to 
it.  Courage  is  active  fortitude,  and  is  shown  against  every 
sort  of  danger.  Bravery  and  valor  are  both  courage,  ex- 
hibited against  the  danger  of  death  from  a  living  opponent ; 
bravery,  perhaps,  extends  to  all  living  opponents  ;  valor  is 
certainly  confined  to  human  adversaries,  and  chiefly,  if  not 
solely,  in  regular  war.  Firm  courage  is  intrepidity ;  ad- 
venturous courage  is  gallantry.  The  contempt  of  danger, 
not  from  ignorance  or  inconsiderate  levity,  but  from  just 
confidence  in  the  power  of  overcoming  the  peril,  is  heroism. 
Fortitude  is  one  of  those  moral  qualities,  which,  on  account 
of  their  eminent  importance,  were  called  by  the  ancients 
cardinal  virtues.  Regulus  showed  a  determined  fortitude 
when  he  returned  to  death  rather  than  violate  his  pledged 
word. 

'  Courage  may  be  shown  by  a  seaman  who  braves  the 
dangers  of  the  sea,  or  by  a  horseman  who  mounts  a  horse 
which  no  one  else  will  approach. 

'  Valor  and  bravery  can  only  be  displayed  against  present 
danger  from  a  living —  if  not  a  human  —  adversary.     The 


ENGLISH    SYNONYMS.  li>9 

tortures  of  Regulus  were  distant,  though  certain  ;  he  would 
rather  be  said  to  have  encountered  them  with  fortitude. 
He  might  be  praised  for  courage,  but  he  would  not  be  called 
hrave  or  valiant.  He  who  climbs  up  a  house  almost  de- 
stroyed by  fire  to  save  a  life  may  show  the  greatest  courage, 
but  not  bravery  or  valor.  It  is  more  natural  to  say  that  a 
man  encounters  a  tiger  with  courage,  but  perhaps  there  is 
no  impropriety  in  saying  that  he  showed  bravery.  Bravery 
may  be  proved  in  single  combat ;  valor  is  the  courage  of  a 
soldier  in  war  —  it  cannot  be  applied  to  single  combats.  A 
defence  is  intrepid,  and  seems  scarcely  to  be  gallant, 
unless  we  consider  the  attacks  by  which  the  defence  is  car- 
ried on  ;  it  is  in  attack  that  gallantry  is  shown. 

'  The  consciousness  of  power  which  forms  a  hero  usually 
inspires  sentiments  so  elevated,  that  the  word  denotes  mag- 
nanimity and  generosity,  however  irregular,  as  well  as  cour- 
age. We  say,  indeed,  a  barbarous  hero,  but  it  is  a  phrase 
which  is  striking,  from  the  perception  of  some  degree  of 
repugnancy  between  the  parts  which  compose  it.' 

LAW,    STATUTE,    EULE,    REGULATION. 

A  '  law  '  is  a  '  rule  '  formed  by  the  goverment  of  a  coun- 
try. A  nation  is  governed  by  laws  ;  a  household  by  rules. 
A  '  statute '  is  a  '  law  '  which  is  solemnly  and  formally 
enacted,  and  distinctly  set  forth  in  words.  The  expression 
'  statute-law  '  is  opposed  to  '  common-law,'  or  law  established 
by  long  custom.  The  by-laws  of  an  university  are  also 
called  '  statutes.' 

A  '  regulation  '  is  nearly  the  same  as  a  '  rule,'  in  its  ordi- 
nary sense.  The  enactments  of  a  subordinate  body  are 
called  '  regulations,'  or  '  by-laws  :  '  those  of  a  church, 
'  ordinances.' 

'  Rule  '  and  '  law '  have,  however,  other  meanings  besides 
those  we  have   mentioned,  which  are  sometimes  liable  to  be 


140  JL    COLLECTION    OF 

confounded  with  them.  '  llule  '  sometimes  implies  a  gov- 
erning force  or  power ;  as,  '  to  live  under  a  stern  or  a  gentle 
rule.^  '  Law '  is  used  for  an  invariable  custom.  It  is  in 
this  sense  we  speak  of  the  laws  of  nature  ;  they  are  simply 
certain  events  which  happen  invariably,  and  it  is  only  by 
observation  we  can  discover  them.  If  one  of  them  was 
broken  through,  it  would  cease  to  be  a  law  of  nature  :  but 
a  human  law  is  no  less  a  law,  however  ill  it  be  obeyed.* 

CONSOLATION,    COMFOET,    SOLACE. 

*  Consolation  '  and  '  comfort '  are  often  synonymous  ; 
where  they  differ,  the  chief  difference  between  them  is, 
1st,  that  'consolation'  has  relation  chiefly  to  real  afflic- 
tions, while  '  comfort '  may  also  apply  to  what  mitigates 
lesser  evils,  besides  including  the  material  and  substantial 
conveniences  of  life. 

2dly,  '  Consolation  is  used  in  a  more  active  sense  than 
♦comfort.*  It  implies,  generally,  the  agency  of  another. 
We  administer  '  consolation  '  to  a  friend  in  distress ;  we 
exhort  him  *  to  take  comfort^  not '  to  take  consolation* 

*  Solace '  difi'ers  from  both  the  other  words,  in  being  never 
applied  to  human  agents.  We  do  not  '  afibrd  a  solace  '  to 
sufferers,  as  we  may  afibrd  consolation,  or  even  comfort. 
Habits  or  occupations  are  most  frequently  described  as 
afibrding  '  a  solace  '  in  trouble ;  as,  for  example,  '  Books  are 
his  chief  solace  in  his  present  melancholy  situation ; '  — '  The 
companionship  even  of  a  mouse  or  spider  has  often  been  a 
solace  to  a  lonely  prisoner.' 

GIFT,    PKESENT,    DONATION. 

Where  no  qualifying  clause  is  inserted,  '  gift '  is  generally 
understood  to  imply  something  of  considerable  value,   and 

*  See  the  article  •  Law,'  in  the  Appendix  to  Elements  of  Logic. 


ENGLISH    SYNONYMS.  141 

'  present '  something  comparatively  trifling.  A  property  ij 
conferred  by  a  deed  of  'gift ; '  one  friend  makes  a  '  present' 
to  another  of  some  small  article  of  use  or  ornament. 

2dly.  A  '  present '  must  be  intended  as  a  mark  of  real  oi 
supposed  regard,  or  at  least  a  kind  of  compliment :  a  '  gift' 
may  be  made  without  any  personal  view  to  its  object.  An 
author  will  sometimes  make  a  '  gift '  of  some  of  his  works 
to  a  library  or  to  a  bookseller,  merely  with  a  view  to  circu- 
late them  more  widely ;  in  such  a  case  the  word  '  present ' 
would  be  inappropriate.  Any  benefit  conferred  as  it  were 
accidentally,  and  not  of  compliment  to  its  object,  may  be 
called  a  '  gift ; '  hence  we  speak  of  '  the  gifts  of  nature  or 
of  fortune  '  —  not  of  their  '  presents.' 

In  the  common  expression,  '  A  New-year's  or  Christmas- 
gift,'  '  gift '  is  used  synonymously  with  '  present.' 

A  '  donation  '  is  always  a  '  gift  '  made  to  a  public  charity 
or  other  institution. 

REASON,    CAUSE,    SOUKCE,    ORIGIN. 

'  Reason '  relates,  originally,  to  logical  sequence  ;  that 
which  takes  place  in  an  argument ;  as,  for  instance,  '  Be 
always  ready  to  give  a  reason  of  the  hope  that  is  in  you.'  — 
(1  Pet.  iii.  15.)  Strictly  speaking,  a  '  reason'  is  the  cause, 
not  of  so  and  so  existing  or  occurring,  but  of  our  knowing 
or  helieving  it:  as,  the  print  of  a  man's  footsteps  is  the 
'  cause '  —  not  of  his  having  passed  that  way,  but  of  our 
knowing  it.  But  in  conversation,  and  sometimes  in  books, 
one  may  find  this  word  employed  in  the  sense  of  '  cause,' 
properly  so  called,  viz. :  either  the  physical  '  cause,'  (that 
which  produces  such  and  such  an  effect,)  or  what  is  called 
the  final  '  cause,'  *  (or  object  aimed  at  in  the  production  of 
that  effect.)     Thus,  we  may  hear  people  say,  '  The  reason 

*  See  Whately's  Logic  under  the  head  ♦  Reason  '  and  ♦  CArsE,'  ir: 
which  this  subject  is  fully  discussed. 


142  A    COLLECTION    OB 

why  the  days  arc  longest  in  summer  is  so  and  so  ;  '  or  '  The 
reason  why  this  house  was  built  on  high,  ground  was  to 
escape  the  floods.'  But  in  -such  expressions,  '  cause  '  would 
have  been  more  proper.  In  the  latter  of  these  sentences,  it 
is,  strictly  speaking,  the  wish  to  avoid  floods  that  caused  the 
choosing  of  that  site  for  the  house. 

Though  '  reason  '  is  often  used  for  '  cause,'  the  converse 
rarely  takes  place.  We  seldom  find  '  cause '  put  for  '  rea- 
son.' 

'  Source  '  and  '  origin  '  both  have  reference  to  physical, 
not  to  logical  sequence.  They  are  sometimes  \ised  indiffer- 
ently, but  in  general  they  preserve  the  character  of  their 
rctpective  etymological  derivations.  The  Latin  surgere, 
the  root  or  '  source,'  often  implies  rising,  as  if  from  the 
ground  ;  hence  '  source  '  was  used  to  describe  a  fountain  or 
spring.  And  the  idea  conveyed  by  a  spring,  that  of  yielding 
or  producing  as  well  as  rising,  has  been  preserved  in  the 
more  abstract  meanings  of  the  word.  A  '  source  '  of  informa- 
tion is  not  only  that  from  which  our  information  proceeds, 
Vut  one  to  which  we  can  recur,  and  from  which  we  can 
draw  fresh  stores.  If  we  say,  '  The  source  of  his  strength 
and  resolution  is  his  ardent  patriotism,'  we  imply  that  the 
feeling  described  continually  feeds  the  flame  it  has  kindled  ; 
but  if  we  said,  '  The  origin  of  my  liking  for  such  a  person 
was  so  and  so,'  it  might  imply  that  the  circumstance  from 
which  it  had  risen,  had  itself  passed  away.  Hence  we 
speak  of  the  '  origin,'  not  of  the  '  source,'  of  a  family,  a 
dynasty,  a  discovery,  or  a  language  ;  but  of  a  '  source '  of 
happiness,  of  information,  of  interest,  or  of  gain.  We  might 
say,  '  This  or  that  was  the  origin  of  the  friendship  which  is 
now  such  a  source  of  happiness  to  me.' 

Finally  '  origin  '  is  perhaps  less  remote  than  '  source ;  ' 
we  call  that  a  '  source  '  to  which  something  is  ultimately 
traced. 


ENGLISH    SYN0NTM3.  14^ 


SELF-LOVE,    SELFISHNESS. 

'  Self-love '  is  not  onlj'^  a  feeling,  but  a  principle  of  action  ; 
'  selfishness  '  is  a  habit.  '  Self-love  '  is  a  calm,  deliberate 
pursuit  of  that  which  is  supposed  to  conduce  to  our  welfare ; 
'  selfishness  '  is  the  almost  instinctive  desire  of  seeking  our 
own  gratification  at  the  moment,  without  regard  to  any  other 
consideration.  Like  all  other  instincts,  it  is  not  far-sighted  ; 
as  the  object  of  hunger  is  not  happiness,  but  food,  so  the 
object  of  '  selfishness  '  is  not  happiness,  but  immediate  grati- 
fication. It  will  assume  different  forms,  according  to  the 
character  of  its  possessor:  as  has  been  justly  remarked, 
'  every  one  has  a  self  of  his  own.'  One  person  will  seek 
glory ;  another  ease,  another  wealth  :  the  disposition  is  the 
same. 

'  Self-love,'  on  the  other  hand,  has  happiness  —  as  such  — 
for  its  object,  and  will  sacrifice  present  pleasure  to  attain 
that  object ;  hence,  it  is  implied  by  a  rational  nature,  and 
cannot  exist  without  it. 

'  Selfishness,'  however,  is  applied  generally  to  a  disregard 
of  the  welfare  of  others,  w^hether  that  disregard  is  shown  in 
grasping  at  momentary  pleasures,  or  in  deliberately  follow- 
ing the  dictates  of  '  self-love,'  and  pursuing  our  own  ad- 
vantage at  the  expense  of  others.  In  either  case,  it  must  be 
blameable ;  whereas  '  self-love,'  if  unaccompanied  with 
'  selfishness,'  is  not  necessarily  so.  Indeed,  as  Bishop  But- 
ler has  well  remarked,*-  the  world  would  be  better  than  it  is 
if  men  had  more  '  self-love  ; '  it  is  from  the  eager  pursuit 
of  transient  gratifications  that  most  evil  takes  place,  not  from 
the  pursuit  of  happiness,  as  such. 

'  Self-love  '  is  sometimes  used  in  another  sense,  as  some- 
thing compounded  of  self-esteem  and  love  of  approbation  — 

*  See  Introduction  to  Butler's  Sermons. 


144  A    COLLECTION    OP 

self-respect,  heightened  by  our  sense  of  the  estimation  in 
which  othcis  hold  us.  It  is  in  this  sense  that  we  speak  of 
'  wounded  self-love,'  &;c. 

DISCIPLINE,    TRIAL. 

These  two  words  have  each  senses  quite  remote  and  un- 
mistakcable  ;  but  they  have  also  a  sense  in  which  they  are 
occasionally  and  justly  applied  to  the  same  things  ;  they 
then  difier  in  the  view  taken  of  the  things  they  qualify. 

'  Discipline  '  is  given  with  a  view  to  training ;  as  its  ety- 
mology implies,  it  is  a  kind  of  teaching.  A  '  trial,'  on  the 
other  hand,  is  given  to  prove  the  strength  or  proficiency  of 
its  object.  A  student  receives  instructions  by  way,  of  '  disci- 
pline ;  '  his  examination  is  a  '  trial.'  A  gun  is  subjected  to 
various  processes  to  strengthen  the  metal,  which  answer  to 
'  discipline  ; '  it  is  loaded  to  the  muzzle,  and  fired  by  way  of 
'  trial,'  or  proof,  as  it  is  called. 

But  two  circumstances  cause  these  two  wq^ds  to  be 
confounded  together.  One  is,  that  a  trial  well  stood  does 
answer  the  purpose  of  discipline.  A  candidate  who  con- 
tends for  a  prize,  or  is  examined  to  test  his  proficiency,  is 
likely  to  be  the  better  scholar  after  this  trial  of  skill ;  and 
so  in  other  cases. 

Secondly,  the  circumstance  of  a  trial  being  successfully 
passed  through,  is  often  the  cause  of  our  knoiving  the  quali- 
fications of  the  person  or  thing  tried  ;  and  we  are  then  apt  to 
think  it  has  been  the  cause  of  these  qualifications.  For  ex- 
ample, men  and  animals  in  cold,  mountainous,  and  barren 
districts,  are  generally  strong  and  hardy ;  and  many  imagine 
that  the  life  of  privation  they  lead  actually  gives  them 
strength  ;  the  fact  being,  that  such  a  life  is  not  a  '  discipline,' 
but  a  '  trial.'  It  is  a  trial  which  kills  all  the  weaker  ones  ; 
none  but  the  strong  can  stand  it :  but  as  their  power  of  re- 
sisting such  a  life  enables  us  to  see  that  they  are  strong,  we 
are  prone  to  imagine  that  it  gives  them  strength. 


ENGLISH    SVNONYMS.  145 

The  words  '  discipline  '  and  '  trial,'  are  both  frequently 
applied  in  reference  to  the  crosses  and  afflictions  of  life, 
and  not  incorrectly,  in  different  senses.  Primarily,  they 
may  be  all  said  to  come  under  the  head  of  '  trials  ;  '  some 
of  them,  however,  are  undoubtedly,  in  themselves,  well 
calculated  for  a  '  discipline '  to  the  mind.  But  there  are 
others  which  have  no  tendency  in  themseJiies  to  make  us 
better,  and  are  rather  to  be  regarded  as  tests  or  trials  of  our 
faith,  patience,  and  Christian  principles.  Still,  if  these 
•  trials  '  are  well  borne,  they  also  form  a  most  salutary  '  dis- 
cipline '  to  us  ;  and  we  have  then  reason  —  from  experience, 
as  well  as  from  the  teaching  of  Scrijiture  —  to  believe  that 
they  were  intended  as  such  by  the  wise  and  merciful  Ruler 
of  the  world.  The  word  '  discipline  '  is  not,  therefore,  mis- 
applied in  speaking  of  them  ;  though  it  should  be  remem- 
bered that  they  are  '  trials  '  in  themselves,  and  '  discipline  ' 
only  so  far  as  we  viake  them  such. 


ATTACHMENT,    AFFECTION,    TEXDEKNESS,    FONDNESS, 
XOVE,    LIKING. 

•  Attachment '  is  generally  used  to  express  a  feeling  which 
has  more  of  the  character  of  fidelity  than  of  sentiment :  for 
though  often  used  in  precisely  the  same  sense  as  '  affection,' 
it  is  also  often  used  to  denote  merely  a  faithful  adherence  to 
its  object.  A  man  may  have  a  strong  'attachment'  to  his 
party,  sect,  or  class  :  in  this  sense,  the  word  '  affection  ' 
would  never  be  used.  A  faithful  subject  would  have  an 
•  attachment '  to  his  king  —  a  Highland  clansman,  to  hia 
chief;  in  all  these  cases,  the  word  implies  devoted  fidelity. 
It  is  also  used  in  relation  to  our  feeling  towards  places, 
which  is  seldom  or  never  the  case  with  '  affection.'  And 
yet  strangely  enough,  the  expression  '  an  attoclnnent,'  in  the 
abstract,  is  frequently  used  to  denote  an  affaire  de  cceur  — 
13 


146  A    COIiLECTION    OF 

the  very  '  affection  '  which  is  generally  considerod  as  em- 
phatically more  sentimental  than  constant. 

'  Affection  '  is  '  attachment,'  combined  with  more  warmth 
and  feeling  :  it  is  also  less  restricted  in  its  sense.  ♦  Attach- 
ment '  is  not  felt  towards  inferiors  either  in  age  or  station  : 
'  affection  '  may  be  felt  to  all.  A  mother  is  not  said  to  feel 
'  attachment,'  but  '  affection,'  for  her  child. 

'  Tenderness,'  in  reference  to  the  words  under  considera- 
tion,* may  be  considered  as  a  sort  of  accompaniment  to 
'  affection,'  refining  that  affection  by  a  certain  delicacy  and 
softness,  and  by  a  thoughtfulness  and  care,  not  only  for  the 
welfare  and  real  interest  of  its  object,  but  even  for  his  feel- 
ings, his  comforts,  and  smallest  pleasures.  It  can  only  be 
shown,  in  general,  by  the  educated  and  civilized,  because 
they  alone  are  considerate.  A  little  child,  or  a  barbarian, 
may  be  full  of  '  affection,'  but  cannot  show  '  tenderness  ;  ' 
and,  in  general,  the  softer  and  gentler  natu-res  possess  it 
most. 

'  Fondness  '  originally  meant  foolishness  ;  and  is  now 
generally  applied  to  that  caressing  kind  of  affection  which 
has  more  of  demonstration  than  deep  feeling.  It  is  the  only 
one  of  the  words  before  us,  except  '  love,'  which  is  used 
with  reference  to  tastes  and  pursuits  as  well  as  persons ; 
though  the  adjective  '  fond  '  is  oftener  used  in  this  sense. 
But  we  may  have  a  '  fondness  '  for  gardening  or  mechanics 
—  for  music  or  painting  (though,  by  the  way,  this  last 
expression  is  seldom  used  by  those  who  are  really  devoted 
to  the  fine  arts  )  :  but  '  fondness  '  is  never  used  in  reference 
to  higher  pursuits,  as  science  or  philosophy.  It  is  used  in 
reference  chiefly  to  habits. 

*  It  has  two  other  meanings,  one  of  them  nearly  conjugate  to  the 
adjective  '  tender  hearted,'  which  implies  an  extreme  degree  of  com- 
passion and  passive  benevolence  ;  the  other,  implying  great  carefulness 
and  attention  In  performing  any  office. 


ENGLISH    SyNOJJYMS.  147 

'  Love  '  is  the  most  general  of  all  the  terms  before  us ; 
and  includes  almost  all  their  different  meanings  ;  though,  in 
the  abstract,  usually  employed  to  qualify  one  kind  of  affec- 
tion, the  being  '  in  love.' 

'  LoA'e,'  is  also  used  for  a  strong  desire  for  the  welfare  of 
its  object,  which  may  be  felt  quite  apart  from  any  prefer- 
ence of  his  society  or  feeling  of  tenderness.  It  is  in  this 
sense  we  speak  of  '  the  love  of  mankind  ;  '  in  this  sense 
that  we  are  commanded  to  '  love  our  neighbor,'  '  to  love  our 
enemies,'  &c.  It  does  not  imply  any  personal  knowledge 
of  its  object,  or  any  consciousness  on  the  part  of  that  ob- 
ject. 

'  Liking,'  on  the  other  hand,  implies  a  preference  for  the 
society  of  its  object  quite  independent  of  any  wish  for  his 
welfare,  or  any  feeling  of  strong  affection.  Hence,  people 
are  liked  for  very  different  qualities  from  those  for  which 
they  are  loved.  '  Liking '  is  also  extended  not  only  to 
pursuits  and  habits,  but  to  inanimate  objects,  which  is 
not  the  case  with  any  any  of  the  other  words  under  consid- 
eration. 

KEASO>^,  SENSE,  TJNDEESTANDING. 

'  Reason  '  is  the  most  comprehensive  of  these  three  words, 
as  it  takes  in  the  faculty  of  '  understanding '  in  its  widest 
and  most  abstract  signification.  But  it  is  used  in  three 
senses,  which  are  sometimes  overlooked,  from  their  close 
connection.  The  first,  as  we  have  said,  is  that  which  denotes 
all  the  intellectual  powers  collectively  ;  the  second,  those 
particular  powers  which  distinguish  man  from  the  brutes.* 
The  third,  the  arguments  which  are  addressed  to  the  reason- 
ing faculty.     This  last   is  the  sense  in  which  persons  are 

*  See  Appendix  to  Whatoly's  Logic,  and  Easy  Lessons  on  Reason' 
ing. 


148  A    COLLKCTION    OF 

exhorted  to  '  hear  reason.''  «  Reason,'  in  short,  in  the  second 
sense,  is  the  faculty  which  enables  us  to  understand  a 
'  reason  '  in  the  third  sense. 

'  Sense  '  and  '  understanding '  are  used  for  a  certain 
amount  of  '  reason.'  One  who  possesses  a  large  share  oi 
'  reason  '  is  said  to  have  '  good  sense,'  or  a  '  good  under- 
standing.' These  two  expressions,  however,  arc  not  synony- 
mous. '  Sense  '  is  hoth  active  and  passive  in  its  signification ; 
'  understanding,'  only  passive.  '  Understanding '  is  used  for 
a  clear  perception  of  what  is  put  hcfore  us  ;  ^''  good  '  sense  ' 
enables  us  to  find  out  such  thi7igs  for  ourselves.  '  Sense ' 
is  accordingly  used  for  judgment  in  the  practical  affairs  of 
life  ;  '  understanding  '  is  never  so  employed.  The  expres- 
sion, '  want  of  reason/  implies  something  different  from 
'  want  of  sense.'  One  who  shows  want  of  '  sense  '  must  be 
naturally  stupid  or  silly  ;  one  who  shows  want  of  '  reason  ' 
may  be  so  blinded  by  passion  or  prejudice  as  not  to  make 
use  of  the  '  sense  '  he  possesses. 

GAYETY,    LIVELINESS,    ANIMATION,    VIVACITY. 

'  Liveliness  '  and  '  gayety  '  are,  perhaps,  the  nearest  to  each 
other  in  meaning  amongst  this  group ;  but  there  is  this  great 
difference  between  them,  that  '  gayety  '  refers  more  to  a  tem- 
porary state  or  mood  of  mind,  '  liveliness  '  more  to  the 
habitual  disposition  and  character.  '  Gayety  '  is  applied  by 
metonymy  to  those  things  which  are  supposed  to  excite  it, 
such  as  amusement,  and  dissipation  ;  while  '  liveliness  '  is 
seldom  applied  to  designate  anything  but  character. 

'  Animation  '  appears  at  first  sight  to  resemble  '  liveliness,' 
but  it  is,  in  fact,  different.  Both  literally  signify  'alive,' 
but  imply  it  in   different  senses.     An   animated    person    is 

•  See  Proverbs  and  Precepts  ;  in  which  may  be  found  a  translation 
of  the  Unes  of  Hesiod  on  the  subject. 


ENGI.ISH    SYNONYMS.  149 

eager,  and  easily  excited ;    a  lively   person   is  light,   gay- 
spirited,  cheerful. 

'  Vivacity  is  sometliing  between  '  liveliness  '  and  '  anima- 
tion ; '  it  is  less  frequently  used,  being  rather  recently 
adopted  from  the  French.  In  French,  it  has  come  to  mean 
something  more  like  '  hot-tempered.' 

MISFORTUNE,    CALAMITY,    DISASTER. 

♦  Misfortune '  is  the  most  general  of  these  words,  and 
applies  to  all  kinds  of  untoward  events.  '  Calamity '  is 
oftenest  applied  to  some  great  public  or  family  misfortune, 
such  as  famine,  pestilence,  or  the  death  or  ruin  of  the 
head  of  a  household.  '  Disaster '  is  rather  more  correctly 
applied  to  some  unfortunate  event,  occurring  as  a  hindrance 
to  some  undertaking  or  work.  A  man  who  loses  his  proper- 
ty encounters  a  misfortune  ;  '  if  he  meets  with  losses  in 
some  speculation  or  other  enterprise,  they  are  '  disasters ; ' 
a  war  is  a  great  calamity  to  a  nation,  and  entails  misfortunes 
on  individuals ;  the  defeats  and  failures  incidental  to  it  are 
'  disasters.' 

It  is  the  same  with  the  conjugate  words.  '  Calamitous  ' 
draws  the  attention  to  the  fact  of  the  event  itself  being 
unfortunate  :  '  disastrous  '  to  the  evils  accompanying  it.  A 
war  is  'calamitous'  in  itself:  it  is  'disastrous'  if  it  turns 
out  ill. 

ENVY,    EMULATION,    JEALOUSY. 

All  these  words  relate  to  sensations  of  uneasiness  pro- 
duced by  the  sight  of  another's  advantages,  not  on  Ms 
ascount,  but  on  our  own.  But  their  exact  meaning  it  is 
difficult  to  define,  not  only  because  their  boundaries,  as  it 
were,  trench  closely  on  each  other,  but  because  the  names 
are  rendered  uncertain  by  people's  proneness  to  disguise  the 
thing.  They  are  unwilling  to  admit,  either  to  others,  oi 
13* 


150  A    COLLECTIOX    OF 

even  to  themselves,  that  they  are  guilty  of  faults  which  aw 
8o  revolting  to  the  ideas  of  all  as  '  envy  '  and 'jealousy,' 
especially  the  former.* 

'  Envy  '  is  a  dislike  felt  towards  another,  caused  hy  the 
circumstance  of  his  possessing  some  good,  either  not  pos- 
sessed at  all  by  ourselves,  or  possessed  in  an  inferior  de"-ree, 
or  in  which  the  superiority  on  our  side  is  at  least  doubtful. 

'  Emulation,'  on  the  other  hand,  is  a  desire  to  attain,  our- 
selves, an  equal  share  of  some  good  which  we  see  another 
possess,  without  any  dislike  to  him,  or  wish  to  deprive  him 
of  it.  The  actions  to  which  these  two  feelings  give  rise  are 
very  different :  '  emulation  '  leading  us  to  endeavor  to  attain  a 
share  of  the  good  for  ourselves  which  we  see  another  enjoy  ; 
'  envy,'  to  deprive  him  of  it.  The  one  has  for  its  object,  our 
own  gain;  the  other,  our  neighbor's  loss.  'Emulation,' 
accordingly,  is  not  used  in  reference  to  every  kind  of  good 
which  can  be  desired,  but  only  to  those  things  which  we  may 
possibly  attain  by  striving.  Hence,  it  is  almost  limited  to 
honors,  power,  station,  or  excellence  in  any  pursuit  or  moral 
habit.  We  are  not  emulous  of  another's  beauty,  health  or 
natural  talents,  though  we  may  be  '  emulous  '  oi'  his  attain- 
ments or  virtue.  But  '  envy  '  may  be  felt  equally  for  any 
advantage,  whether  attainable  by  ourselves  or  not. 

Many  moralists  aie  in  the  habit  of  speaking  of  '  emula- 
tion '  as  a  feeling  utterly  bad  in  itself ;  and  in  support  of 
this  opinion  the  passage  from  the  Epistle  to  the  Galatians 
is  quoted,  on  '  emulations,  wrath,  strife,'  &c.  But  the  word 
in  the  original,  which  is  here  translated  '  emulation  '  {zelos). 


*  This  remark  has  been  happily  expressed  by  a  German  writer  :  '  No 
one  is  envious  :  envy  is  something  so  nasty  that  no  one  will  touch  it. 
People  hate  their  neighbors  from  jealousy  —  from  a  sense  of  honor  — 
from  a  consciousness  of  dependence  —  it  all  comes  to  the  same  as  envy. 
But  envious!  heaven  forbid!  no  one  is  envious.'  —  From  the  D<-umas  ot 
Princess  Amalie  of  Saxony. 


ENGLISH    STNOXTMS.  151 

is  in  other  parts  of  the  New  Testament  rendered  by  'jeal- 
ousy,' '  rivalry,'  or  '  zeal ;  '  and  the  word  is  almost  as  often 
used  in  commendation  as  in  blame.  Hence,  it  seems  clear 
that,  in  the  above-mentioned  passage,  it  is  used  for  an 
unchristian  and  bitter  spirit  of  rivalry  and  contention,  and 
not  simply  for  the  feeling  we  understand  as  '  emulation.' 
This  sentiment  is,  in  moderation,  a  useful  one  ;  it  requires, 
however,  to  be  kept  in  check,  as  it  is  too  liable,  if  indulged 
to  excess,  to  degenerate  into  'envy.' 

*  Jealousy  '  is  a  somewhat  ambiguous  word,  being  capable 
of  three  different  senses,  and  used  both  to  express  a  passion 
and  a  habit. 

First,  it  is  used  for  a  proneness  to  suspect  a  slight,  or 
faithlessness,  or  coldness,  in  the  object  of  affection  —  this  is 
the  halit. 

Secondly,  for  a  desire  for  the  exclusive  possession  of 
power,  influence,  approbation,  or  affection  —  this  is  the 
-passion. 

And  thirdly,  it  is  used,  though  perhaps  improperly,  for  a 
modification  of  this  passion,  in  the  pain  felt  by  those  who 
feel  they  have  not  their  just  due  of  affection  or  preference. 
A  child  who  sees  his  parents  treat  a  brother  or  sister  with 
unjust  preference  may  feel  jealous  in  this  sense,  without 
iiaving  a  jealous  temper.  The  other  two  kinds  mentioned, 
—  the  passion  and  the  habit  —  are  not  necessarily  com- 
bined, though  they  ai-e  generally  found  together. 

'  Jealousy  '  differs  from  '  envy  '  in  being  oftener  (though 
not  always)  appropriated  to  cases  in  which  the  affections  are 
concerned,  and  also,  in  relating  more  to  ourselves  and  less 
to  others.  A  person  is  jealous  on  his  own  account,  envious 
on  that  of  another.  The  person,  too,  over  whom  (to  use  an 
old  English  expression,  v.hich  avoids  an  ambiguity)  he  is 
jealous,  must  always  be  some  one  beloved. 

There  are  two  or  three  other  sentiments,  to  express  which 


152  A.    COLLECTION    OF 

we  have  no  very  exact  words,  and  which  are  very  apt  to  he 
confounded  with  those  we  have  mentioned,  though  in  reality 
different,  because  they  all  relate  to  pain  felt  at  another's 
good  fortune. 

The  first  we  shall  mention  is  the  feeling  called  by  Aris- 
totle 7iC)ncsis.  It  is  an  indignation  at  seeing  another  possess 
a  good  of  which  he  is  undeserving,  — or  of  which  he  makes 
a  bad  use,  —  or  which  he  is  incapable  of  valuing.  Those 
who,  like  David,  '  grieve  to  see  the  ungodly  in  such  pros- 
perity,' —  or  a  poor  student  who  sees  an  ignorant  rich  man 
unable  to  appreciate  his  splendid  library,  —  alike  feel  ne- 
mesis. But,  natural  and  justifiable  as  is  this  feeling,  it 
requires,  even  more  than  emulation,  to  be  kept  in  check  ; 
for  it  is  the  disguise  under  which  envy  gains  access  to  the 
mind  ;  and  many  will  secretly  excuse  their  really  envious 
feelings  on  the  ground  that  they  are  merely  '  indignant '  at 
the  sight  of  ill-bestowed  and  ill-used  advantages.  But  it  is 
a  mistake,  not  of  words,  but  of  things,  when  this  feeling,  in 
itself,  is  called  by  the  name  of  '  envy.' 

Another  sentiment  of  a  really  blameable  kind,  which  may 
be  considered  as  in  some  degree  akin  to  '  envy,'  is  what 
may  be  called  '  grudging,'  or,  to  use  a  polite  term,  '  exclu- 
siveness,'  —  the  dislike  that  any  one  besides  ourselves  should 
possess  some  advantage  we  value.  The  lady  who  is  men- 
tioned as  having  boiled  a  valuable  flower-root  before  sending 
it  to  a  friend,  to  prevent  the  possibility  of  her  plant  being 
propagated,  affords  an  instance  of  this  disposition  ;  as,  also, 
those  persons  who  suffer  a  valuable  invention  to  die  with 
them  rather  than  impart  it :  and  the  still  more  numerous 
class  who  are  in  constant  dread  of  any  one  obtaining  posses- 
sion of  a  song,  a  dress,  a  picture,  or  an  oi'nament,  which 
they  imagine  to  be  their  peculiar  property.  The  Greeks 
included  this  quality  under  the  name  phihonos,  which  also 
comprised  '  envy,'  properly  so  called  :   zelos   included  '  emu 


ENGLISH    SYNONYMS.  153 

Jation,'  and  some  kinds  of  'jealousy.'  The  three  passions, 
phthonos,  zelos,  and  nemesis,  are  discussed  and  compared 
together  in  an  admirable  portion  of  Aristotle's  Rhetoric. 

PKIVACY,    KETIKEMENT,    SOLITUDE,    SECLUSION, 
LONELINESS. 

•  Privacy,'  sometimes  implies  absence  from  the  bustle 
and  state  of  puhiic  life  ;  at  other  times,  it  is  nearly  synony- 
mous with  '  retirement ;  '  with  this  difference,  that  '  privacy  ' 
may  be  occasional  and  temporary,  while  '  retirement '  al- 
ways implies  some  continuance.  If  we  withdraw  to  our 
own  rooms  for  an  hour,  we  spend  that  hour  in  '  privacy  ; ' 
'  retirement '  refers  to  the  habitual  mode  of  life,  and  includes 
not  only  absence  from  public  life,  but  even  from  much 
general  society.  One  who  leads  a  life  of  retirement  has  but 
few  associates,  and  mixes  seldom  in  the  gay  world. 

'  Solitude  '  and  '  seclusion  '  imply  more  than  this  —  an 
enrire  absence  from  all  society ;  but  they  imply  this  in 
different  senses.  '  Seclusion  '  must  be,  to  a  certain  extent, 
'  voluntary  ; '  '  solitude  '  may  be  used  for  a  forced  absence 
from  society.  No  one  would  say  that  a  prisoner  alone  in 
his  cell,  or  a  shipwrecked  man  on  a  desert  island,  were 
living  in  '  seclusion,'  but  in  '  solitude.'  '  Seclusion  '  seems 
to  imply  shutting  oneself  up  from  the  external  world,  as  its 
derivation  indicates  {clauclc,  to  shut  up  or  close)  :  hence,  it  is 
more  applicable  to  a  monk,  or  nun  in  a  convent,  than  to  a 
hermit  in  the  wilderness.  When  we  say  that  '  seclusion '  is 
to  a  certain  extent  voluntary,  we  do  not  mean  that  it  is 
always  in  accordance  with  the  wishes  of  those  who  practise 
it.  Many  persons  submit  to  a  life  of  seclusion  against  their 
inclinations  :  but  still,  in  such  cases  no  direct  force  is  used  : 
they  are  not  compelled,  in  the  sense  that  a  prisoner  is  com- 
pelled, to  leave  the  world. 

Correctly  speaking,  also,  '  solitude '  is  applied  to  one  per- 


154  A    COLLECTION    OF 

6011  alouc  :  '  soclusion  '  is  more  properly  applied  to  a  small 
number  of  persons  living  together  —  as  a  family,  or  a  com- 
munity, or  even  the  inhabitants  of  a  retired  village. 

'  Loneliness  '  implies  rather  the  solitude  of  the  heart.  We 
may  be  lonely  in  a  crowd  ;  or,  indeed,  lonely  in  a  circle  of 
acquaintance  —  even  of  connections,  if  they  are  unsym- 
pathizing  and  uninterested  in  us. 

'  Privacy  '  is  opposed  to  publicity. 

•  Retirement,'  to  gayety,  or  life  in  the  world. 

'  Solitude,'  to  the  adjective  social,  or  to  society 

'  Seclusion,'  to  society,  in  the  widest  sense. 

'  Loneliness,'  to  sympathetic  companionship. 

The  adjectives  are,  some  of  them,  not  strictly  conjugate. 
'  Lonely  '  applies  more  to  places  than  persons,  though  some- 
times to  the  latter.  A  '  lonely '  place  is  one  where  we  should 
feel  lonely.  '  Solitary  '  and  '  retired '  are  also  generally 
applied  to  places  ;  '  retired  '  always,  except  when  a  person  \s 
described  as  having  withdrawn  from  some  public  situation  -  - 
as,  a  '  retired  '  officer,  or  statesman.  '  Secluded  '  is  always 
(correctly  speaking)  confined  to  places.  '  Private  '  is  now 
more  directly  opposed  to  '  public '  than  is  its  conjugate  noun, 
'  privacy.'  A  '  private  *  interview,  letter,  or  individual,  is 
exactly  the  opposite  to  a  public  one. 

EAKTH,    WOKLD,    GLOBE. 

In  speaking  of  the  '  earth,'  we  refer  more  to  its  external 
and  material  part :  in  speaking  of  the  '  world,'  to  the  moral 
and  abstract  view  of  the  same  thing.  In  considering  the 
'  earth,'  we  look  at  its  construction,  its  natural  productions, 
its  geological  formation  ;  in  comparing  our  own  with  other 
planets  or  systems,  we  always  speak  of  the  '  earth '  —  as, 
'  The  earth  moves  round  the  sun  ;  '  in  this  sense,  '  world  * 
would  be  inadmissible. 

The  '  world  '  is  rather  the  '  earth  '  viewed  with   reference 


ENGLISH    SYNONYMS.  155 

to  its  inhabitants.  We  speak  of  the  providential  care  and 
moral  government  of  tlie  '  world,'  not  of  the  '  earth  :  '  we 
might  say,  '  The  wonders  and  beauties  with  which  the  earth 
abounds  display  the  wisdom  and  goodness  of  the  Creator, 
but  still  more  his  government  of  the  world.'  And  not  only 
is  the  expression,  '  world,'  used  with  reference  to  mankind 
in  preference  to  '  earth,'  but  with  reference  to  man  intellect- 
ually, in  contradistinction  to  physically.  We  speak  of  the 
various  races  which  inhabit  the  '  earth'  but  of  the  civilized 
'  world.'  Hence,  America  was  called  '  The  New  World,^ 
being  viewed  with  reference  to  a  place  that  was  to  be  in- 
habited.^  In  speaking  of  men  as  forming  a  community, 
'  world  '  is  always  used  instead  of  '  earth  :  '  as  we  speak  of 
'  the  intellectual,  political,  theological,  or  gay  world '  or 
even  of  '  a  poet's  world  '  — '  the  world  of  fancy  or  of 
dreams,'  &c.  Formerly  '  earth  '  was  used  as  '  world  '  is 
now,  as  we  may  see  in  our  translation  of  the  Psalms,  '  The 
ends  of  the  earth  shall  hear  him,'  &c. 

'  Globe  '  is  generally  used  geologically,  and  occasionally 
in  poetry. 

Lastly,  '  earth '  is  limited  to  our  own  planet ;  but  we 
speak  of  other  '  worlds.'  The  planets  are  supposed  to  be 
'  worlds  ; '  the  starry  sky  may  be  full  of  systems  of  worlds  ; 
the  abode  to  which  we  look  for  a  future  life  is  continually 
called  '  a  better  world.' 

This  may  partly  arise  from  the  different  derivations  of 
these  words.  '  Earth '  is  immediately  traceable  to  the  Ger- 
man erde  ;  but  it  is  probable  that  the  original  root  of  all  was 

*  There  are  exceptions  to  this  rule,  the  principal  one  being  the 
expression,  '  sailing  round  the  world,'  which  is  always  used  instead  of 
•  earth.'  This,  probably,  arises  from  the  ftict,  that '  earth  '  is  also  gen- 
erally used  synonymously  with '  land,'  in  contradistinction  to '  sea;'  hence 
the  expression,  '  sailing  round  the  earth,'  would  be  somewhat  ano> 
malous 


156  A    COLLECTION    OF 

the  Hebrew  Erels,  supposed  to  be  derived   from  a  verb  sig- 
nifying to  crumble  or  break  in  pieces. 

'  World  '  (whirled)  was  evidently  expressive  merely  of 
roundness :  as  the  Latin  mundus  and  Greek  cosmos  were  of 
'  order.'  Cosmos  and  mundus  were  both  used  to  indicate 
the  universe.  And  it  is  curious  that  our  derived  word,  cos- 
mogony, always  relates  to  the  '  earth,'  as  distinguished  from 
'  world.'  The  '  world,'  in  our  modern  sense,  was  rendered 
in  Latin  by  seculum,  and  in  Greek  by  aion. 

PROFIT,    GAIN,    EMOLUMENT. 

'  Profit '  is  distinguished  from  the  other  two  words  of  this 
group  by  being  always  applied  to  gain  accruing  from  some- 
thing that  has  been  laid  out  first.  We  speak  of  '  profits ' 
made  by  the  sale  of  goods,  but  not  of  the  '  profits  '  of  labor, 
or  winning  '  profits  '  in  a  lottery.  '  Gain  '  includes  every 
advantage  obtained  which  was  not  ours  before. 

'Emolument'  is  always  the  reward  of  labor,  and  that 
reward  obtained  in  a  regular  way,  and  not  by  chance. 

The  history  of  the  derivation  of  this  word  is  curious  :  its 
root  is  the  Latin  mola,  a  mill ;  it  was  first  used  to  signify 
anything  which  could  be  ground  out  of  a  mill  ;  then  it 
came  to  be  figuratively  employed,  as  if  to  convey  the  idea 
of  '  grist  to  the  mill,'  and  so  gradually  assumed  its  present 
sense. 

IMPORT,    MEANING,    SENSE. 

The  '  import'  of  a  speech  or  book  is  the  idea  which  it  most 
readily  conveys  to  others  ;  the  '  meaning '  is  the  idea  really 
intended  to  be  conveyed  by  the  speaker  or  writer  :  the  '  sense  ' 
is,  either,  1st,  The  general  substance  of  the  whole;  or, 
2dly,  The  different  ways  in  which  it  may  be  understood, 
and  the  ideas  it  may  be  made  to  convey. 

For  instance,   we   might   say,   '  This  writer  declares   his 


ENGLISH    SYNONYMS.  157 

meaning  to  be  so  and  so ;  it  is  true  his  words  may  be 
brought  to  bear  that  sense,  but  such  is  not  their  obvious  im- 
port.' Or  again,  '  The  Articles  of  our  Church  have  been 
received  by  certain  writers  in  a  non-natural  sense ;  but  what- 
ever may  have  been  the  meaning  of  their  compilers,  the 
import  is  quite  unlike  what  they  are  now  made  to  say.' 

AMXTSEMENT,    ENTERTAINMENT,    DIVEKSION,    RECKEATION. 

These  four  words  are  sometimes  used  differently,  but 
there  are  occasionally  variations  in  their  meaning. 

'  Diversion  '  often  preserves  something  of  its  etymological 
sense,  and  conveys  the  idea  of  distracting  the  attention  and 
drawing  the  mind  from  subjects  fatiguing  or  depressing  :  at 
other  times  it  is  used  to  describe  the  lightest  and  gayest 
kind  of  pleasures,  and  those  which  excite  most  laughter  and 
merriment,  '  Recreation  '  adheres  even  more  strictly  to  its 
etymology:  it  always  implies' refreshment  after  business  or 
serious  employment.*  An  idle  person  may  enjoy  amuse 
ment,  entertainment,  or  diversion ;  but  never  recreation. 

'Amusement'  and  'entertainment'  are  perhaps  the  most 
alike  in  meaning ;  but  there  is  this  great  difference,  that  a 
useful  pursuit  may  be  an  amusement,  if  it  pleases  and  recre- 
ates the  mind :  but  nothing  can  be  looked  on  in  the  light  of 
'  entertainment '  Avhich  is  not  pursued  for  sake  of  that  alone. 
For  instance,  we  should  say,  '  I  find  much  amusement  in 
gardening,'  but  not  '  much  entertainment : '  or,  '  I  derive  so 
much  amusement  from  the  labors  of  my  garden,  that  I  do  not 
care  for  idle  diversions.'  Again,  an  '  entertainment '  always 
conveys  the  idea  of  an  elaborate  show  or  spectacle,  which 
is  not  given  by  an  '  amusement,'  or  a  '  diversion.'  \     '  Rec- 

*  See  some  remarks  on  the  subject  in  English  Life,  Social  and 
Domestic. 

t  The  conjugate  adjective  *  entertaining '  is  nearly  the  same  aa 
*  amusing.' 

14 


158  A    COLLECTION    OF 

reation'  differs  from  the  other  three  in  always  implying  that 
an  active  part  is  taken  in  it.  We  speak  of  '  the  recreation 
of  dancing,'  but  not  '  the  recreation  of  witnessing  a  ballet ' : 
where  the  pleasure  is  passive,  '  amusament  *  or  '  entertain- 
ment '  is  employed.  We  might  express  omselvcs  thus  : 
'  They  enjoyed  the  recreation  of  a  game  of  cricket :  the 
spectacle  afforded  much  amusement  (or  entertainment')  to 
the  spectators  :  and  the  ludicrous  falls  of  some  of  the  play- 
ers supplied  them  with  infinite  diversion.* 

USAGE,    CUSTOM. 

Whenever  '  usage  '  is  employed,  '  custom  '  might  be  sub- 
stituted, though  with  less  force :  but  a  custom  is  not  neces- 
sarily a  usage.  A  '  custom '  is  merely  that  which  is  often 
repeated ;  a  '  usage  '  must  be  both  often  repeated  and  of 
long  standing.  Hence  we  may  speak  of  a  new  '  custom,' 
but  not  of  a  new  '  usage.' 

The  history  of  the  word  '  custom  '  is  curious  ;  it  proba- 
bly had  the  same  origin  as  '  accost,'  to  come  near ;  and 
thence  '  to  be  habitual.'  The  root  is  the  Latin  costa,  the 
side  or  rib. 

DEXTERITY,    ADDRESS,    SKILL. 

*  Dexterity '  is  most  applicable  to  those  actions  in  which 
there  is  more  call  for  quickness  and  readiness  with  the  hands 
than  for  deliberate  contrivance  and  intelligence.  '  Skill,' 
on  the  other  hand,  implies  more  of  head  and  less  of  hand- 
work. A  cricket  or  billiard  player  shows  dexterity :  an 
artist  or  mechanician,  skill.  The  same  Avith  the  conjugate 
adjectives:  a  dexterous  workman  is  quick,  neat,  and  handy; 
a  skilful  workman  understands  the  theory  and  practice  of 
his  business  thoroughly:  it  would  not  be  exiough  for  a 
watchmaker  to  be  dexterous,  he  must  be  also  skilful. 

'  Address  '  is   sometimes   applied  to  feats   of  '  sleight  of 


EJfGLISH    STNONYMS.  159 

i:s.ad,'  but  oftener  to   diplomatic  readiness  and  acuteness  in 
accommodating  ourselves  to  those  we  have  to  deal  with. 

The  French  use  '  address,'  generally,  where  we  use  the 
T/ord  '  dexterity.' 

HELP,    AID,    ASSISTANCE. 

These  words  are  nearly  synonymous  ;  but  as  generally 
happens  when  words  of  Saxon  and  Latin  derivation  are 
compared  together,  the  Saxon  word  is  the  stronger.  '  Help  ' 
implies  more  done  by  the  helper,  and  less  by  the  person 
helped,  than  '  aid  '  or  '  assistance  :  '  and  it  is  the  same  with 
the  conjugate  verbs :  we  may  aid  a  person  in  carrying  a 
load,  we  help  him  out  of  a  ditch  into  which  he  has  fallen. 
Hence,  in  a  religious  sense,  it  is  usual  to  speak  of  '  seeking 
help,'  not  '  aid,'  from  above,  —  unless  we  are  understood  to 
speak  of  a  power  co-operating  with  man  ;  when  the  word 
'  aid  '  is  admissible.  In  sudden  distress  the  cry  raised  is 
always  '  Help  ! '  not  '  aid.'  In  the  common  expressions,  *  I 
cannot  help  this '  — '  you  must  help  yourself,'  the  word  '  aid ' 
could  not  be  substituted.* 

'  Assistance  '  implies  still  more  of  co-operation,  and  less 
of  succor,  than  even  '  aid.'  Two  persons  are  said  '  to  assist 
each  other,'  not  '  to  aid  each  other.'  It  implies  mutual  aid. 
We  might  say,  '  Beaumont  and  Fletcher  wrote  plays,  in 
which  each  afforded  assistance  to  the  other :  Beaumont 
could  not  have  succeeded  without  Fletcher's  aid,  and  when 
he  was  in  a  difficulty  his  friend's  help  extricated  him.' 

ACT,    ACTION,     DEED. 

These   first  two  words  are   often   synonymous,  but  there 

*  There  is  a  curious  colloquial  incorrectness  in  the  common  phrase, 
•  Don't  do  so  more  than  you  can  help : '  correctly  speaking,  it  should 
be  •  more  than  you  canH  help; '  though  this  last  would  sound  so  strange 
that  it  could  hardly  pass  current. 


160  A    COLLECTION    OF 

are  essential  differences  between  them.  1st.  — '  Act'  does 
not  necessarily  imply  an  external  result ;  '  action  '  always 
does.  We  may  speak  of  repentance,  for  example,  as  an 
'  act :  '  we  could  not  call  it  an  '  action.'  The  expression, 
now  nearly  obsolete,  but  formerly  common  among  Roman 
Catholic  writers,  and  our  older  divines,  of  *  an  act  of  faith, 
contrition,  humility,'  &c.,  —  signifying  merely  a  mental 
determination,  —  shows  how  strong  was  the  tendency 
even  then  to  extend  the  word  '  act '  to  operations  of  the 
mind.* 

2dly.  —  An  act  must  be  individual :  we  may  speak  of  '  a 
course  of  action.'  '  Action,'  without  the  article,  may  even 
be  spoken  of  in  the  abstract  as  opposed  to  a  state  of  '  repose,' 
'  indolence,'  or  '  contemplation  :  '  this  could  never  be  done 
with  the  v.ord  '  act.'  f 

Lastly.  —  '  Act,'  when  qualified,  is  oftener  though  not 
universally,  coupled  with  another  substantive :  '  action  ' 
always  by  an  adjective  preceding  it.  "We  speak  of  '  a  kind 
action  '  —  but  of  '  an  act  of  kindness.'  '  A  kind  act '  might 
be  admissible,  though  not  usual ;  but  '  an  action  of  kindness  ' 
is  an  expression  never  used.  '  Deed  '  appears  synonymous 
with  '  act.' 

ANGEE,    WKATH. 

'  Anger  '  is  more  correctly  applied  to  the  inward  feeling  : 
•  wrath  '  to  the  outward  manifestation.  Hence,  in  describing 
external  effects,  which  seem  like  those  produced  by  anger, 
the  word  '  wrath  '  is  always  used.     We  should  not  speak  of 


♦  The  French  use  the  expression  '  actions  de  graces  '  for  thanksgiv- 
ings; this  is  evidently  derived  from  the  Latin,  *  agrere  gratias.' 

t  The  only  way  in  which  '  act '  could  be  used  without  the  article, 
would  be  in  such  an  expression  as  •  in  act  to  strike  ' 


ENGLISH    SYNONYMS.  161 

the  '  anger  '  but  of  the  '  wrath  '  of  the  elements  '  *  We 
therefore  speak  of  '  the  wrath  of  God,'  more  correctly  than 
of  his  anger.  We  cannot  attribute  to  Him  passions  like 
those  of  men  :  we  can  only  describe  the  external  effect? 
which  in  men  would  be  produced  by  those  passions. 

TYRANNY,    DESPOTISM. 

Both  of  these  terms  generally  imply  absolute  power, 
and  power  which  is  exercised  for  the  pleasure  of  the  gov- 
ernor, not  the  benefit  of  the  governed.  But  '  despotism  '  is 
applicable  to  a  power  which  is  regularly  established  by  law, 
however  unjustly:  while  '  tyranny '  indicates  the  abuse  of 
extensive  power,  whether  legal  or  otherwise.  A  nation  may 
be  said  either  to  suffer  under  '  despotism  '  or  '  tyranny  ; '  but 
the  word  '  despotism  '  draws  attention  to  the  absolute  power 
of  a  government ;  '  tyranny,'  to  the  severe  and  harsh  use 
of  that  power.  The  word  '  tyranny  '  is  likewise  much  less 
limited  to  the  description  of  the  government  of  a  country, 
than  '  despotism.'  We  speak  of  the  '  tyranny '  exercised  by 
a  harsh  parent  or  schoolmaster,  or  even  by  a  stronger  boy 
over  a  weaker.  Even  in  an  abstract  sense,  we  often  speak 
of  the  '  tyranny  '  of  fashion,  habit  or  the  passions  ;  in  none 
of  these  cases  could  we  use  the  word  '  despotism.'  f 

♦  Tyranny  '  and  '  despotism '  must  both  be  unjust  in  all  cases, 
since  they  imply  a  preference  of  the  interest  of  the  governor 
to  that  of  the  governed  :  but  a  '  tyranny  '  must  also  necessa- 
rily be  cruel :  a  '  despotism  '  may  be  mild,  and  even  in  its 
way   beneficent.     A    slave-owner  may    be    benevolent  and 


•  See  Scott's  Rokeby  : 

♦  Mine  be  the  eve  of  tropic  sun  ! 
No  pale  gradations  mark  his  way. 
No  twilight  dews  his  wratli  allay.' 
tThe  conjugate  adjective,  'despotic,'  somewhat  diifers  from  the  sub 
Btantive  in  this  respect.     We  do  speak  of  *  a  despotic  parent,'  &c. 


162  A    COLLECTION    OF 

kind  to  liis  serfs,  but  his  government  of  them  must  be  a 
'  despotism,'  that  being  applied  in  the  very  meaning  of  the 
word,  which  has  deviated  but  little  from  its  original  etymo- 
logical signification  in  Greek  :  —  'a  master  of  slaves  *  {Des- 
potes). 

'  Tyranny,'  on  the  contrary,  originally  implied  merely  a^ 
absolute  government.  It  is  used  in  this  sense  by  the  early 
Greek  poets :  though  the  oldest  prose  writers  on  record 
apply  the  word  exclusively  to  those  who  had  usurped  abso- 
lute power  in  a  free  country. 

It  is  a  curious  satire  on  human  nature,  that  the  word 
which  originally  implied  only  unlimited  power,  should  have 
afterwards  come  to  imply  the  abuse  of  that  power,  as  if  the 
last  was  the  necessary  consequence  of  the  first.* 

LIBERTY,    FKEEDOM. 

When  applied  to  the  condition  either  of  a  nation  or  indi- 
vidual, these  words  are  strictly  synonymous,  and  conjugates 
of  the  same  adjective  '  free  ;  '  but  when  used  in  ordinary 
polite  conversation,  there  is  the  same  shade  of  difference 
which  is  observable  (as  has  been  remarked  before)  in  other 
pairs  of  Saxon  and  Latin  synonyms.  '  May  I  take  the 
liberty  ? '  is  an  expression  in  frequent  use  :  '  May  I  take  the 
freedom  7  '  would  be  considered  as  a  piece  of  vulgarism. 

VISTIGES,    TRACES. 

These  words  have  a  corresponding  origin,  and  are  often 
synonymous  ;  when  they  differ,  the  word  '  vestiges  '  is  al- 
ways applied  in  its  analogical  sense,  while  '  traces  '  may  be 
used  either  in  this  or  in  its  primary  sense.     We  follow  the 

*It  has  been  suggested  that  the  Greek  Tyrannos  may  be  nearly  re- 
lated to  the  Irish  Tigernach  (pronounced  Tierna),  a  chief  or  lord,  -which 
is  the  word  used  as  an  equivalent  to  Kurios  in  the  Greek  Testa- 
ment 


ENGLISH    SYNONTMS.  >  163 

traces  of  a  person  or  animal  lost  sight  of :  we  dii-cover  the 
vestiges  of  earlier  formations  in  geology.  In  this  last  sense 
the  word  '  traces  '  might  be  equally  well  used  :  but  we  never 
speak  of  '  the  vestiges  of  foot-marks  in  a  wood,'  «Sz;c. 

It  may  be  observed  that  words  of  Latin  origin  are  much 
sooner  corrupted  from  their  original  signification  than  Anglo- 
Saxon  ones  :  probably  from  the  body  of  the  language  being 
essentially  Teutonic. 

CHASTISEMENT,    PUNISHMENT,    PENALTY. 

According  to  its  primary  sense,  '  punishment '  meant 
neither  more  nor  less  than  vengeance  or  retribution.  It 
originally  implied  the  giving  satisfaction  to  individuals : 
hence  the  Latin  expression  '  sumere  poenas  '  (to  fake  or  re- 
ceive the  punishment  of  an  offender)  ;  and  '  luere  [or  solvere^ 
pcenas  '  (to  '  pay,'  or  discharge  the  penalty).  In  short,  pun- 
ishment was  correlative  to  the  sentiment  of  anger ;  and 
accordingly  Bacon  speaks  of  revenge  as  '  a  wild  justice.' 
But  in  its  established  modern  sense,  both  *  punishment '  and 
'  chastisement '  may  be  defined  as  pain  inflicted  with  a  view 
to  prevent  future  wrongdoing.  The  chief  difierence  be- 
tween them  is,  that  '  punishment '  is  the  term  applied  to 
designate  sufi'ering  inflicted  with  a  view  to  deter  either  the 
sufferer  or  others  :  while  '  chastisement '  is  confined  to  the 
individual  who  is  the  object  of  it,  and  is  supposed  and  in- 
tended to  have  some  reforming  and  corrective,  as  well  as 
deterring  power. 

Hence  afflictions  are  called  the  '  chastisements '  (not  the 
punishments)  sent  by  Providence:  but  the  future  retribution 
of  the  wicked  is  spoken  of  as  a  '  punishment,'  because  it 
cannot  act  as  a  corrective,  but  as  a  terror  (in  prospect)  to 
offenders. 

The  pains  inflicted  by  the  law  of  the  land  are,  correctly 
speaking,  punishments,  not  chastisements  ;  for  though  some 


164  A    COLLECTION    OF 

of  them  may  happen   to  be  of  a  reformatory  character,  theii 
primary  object  is  to  deter,  not  to  correct. 

A  'penalty '  is  a  punishment  considered  in  the  light  of  a 
debt  incurred  by  certain  offences,  which  must  be  paid  off  by 
its  object.  The  expression,  when  used  in  reference  to  the 
law,  is  oftenest  applied  to  fines ;  and  in  a  more  general 
application  it  is  used  to  describe  those  sufferings  which  are 
the  natural  consequences  of  a  fault,  and  which  may  be  con- 
sidered as  the  debt  which  the  offender  incurs.  We  should 
say,  '  sickness,  or  poverty,  is  the  "penally  which  the  in- 
temperate, or  the  extravagant,  must  pay  for  their  criminal 
indulgences.' 

PROJECT,    DESIGN,    SCHEME,    PLAN. 

All  these  words  imply  a  certain  end  in  view,  and  means 
used  to  accomplish  it :  of  the  four,  '  design  '  looks  most  to 
the  end,  and  least  to  the  means :  '  scheme  '  and  '  plan  ' 
most  to  the  means  and  least  to  the  end:  while 'project ' 
seems  to  hold  a  middle  place  between  the  extremes. 

'  Scheme,'  in  accordance  with  its  original  root  [schema,  a 
pattern),  implies  something  fully  formed  and  sketched  out. 
'  Plan  '  conveys  this  idea  even  more  fully,  and  betokens  a 
more  advanced  and  matured  state  than  '  scheme.' 

For  instance  :  '  They  formed  a  project  to  revolutionize  the 
country :  with  this  design  they  concocted  a  scheme ;  they 
then  met  together  to  mature  their  plan.' 

PURPOSE,    INTENT,  INTENTION. 

The  word  '  purpose '  always  implies  the  use  of  some 
means  towards  the  end  :  with  '  intention '  this  is  not  the  case. 
For  instance :  '  He  had  long  harbored  the  intention  of  taking 
the  life  of  his  enemy,  and  for  this  purpose  he  provided  him- 
self with  weapons.' 

*  Purpose '  has  some  resemblance  to  '  design,'     (See  the 


ENGLISH    SYNONYMS.  165 

head,  design,  peoject,  scheme.)  It  was  originally  a  cor- 
ruption of  '  pro-pose,'  and  the  conjugate  of  the  verb  '  to 
propose,'  or  '  to  purpose,'  as  it  was  formerly  called. 

'  Intent '  and  '  intention '  are  much  the  same  in  significa- 
tion. '  Intent '  was  used  in  old  English  where  '  intention  ' 
would  now  be  employed  ;  (as  may  be  seen  from  the  tech- 
nical expression,  'with  intent  to  kill.')  'Intention'  was  then 
never  used  except  — 

First,  in  the  logical  sense  of  '  first  or  second  intentions.' 

Secondly,  in  a  technical  theological  sense,*  which  it  still 
preserves:  i.  e.  the  Romish  doctrine  of  intention,  which 
inculcates  that  if  a  priest  administers  any  of  the  sacraments 
without  the  inward  will  and  determination  to  exercise  his 
priestly  function,  those  sacraments  are  null  and  void. 

[See  the  Archives  of  the  Council  of  Trent,  where  an 
anathema  is  pronounced  upon  those  who  doubt  the  truth  of 
this  doctrine.  See  also  some  remarks  on  the  subject  in  the 
third  number  of  the  Cautions  for  the  Times.'] 


^ 


LIST,    CATALOGUE. 

A  '  catalogue  '  always  implies  some  description  of  the  arti- 
cles named  ;  a  '  list,'  though  it  does  not  exclude  a  description, 
only  implies  a  simple  enumeration.  Hence,  we  never  speak 
of  a  *  catalogue '  of  subscribers,  a  visiting  '  catalogue,'  &c. 
because  then  the  names  alone  are  enumerated ;  but  the  con- 
tents of  a  museum,  library,  or  picture  gallery,  are  said  to 
be  set  down  in  a  '  catalogue,'  because  something  answering 
to  a  description  is  always  appended,  though  it  may  only  be 
the  title  of  a  book,  which  is  not  a  mere  arbitrary  sound  like 
the  name  of  an  individual,  but  conveys  some  sort  of  descrip- 
tion of  its  contents. 


•  Many  of  the  old  technical  terms  in  theology  were  scarcely  altered 
from  the  Latin. 


166  A    COLLECTION    OP 


BRKVITY,    CONCISENESS. 

'  Brevity  '  is  often  used  indifferently  with  '  conciscnesa ; ' 
but  when  any  difference  is  implied,  then,  properly  speaking, 
♦  brevity  *  refers  to  the  matter,  and  '  conciseness  '  to  the 
style.  In  fact,  when  brevity  of  shjle  is  spoken  of,  it  may 
be  considered  as  synonymous  with  '  conciseness.'  Strictly 
speaking,  however,  '  brevity '  merely  implies  the  use  of  few 
words,  while  '  conciseness  '  implies  a  great  deal  of  maUer 
concentrated  in  a  small  space. 

'  Brevity  '  is  sometimes  attained  by  leaving  much  unsaid : 
in  such  a  case,  what  is  said  is  not  necessarily  expressed 
with  '  conciseness  ; '  '^'  this  last  can  only  be  attained  by  lonw 
practice  in  the  art  of  compressing. 

A  concise  discourse  is  like  a  well-packed  trunk,  which 
contains  much  more  than  it  at  first  sight  appears  to  do :  a 
brief  discourse  may  be  like  a  trunk  half  full ;  short,  because 
it  is  scanty. 

TOLEKANCE,    TOLEKATION. 

'  Tolerance  '  is  a  habit  of  mind  ;  '  toleration  '  applies  to  ac- 
tion, not  disposition.  Principles  of  tolerance  will  lead  to 
the  toleration  of  different  opinions. 

CONFIDENCE,    TRUST,    KELIANCE. 

'  Confidence '  implies  '  trust' ;  but  '  trust '  does  not  always 
imply  '  confidence.'  Trust  is  rather  particular  than  general  : 
we  may  feel  trust  in  a  man's  honesty,  but  not  in  his  good 
judgment,  &c. ;  but  'confidence,'  though  sometimes  used  in 
this  partial  sense,  is  also  used  in  reference  to  the  general 
character.  But  we  may  repose  trust  in  a  person  in  whose 
character,  as  a  whole,  we  have  no  confidence.     For  instance, 


'  See  Midsummer  .Xi-UVs  Dream  —  '  A  tedious  brief  play.' 


ENGLISH    SYNONYMS.  167 

we  migbit  say,  '  I  can  trust  *  in  such  a  person's  acting  in 
this  way  because  it  is  his  interest,  or,  he  is  afraid  of  acting 
otherwise ; '  these  expressions  themselves  imply  that  the 
person  referred  to  is  unworthy  of  conjidence.  '  Reliance  ' 
is  only  applied  to  qualities  or  actions  :  not  in  general  to 
persons  ;  if  so  used,  it  may  usually  be  considered  as  trans- 
ferred by  metonymy  from  the  action  or  quality  to  the  person 
qualified. 

ERROK,    MISTAKE,    BLUNDER. 

'  Error '  is  always  used  to  designate  some  action  which 
is  blamed,  whether  morally  or  intellectually.  It  may  pro- 
ceed from  nothing  but  a  failure  in  judgment ;  still  the  word 
implies  some  degree  of  blame,  though  generally  slight. 
An  '  error  '  is  always  a  '  mistake  ' ;  a  '  mistake '  is  not  always 
an  '  error.'  A  mistake  may  attach  no  sort  of  blame  to  the 
person  who  makes  it ;  it  may  even  be  '  a  fortunate  mistake,' 

A  '  blunder '  implies  a  mistake  which  is  inconsistent  with 
the  knowledge  the  agent  possesses.  If  any  one  is  said  to 
make  a  blunder  in  spelling  or  grammar,  it  implies  that  he  is 
acquainted  with  both.  We  talk,  it  is  true,  of  '  blundering 
on  an  object  in  the  dark,'  but  this  is  rather  for  want  of  a 
more  correct  expression. 

A  '  bull '  is  in  fact  a  blunder. 

MALICE,    SPITE. 

These  words  are  often  used  indifferently,  and  both  imply 
a  desire  of  giving  pain  for  its  own  sake ;  but  there  are 
important  distinctions  between  them. 

'  Malice,'  like  its  conjugate  '  malicious,'  is  applied  not  only 
to  individual  acts,  but  to  the  whole  character  and  disposi- 
tion ;  '  spite '   and  '  spiteful,'   only  to  individual  manifesta- 

*  The  verbs  anii  nouns  correspond  exactly. 


168  A    COLLECTION    OF 

tions.  For  when  a  person  is  described  as  '  spiteful,'  it  is 
always  with  reference  to  some  particular  speech  or  action. 
'  Malice,'  as  its  root  {malum)  would  seem  to  imply,  is  often 
used  to  describe  an  utterly  unprovoked  and  spontaneous 
desire  of  giving  pain :  in  French,  it  is  used  to  express  a 
mere  love  of  teasing  for  fun's  sake  ;  in  English,  it  describes 
that  ill-will  which  often  springs  originally  from  that  prin- 
ciple when  perverted  and  exaggerated. 

*  Spite  '  which  immediately  is  derived  from  despite  (depit), 
seems  traceable  to  the  Latin  root  despuo,  to  spit  out,  as  if 
something  loathsome  and  offensive.  It  has  still  preserved 
so  much  of  its  etymology,  as  to  imply  ill-will  resulting  from 
some  feeling  of  pique,  anger,  or  opposition ;  and  it  general- 
ly indicates  a  low  and  petty  manifestation  of  the  feeling. 
A  cruel  boy  will  torment  a  younger  child  or  an  animal  from 
'  malice ;  '  a  successful  candidate  is  slandered  by  his  rivals 
from  '  spite.' 


f. 


OCCUPATION,    BUSINESS,    AVOCATION. 

The  word  '  occupation '  is  applied  to  whatever  employs 
us  either  at  the  moment  or  habitually.  '  Business '  must 
always  be  a  necessary,  or,  at  least,  an  important  and  pressing 
occupation  —  something  connected  with  our  profession  or 
other  duties  in  life ;  while  '  occupation  '  may  describe  a 
merely  amusing  or  ornamental  pursuit.  Painting  affords  an 
agreeable  occupation  to  an  amateur ;  to  a  professional  artist 
it  is  a  business. 

An  '  avocation,'  strictly  speaking,  is,  as  its  root  (a-voco) 
indicates,  that  which  calls  us  off,  hinders  us,  from  other 
employments.  It  can,  therefore,  be  only  correctly  used 
relatively  to  other  things. 

NOVEL,    ROMANCE. 

Both  these  words  have  widely  diverged  from  their  etymol- 


ENGI,ISH    SYNONYMS.  169 

ogy.  Originally  a  novel  meant  merely  a  new  tale,^'  Now 
(as  the  common  term,  '  a  new  novel,'  may  show)  the  idea  of 
newness  is  nowise  connected  with  it.  To  define  a  '  novel '  is 
no  very  easy  task  ;  but  it  generally  seeems  to  convey  the  idea 
of  something  longer  and  more  elaborate  than  a  mere  '  tale  ; ' 
and  the  complement  of  three  volumes  appears  even  more 
closely  connected  with  it  than  the  magic  '  five  acts  '  with  a 
tragedy. 

A  romance  originally  meant  something  written  in  the 
Romance  language,  the  old  langue  d'oc  of  the  south  of 
France,  which  was  the  vehicle  of  the  earliest  poetry  of  the 
middle  ages.  Hence  it  has  now  come  to  signify  a  tale  of 
a  wild,  high-flown,  adventurous,  and  poetical  cast  —  some- 
thing very  far  removed  from  ordinary  life. 

The  French  have  also  preserved  the  word  '  romance,'  but 
use  it  to  describe  a  very  different  style  of  composition  — 
the  lyrical  ballad.  '  Roman  '  seems  to  apply  equally  to  the 
'  novel '  and  the  '  romance.' 

POVERTY,    INDIGENCE,    PAUPERISM. 

'  Poverty '  simply  implies  a  difficulty  in  supporting  oneself 
in  one's  own  station  ;  it  is  therefore  relative  ;  what  is  pov- 
erty to  a  gentleman  would  be  affluence  to  a  laborer. 

'  Indigence '  implies  extreme  distress,  and  almost  destitu- 
tion. 

'  Pauperism '  signifies  being  maintained  in  idleness  by  pub- 
lic charity ;  it  is  therefore  the  most  hopelessly  degrading 
state  of  all.  A  poor  man,  even  an  indigent  man,  may  retain 
his  independence  of  character  and  self-respect :  but  a  pauper 
is  degraded  in  his  own  eyes  and  those  of  all  others.     En- 


*  In  old  English,  a  •  novelist '  signified  a  propounder  of  new  opinion* 
in  science  or  politics. 
15 


170  A    COLLECTION    OF 

couraged,  nay  urged  on,  to  a  life  of  indolent  inactio:., 
and  owing  his  wretched  subsistence  to  that /orcecZ  charity 
which,  reversing  the  description  of  '  the  quality  of  mercy,'' 
which  '  is  not  strained  '  —  may  be  said  truly,  to  be  '  doutiy 
cursed  —  cursing  him  that  gives  and  him  that  takes  '  —  hia 
existence  cannot  but  be  miserable  and  degraded. 

V 

*  MATTER,    SUBJECT. 

The  '  matter'  of  a  discourse,  book,  &c.,  is  from  within  ;  the 
♦  subject '  from  without.  The  '  matter  '  comprises  the  argu- 
ments used  and  the  substance  of  what  is  said — all,  in  short, 
except  what  concerns  the  style  of  writing  or  speaking. 

The  ♦  subject,'  on  the  other  hand,  is  the  theme  of  the  dis- 
course, that  about  which  the  arguments  are  brought  forward. 

Two  persons  taking  different  sides  in  a  debate  must  treat 
of  the  same  subject  :  but  the  matter  of  their  discourse  must 
be  different. 

We  might  say  :  '  The  subject  of  discussion  was  very  in- 
teresting :  in  Mr.  A.'s  speech  the  matter  was  good,  though 
ill-expressed ;  Mr.  B.'s  style  was  better,  but  his  matter  in- 
ferior.' 

LAKGUAGE,    "WORDS,    TERMS,    EXPRESSIONS. 

In  classing  these  substantives  together,  we  do  not,  of 
course,  allude  to  their  separate  and  independent  meanings, 
but  merely  to  the  sense  in  which  they  are  used  to  describe 
the  matter  and  manner  of  a  discourse.  '  Words  '  are  used  to 
designate  the  simple  meaning  and  sense  of  what  is  said, 
without  any  allusion  to  its  manner,  style,  or  grammatical 
accuracy.  '  Language,'  on  the  other  hand,  is  generally  used 
to  describe  these  latter  characteristics.  If  we  praise  any  one 
for  using  '  good  language,'  we  are  understood  to  praise  hia 
correctness  of  style  and  manner,  not  his  matter ;  but  if  we 


ENQT^ISH    SYNONYMS,  171 

say,  '  These  are  good  words,'  this  though  not  a  usual  ex- 
pression, would  be  understood  to  refer  to  the  meaning  of 
what  was  said.  The  phrase  '  bitter  words,'  would  be  used 
to  describe  the  words  whose  meaning  was  bitter. 

'  Terms '  are  generally  used  to  describe  or  define  some- 
thing else :  and  one  term  may  be  composed  of  several 
words. 

'  Expressions  *  resemble  '  language,'  but  apply  more  to 
individual  words  or  phrases,  and  less  to  the  general  tenor  of 
a  discourse. 

'  Words,'  '  terms,'  and  '  language  '  may  sometimes  be  used 
indifferently  —  as  when  we  speak  of  '  delivering  an  opinion 
in  plain  terms,  words,  or  language  ; '  in  such  a  phrase  as  this, 
'  expressions '  would  be  inadmissible. 

SUGGESTION,    HINT. 

A  '  suggestion  '  is  generally  supposed  to  furnish  us  with 
some  practical  assistance  or  directions ;  a  '  hint'  implies 
something  slighter  and  more  covert,  and  may  be  merely 
negative  in  its  tendency. 

We  may  throw  out  a  '  hint '  against  some  one's  character 
—  we  dissuade  another  from  taking  certain  steps  by  a  timely 
'  hint :  '  in  neither  of  these  cases  could  we  be  said  to  give  a 
'  suggestion.' 

We  might  say  — '  He  gave  me  a  hint  of  the  danger  to 
which  I  was  exposed  ;  and  afterwards  supplied  me  with 
suggestions  as  to  the  best  means  of  avoiding  it.' 

MOMENT,    INSTANT. 

These  words  are  most  commonly  synonymous ;  where 
they  differ,  '  instant '  seems  to  imply  something  even  more 
speedy  than  '  moment.'  '  This  instant,'  conveys  the  idea  of 
p-^ater  rapidity   than   '  this  moment.'      Another   difference 


172  A.    COLLECTION    OF    ENGLISH    SYNONYMS. 

may  be  mentioned;  the  expression,  'a  few  moments'  — 
*  two  or  three  moments  *  —  is  not  uncommon  :  '  a  few  in- 
stants '  is  never  used.  In  this,  our  habit  of  speaking  pre* 
sents  a  striking  contrast  to  the  French,  with  whom  '  quelques 
instants  '  is  such  a  favorite  expression. 


INDEX. 


Abandon 

Abdicate 

Abhorrence 

Abjure 

Abilities  . 

Absurd 

Accordingly 

Account 

Acknowledge 

Admittance 

Admission 

Admirable 

Adversary 

Affection 

Affliction 

Agreeable 

Alleviate 

Alarm 

Almost 

Also 

Allow 

Allegiance 

Announce 

Animation 

Answer 

Antagonist 

Antipathy    . 

Approval         > 

Approbation    j 

Apprehension 

Arrogance 

As    °.         . 

Ask 

Attract 

Attachment 

Austerity     . 

Authentic 

Aversion 


Paob 

.       45 

Avow 

45 

Amicable 

.     112 

Apt 

49 

Amid 

.     136 

Amidst 

64 

Among 

.       28 

Amongst 

122 

Admire  . 

.       35 

Amaze 

119 

Astonish 
Alone 

.       63 

Absent 

113 

Abstracted 

.     145 

Although 

100 

Accurate 

.       82 

Address  . 

48 

Amusement 

.     102 

Aid 

23 

Assistance 

26 

Act 

35 

Action 

.     128 

Avocation 

48 

Anger 

.     148 

Avoid     . 

116 

.     113 

Barbarous 

112 

Bash  fulness 

.      99 

Bear    . 

Because  . 

102 

Beg 

.     108 

Beseech 

29 

Besides    . 

.      40 

Believe 

37 

Belief     . 

.     145 

Beautiful 

135 

Bright 

.       75 

Brilliant 

112 

Bravery 

\- 


Pasi 

35 
92 
93 


31 

50 
53 
33 

91 

32 

93 

158 

157 

159 

159 

168 
97.  160 
52 

80 
99 
41 
29 

40 

26 

43 

130 

61 

70 

138 


[173] 


174 


IKDEX. 


But 

Sy  •• 

Betwixt 
Between 
Be       . 

Benevolent 

Beneficent 

Bountiful 

Benignant 

Blameless 

Brotherly 

Brevity    . 

Blunder 

Business 

Calm  . 

Calculated 

Captivate 

Capacity 

Calamity 

Capricious 

Catalogue 

Cause 

Candid 

Charm     . 

Changeable 

Certainty 

Censure 

Civil 

Comfort 

Command 

Compassion 

Completely 

Compulsion 

Coercion 

Constraint 

Conaiat 

Combat 

Contest 

Contention 

Consolation 

Conception 

Concealed     . 

Conquer 

Conjecture    . 

Consequences 


Page 

25,34 
24 

.       31 

51 


90 
.       86 

92 

.     166 

167 

.     168 

82 

.       93 

37 

.     136 

149 

.       84 

165 

.     141 

68 

.       37 

84 

.     130 

114 

.       58 

117,  140 

.     116 

132 

.       23 

119 


111 

140 

124 

75 

39 

43 

110 


Consequently 

Conviction 

Continual 

Continuous 

Contentment 

Contemn 

Confess    . 

Cost     . 

Courage 

Courteous 

Cowardly 

Covert 

Cruel 

Curious 

Comprehend 

Commend 

Criminal 

Charitable 

Celebrated 

Cunning 

Crafty 

Custom 

Chastisement 

Cleverness 

Conciseness  • 

Confidence 

Despise 

Disdain 

Direct     . 

Delude 

Desert     . 

Distinguish 

Discriminate 

Declare  . 

Delighted     , 

Dull 

Dastardly     . 

Dissimilar 

DiflFerent 

Distinct 

Durable 

Delightful 

Delicious 

Deep   . 

Diligence 


INDEX. 

Page 

Displeasure 

. 

97 

Extol 

Diffidence 

.       99 

Eulogize 

Distress 

. 

100 

Exist    . 

Dread 

.     102 

Endue 

Dislike 

l 

112 

Endow 

Detestation 

Expressions 

Deference 

.     117 

Elude 

Delusion 

. 

118 

Employ  . 

Deceit 

i 

.     118 

Exact  . 

Deception 

c    • 

Emolument 

Determination 

5 

121 

Entertainment 

Decision 

c 

Error 

Display  . 

.     123 

Discourse     . 

132 

Diffidence 

.     133 

Famous 

Donation 

140 

Forward 

Discipline 

.     144 

Faultless 

Disaster 

149 

For      . 

Depraved 

.       86 

Fascinate 

Deceitful 

94 

Forbid 

Diversion 

.     157 

Forsake  . 

Dexterity     . 

158 

Fine    . 

Deed 

.     159 

Foolish    . 

Despotism    . 

161 

Fruitless 

Design    . 

.     164 

Frank     . 
Fool-hardy  . 
Fleeting  . 

Enrapture 

\- 

.       37 

Forcible 

Enchant 

Fickle      . 

Entirely 

23 

Fear 

Entreat   . 

.       40 

Fright 

Endure 

41 

Fortitude 

Embarrass 

.       41 

Falsehood 

Educate 

46 

Falsity 

Expostulation 

.     114 

Fraud 

Elegant 

59 

Fancy 

Everlasting 

{■ 

.       76 

Faith  . 

Eternal 

Forgiveness 

Expense 

106 

Fortitude 

EflFects     . 

.     110 

Feelings  . 

Enemy 

113 

Fondness 

Envy 

\ 

.     149 

Fatherly 

Emulation 

Fraternal     .    . 

Earth 

154 

Friendly 

Excepting 

\- 

.       34 

Fit       .         . 

Except 

Freedom 

175 

Pa6B 

50 
51 

52 

134,  170 

52 

54 

93 

156 

157 

167 


94 
51 

86 
29 
37 
42 
45 
61 
64 
67 
68 
69 
69 
77 
84 

102 

105,  138 

118 

118 

124 

130 

131 

105 

132 

145 

92 

92 

92 

93 

162 


176 


INDEX. 


Garrulous 

(jJaliantrj     , 

Gaiety     . 

Gentlo 

Genuine 

Geniua 

Gift 

Glad 

Gratified 

Globe 

Goodness 

Grief  . 

Grand 

Glistening 

Glittering 

Graceful 

Grateful 

Guide 

Gain    . 

Good-natured 

Guilty 

Hardly 

Haughtiness 

Hatred 

Handsome 

Harangue     . 

Hence 

Heroism 

Hidden    . 

History 

Hinderance 

Honest 

However 

Humility 

Heavy 

Hint    . 

Help        . 

Idle 

Inasmuch  as 

Indignation 

Industry 

Ineffectual 

Incongruous 

Inconsistent 


Page 

77 
138 
148 
71 
75 
136 
140 

65 

154 

127 

100 

80 

70 

59 

G7 

42 

156 

yo 

86 

23 
108 
112 

61 
132 

28 
138 

75 
122 
128 

62 

25 
133 

85 
171 
159 

66 
29 
97 
96 
67 

79 


Implore  . 
Indolent 
Inform    . 
Ingenuous    . 
Inliuman 
Injunction    , 
Ingenuity 
Intrepidity  , 
Instruct  . 
In  spite  of   , 
Illusion  . 
Imagination 
Impediment 
Indeed 
Innocent 
Illustrious    , 
Import    . 
Intent 
Intention 
Indigence 
Instant 

Jealousy 

Just 

Joyful 

Kingly 
Kmd       . 

Lazy 

Lasting 

Law 

Likewise 

Liking     . 

Loveliness 

Loquacious 

Lovely 

Love 

Loyalty 

Loneliness 

Liberty 

Liberal    . 

List 

Language 

Magnificent 


80 


INDEX. 


177 


MUd 

Meek 

Mislead  . 

Mitigate 

Meed 

Melancholy 

Modesty 

Misfortune 

Merely    . 

Munificent 

Motherly 

Maternal 

Meaning 

Mistake  . 

Malice 

Matter    . 

Moment 

Notwithstanding 
Nearly    . 
Nevertheless 
Narrative,  narration 
Nay     . 
Neglectful 
Negligent 
Novel 

Own    . 

Open 

Obstinate 

Ostentation 

Order 

Opponent 

Obstacle 

Oration  . 

Origin 

Observe  . 

Only    .  _ 

Occupation 

Permit    . 
Puzzle 

Perplex 
Prohibit 
Presume 
Proclaim 


Page 

71 

43 

48 

98 

100 

133 

149 

33 

88 

92 

156 
167 
167 
170 
171 

22,25 

23 

25 

122 

32 

90 

168 

35 

68 

84 

123 

116 

113 

128 

132 

141 

62 

33 

168 

35 
41 

42 

45 
48 


Polite 

Polished 

Pretty 

Pleased   . 

Permanent 

Perpetual 

Powerful 

Potent 

Pleasing 

Pleasant 

Placid 

Profound 

Patience 

Philanthrop: 

Prudence 

Pride      . 

Parade 

Persuasion 

Pardon 

Pity        . 

Parts  . 

Present   . 

Privacy 

Praise 

Promote 

Precise    . 

Profit  . 

Punishment 

Penalty 

Project 

Plan 

Paternal 

Purpose 

Poverty 

Pauperism 

Quiet 

Rash 

Resign 

Relinquish 

Relieve    . 

Renounce 

Recant 

Romantic 

Resentment 


178 


INDEX. 


Recompense 

Reward 

Regret 

Resignation     . 

Reformation 

Reform 

Rigor 

Relation 

Rule 

Regulation 

Reason 

Restraint 

Resolution   . 

Repugnance     , 

Rebuke 

Reproof 

Remonstrance 

Reprimand 

Reproach 

Request  . 

Reply 

Rejoinder 

Respect 

Results   . 

Retirement 

Remark  . 

Regal 

Rend 

Righteous 

Renowned 

Reliance 

Recreation 

Romance 

Self-conceit 
Secret 
Scarcely 
Still     . 
So  . 
Since  . 
Suffer      . 
Scorn  . 
Subdue 
Subjugate 
Supplicate 
Solicit 


Page 

.       98 

100 
.     105 

129 

.     135 

122 

.     139 

141,  147 

.     119 

121 

.     112 


114 


40 

116 

117 

110 

153 

52 

92 

56 

92 

94 

166 

157 

168 

• 

108 
75 
23 
25 
28 
29 
35,41 
38 

39 
40 


Suffer  . 

Sway 

Surmise 

Suppose 

Sincere    . 

Strange 

Surprising 

Silly 

Stupid 

Simple 

Slothful 

Sparkling 

SFiining 

Soft     . 

Sentimental 

Strong 

Savage     . 

Sublime 

Splendid 

Superb 

Stubborn 

Satisfaction 

Shyness 

Sorrow 

Sadness 

Show  . 

Security 

Safety 

Surety 

Sentiments 

Speech     . 

Sympathy 

Severity 

Sternness 

Strictness 

Statute 

Solace 

Source 

Self-love 

Selfishness 

Sense  . 

Solitude 

Seclusion 

Solely 

Simply 

Save    . 


33 
34 


INDEX. 


179 


Shun       . 
Shall   . 
Spotless 
Sinful 
Suitable 
Sly     . 
Sense 
Skill    . 
Scheme   . 
Spite   . 
Subject    . 
Suggestion 

That 

Though 

Through 

Therefore 

Then 

Thence 

Tolerate 

Think 

Teach      . 

Thankful 

Transient 

Transitory 

Timid 

Timorous 

Timidity 

Too 

Talkative 

Terror 

Tale 

Talents 

Tranquil 

Trial    . 

Tenderness 

'1  hough 

Tear 

Trifling 

Trivial 

Tyranny 

Traces 

Trust      . 


Pace 

52 

54 

80 

86 

93 

94 

156 

158 

164 

167 

170 

171 

21 

23,  32 

24 

28 

35 
43 
46 
67 

09 

71 

99 

26 

77 

102 

122 

136 

82 

144 

145 

32 

56 

91 

101 
102 
166 


Tolerance  t 

Toleration  J 

Terms 

Upright 
Understand 
Useless 
Unlike     . 
Utility  i 

Usefulness  \ 

Understanding 
Use  (to  make,  of) 
Usage 


Variable 

Vanity    . 

Vain    . 

Vanquish 

Virtue 

Voluntarily 

Vigorous 

Vestiges 

Veneration 

Valor      . 

Vivacity 

Which    . 

While 

With       . 

Willingly 

Wherefore 

Well-bred 

Weak      . 

Wisdom 

World     . 

Will    . 

Wicked  . 

Words 

Wonderful 

Weighty 

Wrath     . 

Yet 


Faoi 

166 
170 

62 
50 
67 
73 

106 

147 

54 

158 

84 

108 

67 

39 

127 

27 

77 

162 

117 

138 

148 

21 
23 
24 

27 

28 

58 

.       64 

107,  136 

.     154 

54 

86 

170 

03 

85 

16C 

25 


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Whirlwinds,  Cyclones,  and  Tornadoes.     By  William  Morris 

Davis,  Instructor  in  Harvard  College.    Illustrated. 

Practical  Boat-Sailing.  By  Douglas  Frazar.  Classic  size,  $1.00 
With  numercus  diagrams  and  illustrations. 

Mistakes   in   "Writing  English,  and  How  to  Avoid   Them. 

For  the  use  of  all  who  Teach,  Write,  or  Speak  the  language.  By 
Marshall  T.  Bigei.ow. 
Warrington's  Manual.  A  Manual  for  the  Information  of  Officers 
and  Mcmbci-s  of  Legislatures,  (Conventions,  Societies,  etc.,  in  the  jjractical 
governing  and  membership  of  all  such  bodies,  according  to  the  Parlia- 
mentary Law  and  Practice  in  the  United  States.  By  W.  S.  Robinson 
(  Warriugtoii) . 


Lee  and  Shepard's  Popular  Handbooks. 

Price,  each,  in  cloth,  50  cents,  except  when  other  price  is  given. 
Forgotten    Meanins^s;   or  an  Hour  with  a  Dictionary.     By  Alfred 
Waites,  author  of  Historical  Student's  Manual. 

Handbook  of  Elocution  Simplified.  By  Walter  K.  Fobes,  with 
an  Introduction  by  George  M.  Baker. 

Handbook  of  English  Synonyms.  "With  an  Appendix,  showing  the 
Correct  Use  of  Prepositions;  also  a  Collection  of  Foreigu  Phrases.  By 
LooMis  J.  Campbell. 

Handbook  of  Conversation.  Its  Faults  and  its  Graces.  Compiled  by 
Andrew  P.  Peabody,  D.I).,  IJ^.D.  Comprising:  (1)  Dr.  Peabodys 
Address;  (2)  Mr.  Trench's  Lecture;  (3)  Mr.  Parry  Gwynne's  "A 
Word  to  the  Wise:  or,  Hints  on  the  Current  Improprieties  of  Expression 
in  Keadiiii;  and  Writing;"  (4)  Mistalies  and  Improprieties  of  Speaking 
and  Writing  Corrected. 

Handbook  of  Punctuation  and  other  Typographical  Matters.  For 
the  Use  of  Printers,  Authors,  Teachers,  arid  Scholars.  By  Marshall  T. 
BiGELOW,  Corrector  at  the  University  Press,  Cambridge,  Mass. 

Handbook  of  Blunders.  Designed  to  prevent  1,000  common  blunders 
in  writing  and  speaking.  By  Harlan  H.  Ballard,  A.M.,  Principal  of 
Lenox  Academy,  Lenox,  Mass. 

Broken  English.  A  Frenchman's  Struggle  in  the  English  Language. 
Instructive  as  a  handbook  of  French  conversation.  By  Professor  E.  C. 
Dubois. 

Beginnings  with  the  Microscope.  A  working  handbook  containing 
simple  instructions  in  the  art  and  method  of  using  the  microscope,  and  pre- 
paring articles  for  examination.     By  Walter  P.  Manton. 

Field  Botany.  A  Handbook  for  tlic  Collector.  Containing  instructions 
for  gathering  and  preserving  Plants,  and  the  formation  of  an  Herbarium. 
Also  complete  instructions  in  Leaf  Photograjihy,  Plant  Printing,  and  the 
Skeletonizing  cf  Leaves.    By  Walter  P.  Manton. 

Taxidermy  without  a  Teacher.  Comprising  a  complete  manual  of 
instructions  for  Preparing  and  Preserving  Birds,  Animals,  and  Fishes,  with 
a  chapter  on  Hunting  and  Hygiene;  together  with  instructions  for  Preserv- 
ing Eggs,  and  Making  Skeletons,  and  a  number  of  valuable  recipes.  By 
Walter  P.  Manton. 

Insects.  How  to  Catch  and  how  to  Prepare  them  for  the  Cabinet.  A 
Manual  of  Instruction  for  the  Field-Naturalist.     By  W.  P.  Manton. 

"What  is  to  be  Done?  A  Handbook  for  the  Nursery,  with  Useful 
Hints  for  Children  and  Adults.     By  ICobert  B.  Dixon,  M.D. 

Handbook  of  Wood  Engraving.  AVith  practical  instructions  in 
the  art,  for  persons  wishing  to  learn  without  an  instructor.  By  William 
A.  Emerson.     Illustrated.     Price  $1.00. 

Five-Minute   Recitations.    Selected  and  arranged  by  Walter  K. 

FOBES. 

Five-Minute  Declamations.  Selected  and  arranged  by  Walteb 
K.  Fobes. 

Five-Minute  Readings  for  Young  Ladies.    Selected  and  adapted 

by  Walter  K.  Foees. 
Educational   Psychology.     A  Treatise  for  Parents  and  Educators. 

By  Louisa  Parsons  Hopkins. 
The  Nation  in  a  Nutshell.     A  Rapid   Outline  of  American  History. 

By  George  Makepeace  Towle. 

Sold  brj  all  booksellers.,  and  se7it  by  ynail,  postpaid,  on  receipt  of  price. 

LEE   AND   SHEPARD,   Publishers,   Boston. 


THE   FOLLOWING  BOOKS 

t«nd  to  create  a  love  for  Literature  as  a  means  of  Culture. 


underwood's 
Handbooks  of  English  Literature. 

BRITISH   AUTHORS. 

Inlended  for  High  Schools,  AcademleB,  and  Colleges,  and  as  a  Companion 
and  Guide  for  Private  Students,  and  for  General  Reading.     By  Fuancis 
.    H.  Unuekwood,  A.m.    Cloth,  $2.00  net. 

■  "I  take  great  pleasure  in  expressing  ray  hearty  approval  of  it,  both  as  re- 
spects the  plan  and  the  execution.  It  seems  to  me  to  be  admirably  adapted 
to  meet  a  felt  want  in  the  department  of  education  to  which  it  belongs,  —  a 
dei)artinent  of  the  highest  importance,  but  one  very  much  neglected  in  the 
seminaries,  and  even  in  the  higher  literary  institutions  of  our  country."  — 
Rev.  JouN  Wilson,  A.M.,  President  of  Wesleyan  Female  College,  Wil- 
mington, Del. 

"  I  am  so  well  pleased  with  it,  that  I  have  just  put  it  into  the  hands  of  a 
class  of  thirty.  I  have  examined  with  care  every  book  of  this  class,  and  am 
satisfied  that  Professor  Underwood's  surpasses  all  similar  books  in  the 
beauty,  appositeness,  and  value  of  its  selections."— Professor  A.  B.  Stark, 
Principal  of  Corona  Academy,  Lebanon,  Tenn. 


AMERICAN   AUTHORS.   /  ^  /,  '-^ ,)  ^ 

Intended  for  the  use  of  High  Schools,  Academies,  and  Colleges,  and  as  a  *?  > 
,  Companion  and  Guide  for  Private  Students  and  for  General  Readers.     By 
Francis  H.  Undekwood,  A.M.    8vo.    Cloth,  .$2.00  net. 

"  The  present  volume,  containing  nearly  six  hundred  and  fifty  pages,  opens 
with  an  historical  introduction,  which  is  followed  by  an  alphabetical  list  of 
American  writers  not  included  in  the  collection.  Then  come  carefully 
Bclected  extracts  from  over  a  hundred  and  fifty  American  authors,  with 
e"hort  biographical  and  critical  notices  prefixed  to  most  of  them. 

"  It  is  the  best  manual  of  the  kind  with  which  we  have  acquaintance  :  in- 
deed, we  do  not  know  of  any  other  which  occupies  exactly  the  same  field. 
The  examination  of  its  well-hlled  pages  will  bring  to  many  a  new  revelation 
of  the  real  richness  and  variety  of  our  young  and  vigorous  literature."  — 
Boston  Journal. 

"  I  consider  '  Underwood's  American  Authors '  the  best  book  of  the  kind. 
.  .  .  I  use  it  constantly  in  my  classes."  —  Austin  George,  Professor  of 
English  Literature,  Kalamazoo  College,  Kalamazoo,  Mich. 


Special  Rotes  for  Introduction. 


LEE  AND  SHEPARD,  Publishers,  Boston, 

21 


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